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Latin America

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Colombian, Bolivian Leaders Arrive in Cartagena

PA1502022890 Madrid EFE in Spanish 0103 GMT 15 Feb 90

[Text] Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, 14 Feb (EFE)—The presidents of Colombia and Bolivia, Virgilio Barco and Jaime Paz Zamora, respectively, arrived in this city today to attend a drug summit to be held tomorrow. There, they will meet with their counterparts, U.S. President George Bush and Peruvian President Alan Garcia.

Barco arrived in Cartagena, 800 km north of Bogota, aboard the Colombian Air Force presidential plane, and was immediately transferred by helicopter to Manzanillo Island.

Garcia will arrive in Cartagena tomorrow morning. Bush will be the last to arrive, at an unspecified time on 15 February, aboard "Air Force One," an airplane that is specially equipped to withstand a possible attack on the U.S. President.

The presidents will meet for four hours to "fine tune" and sign a three-part document that devotes special attention to "economic understanding," a ban on drugs, and "diplomatic initiatives" to get the international community involved in the fight against drug trafficking.

The "draft document" of the meeting, convoked by the Colombian Government, stipulates that the drug program should be viewed from an overall perspective, "attacking all aspects of the phenomenon: production, transportation, and consumption."

The preamble of the document states that measures that are adopted to combat drug trafficking "should be accompanied by others to reduce demand."

In the chapter on economic commitments, the U.S. Government pledges to "request that Congress authorize new funds for the drug program during fiscal years 1991-94."

These funds, the amount of which is not specified, will be used to help the "three Andean parties" signing the agreement, including Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru, "to offset the economic traumas that have occurred or that will occur as a result of the implementation of effective measures against drug trafficking."

The United States says that it is "prepared" to collaborate in a "wide range" of initiatives in the areas of development, foreign trade, and investment, to "strengthen and sustain long-term economic growth" in the Andean countries in which coca leaves and cocaine are produced.

There is also mention of developing programs to replace the coca leaf crop, particularly in Bolivia and Peru, where it is estimated that there are over 200,000 hectareas planted.

In Bolivia alone, some 60,000 peasant families grow coca leaves. The crop brings the country an estimated income of $600 million a year.

The Cartagena meeting will also serve to design financial controls on assets obtained through drug trafficking and mechanisms to confiscate and redistribute the property of drug mafias "in any of the four cooperating countries."

"The parties agree to promote formulas for exceptions to bank secrecy laws and for punishing money laundering," according to the document, which was drafted on the basis of the results of a preparatory meeting held in Bolivia in January.

There are also commitments for the Armed Forces of the four signatory countries to participate, within their respective territories, in controlling drug trafficking, which is defined as "a police problem."

The document states that "the parties agree to establish extreme controls on the manufacture of weapons and explosives" that are used by the drug traffickers and on the sale of chemicals used in the production of cocaine, which are generally exported by the United States.

The four countries that will attend the meeting, which will have a followup session within no more than six months after the summit, decided to invite the OAS, the EC, and the United Nations, as well as the countries used by drug traffickers for "transit" purposes to adhere to the agreements reached at the meeting.

Central American Peace Conference Opens 8 Feb

PY1302141090 Madrid EFE in Spanish 0348 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Text] Montevideo, 8 Feb (EFE)—An international conference for cooperation in the search for peace in Central America opened today in Uruguay with the participation of government officials and politicians from 15 countries.

The meeting "For the Right to Free Elections in Nicaragua, Self- Determination, and Peace for Central America," organized by the Latin American Human Rights Association (ALDHU), is being held in Montevideo's City Hall.

Chilean Juan de Dios Parra, ALDHU's executive secretary, told EFE that "human rights, peace, and democracy, which are the challenges of the 21st century," will be the topics discussed by the participants.

The "prospects of the Nicaraguan electoral process within the current Latin American context" and the "threats and challenges regarding the right to self-determination of the Central American peoples" will also be discussed during the conference, along with "Latin America's commitment to the peace meeting in Central America and proposals for action."

Representatives from Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Brazil, Paraguay, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Mexico, Panama, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Cuba, Guatemala, and Uruguay are taking part in the conference.

The participants met with Uruguayan President Julio Maria Sanguinetti on 7 February. Foreign Minister-designate Hector Gros Espiell, who will assume his post on 1 March, hosted a dinner for them.

Cuba

Commentary on U.S. Objectives at Drug Summit

FL1502031790 Havana Television Service in Spanish 0100 GMT 15 Feb 90

[Station commentary]

[Text] President Bush will be in Cartagena, Colombia, for only five hours on 15 February. Thus, the meeting with the presidents of Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia on drug trafficking will be of a more symbolic than practical nature. It is obvious that the primary objective of the United States in this lightning meeting is to wangle letters of marque from the three major cocaine-producing countries to enable it to intervene with no strings attached.

To date, the South Americans have made great efforts to try to calm the United States' enormous interventionist fever, which is disguised as fighting drug trafficking. The Peruvian and Bolivian peasants have been waging intense battles to defend their croplands against the threat of seeing them turned into deserts. The coca fields are fumigated with defoliants that destroy all the nearby flora and fauna, in addition to the coca plants. The U.S. decision to send warships toward the coast of Colombia generated a strong protest movement throughout the continent. A similar situation has occurred with the attempted installation of radar equipment on the Andean peaks.

Washington's second objective at this so-called drug summit is to strengthen the powerful image that President Bush's advisers have designed for him. First, he ordered the invasion of Panama, and, by means of gunboats, installed a government that would suit him. Then he carried out a piratical action against an unarmed Cuban ship in international waters. Now he is dressing up in the clothes of a hero capable of traveling to Colombia, a land of terror and violence, to solve the problem of drug trafficking with his presence alone.

Those of us who read off the teletypes every day can tell you just how far this manipulation goes. All kinds of stories have been concocted: that the Medellin Cartel has surface-to-air missiles capable of shooting down the presidential airplane, that terrorist commandos will attack the U.S. delegation—in short, all kinds of stories. According to the script of the spectacle, two major television channels have not been able to hire personnel who could handle this extremely dangerous coverage. However, against all pleas and advice, Bush will go to the meeting in Cartagena.

In the city, of course, an unprecendented security deployment is awaiting him so that he will abide by a schedule that remains a state secret. At a time when the drug mafia is trying to reach a pact with the Colombian Government, an attack on Bush is tactically improbable, besides being technically unfeasible. The thing is that the Americans have a real culture of spectacles, which can cover up their real strategic interests.

Commentary Assesses Baker's Visit to Moscow

PA1402150790 Havana International Service in Spanish 0000 GMT 14 Feb 90

[Commentary by Roberto Morejon]

[Text] The United States has maintained a hostile policy toward Cuba during the last 30 years. Verbal attacks and various provocations have worsened, at times, during those 30 years.

Cuba has always advocated its right to acquire defensive weapons since it is a sovereign state threatened by the White House's policy of interference.

A few days ago, the U.S. Government again questioned Cuba's right to defend itself. In Moscow, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker expressed his alleged concern about the delivery of Soviet MIG-29 planes to Cuba. According to Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's statements to the press, his country has ruled out all possibilities of discussing the delivery of weapons to Cuba with the United States. In Moscow, Shevardnadze stressed: The shipment of those weapons is not at all special. It is our duty to send them, and that duty is backed by the law.

The firm Soviet attitude is linked to a reality that Washington intends to ignore: Cuba does not represent any danger to its neighbors. The same, however, cannot be said about the United States, whose warships threaten Caribbean waters, while thousands of soldiers invade sovereign nations such as Panama.

The alleged concern expressed by James Baker in Moscow seeks to create artificial defamations. It is no coincidence that these defamations are created on the eve of a presidential Soviet-U.S. summit.

Last December and a few days before the scheduled summit between Presidents Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush, the White House strategists disseminated the first chapter of the propaganda maneuver regarding the hypothetical acquisition of MiG-29 planes by Cuba. By the way, those planes are merely interceptors used for antiaircraft defense. [as heard]

With Baker's recent trip to Moscow, the scandal of the defensive weapons was revived. This is a sign that Washington refuses to consider the traditional and stable military relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union, which are not subject to circumstantial issues, as normal.

Before Baker's visit to Moscow, the Pentagon started to talk to the press about the MiG-29 issue with the clear objective of exercising pressure on the Soviet Union before the talks in Moscow were held.

Shevardnadze's public statements, however, indicate that the Soviet Union rejected the blackmail. For its part, Cuba reasserted its right to receive defensive weapons and to distribute them among its 10 million inhabitants, who are the only ones responsible for guaranteeing Cuba's sovereignty.

Panel Discusses Hermann Incident With Alarcon

FL1502034490 Havana Tele Rebelde Network in Spanish 0200 GMT 13 Feb 90

[From the "Agenda Abierta" program discussing the Hermann incident, hosted by Antonio Resillez with guests Ramon Sanchez Parodi, vice minister of foreign relations; Ambassador Rolando Lopez del Amo, director of international organizations in the Ministry of Foreign Relations; Ana Leonor Diaz of PRENSA LATINA; and Carlos Iglesias of Cuban television; and including a telephone interview from New York with Ricardo Alarcon, ambassador to the United Nations; in Havana—live]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Resillez] Ambassador, we would like to hear your evaluation, directly from New York, about the most recent events following the meeting of the UN Security Council, and any other information you think may be of interest to our people.

[Alarcon] Well, as our people know and as you know the council met on Friday. We spoke first at the meeting to clarify all the [words indistinct] the Hermann, about this incident. We also pointed out everything that constituted a violation of international norms. The U.S. representative responded or I should say tried to respond. The only arguments they presented were the foundations of their position: 1) They said that this was a normal activity in connection with the fight against drug trafficking; 2) that they had authorization from the Panamanian Government; and 3) they only cited one part of an article of a convention that has not yet taken effect: the convention on suppressing drug trafficking. [Word indistinct] try to justify their position.

I think that we refuted all those arguments adequately. In the first place, I do not think it is necessary to say much to show the flimsiness of the so-called Panamanian authorization. Besides, there was no authorization, nor could there be, because Panama cannot authorize anyone to commit an illegal act. [Words indistinct] agreement to authorize a crime [words indistinct] criminal nature of this action.

As for the convention on suppressing drug trafficking that does not yet exist, we proved that several other paragraphs of that same article, of that same convention, make it obligatory that any action against any ship on the high seas must be carried out according to certain norms, which were all violated by the United States in this case. As for these being normal activities, they obviously are not, and it cannot be accepted by anyone that a country take upon itself the right to exercise its jurisdiction on the high seas. When we responded the second time, I think it was obvious that he had nothing more to add, and the debate was suspended at that point.

It must be stressed that the matter is still under the consideration of the Security Council. It is up to us, in consultation with other countries, to consider what steps we should take next. Naturally, it must be taken into account that this is an organization in which the Americans themselves have veto power. That is, any decision that is adopted would have to have their approval, or at least not be opposed by them. In this case, they have insisted since the beginning—and they repeated it on Friday—that this is a matter that should not even have been discussed by the Security Council. So, I would say that we should take all these factors into account.

What we have accomplished with this discussion is that we were able to present to public view, in a forum where representatives of all the countries in the world are present—in a forum that is very attractive, shall we say, to international opinion—our position. I repeat, we criticized the events just as they occurred, and presented our arguments. We were able to prove, shall we say, the illegality of the American action. Moreover, it seems to me that the Americans will have to think twice before undertaking another action like this now, because they know that the subject is on the council's agenda. They know that the discussion has not ended, and that therefore they could be put in an even more embarassing, more difficult position if actions of this type were to occur in the immediate future.

Moreover, I think this has served as a warning for many countries. It has emphasized, before international opinion, the seriousness of this behavior by the Americans. One has to look at it in the context of a sequence of events: first, the invasion of Panama; then, the sending of its fleet into Colombian waters; then, the deployment of its Navy in the Caribbean area. This is the context of the attack on the Hermann. So, it is a process of escalation, of greater aggression, of greater U.S. provocation in the area. But at least all this could be aired, could be presented openly to all the organization's member states, as well as to international public opinion. That is how I would evaluate the situation with respect to this matter at this time.

[Resillez] Wonderful, Ambassador Alarcon. What time is it now in New York?

[Alarcon] In New York, it is now about 2140.

[Resillez] It is more or less the same time here.

[Alarcon] Yes.

[Resillez] Wonderful. So, Ambassador, could we infer that the subject has not yet been closed in the Security Council?

[Alarcon] We could say the subject is open.

[Resillez] Open.

[Alarcon] This also offers us a point in our favor that they must evaluate. That is, any other provocation, any other attempt against one of our ships in the high seas would occur when the council can still meet again at any time to examine it. I should also tell you that up until half an hour ago, I was at the United Nations, because we spent today in very intense consultations concerning another issue that will be examined in the next few days by the Security Council. This concerns the situation in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel. So, you must also keep in mind the great mobility of this organization's activities. However, our subject, the denunciation of the attack on the Hermann, is on the agenda. The meeting ended with the president's announcement that there were no more speakers registered to speak and that the next meeting on this topic would be announced at an appropriate time. So it is not closed, not at all, and can be reopened again, so to speak. We can continue to examine it at any time we feel is appropriate.

[Resillez] Wonderful, Ambassador. You have given us very clarifying, very opportune information. We and all our people have had the opportunity to hear it on television. We thank you for responding to our invitation to participate in our live program, "Agenda Abierta," and we hope you will continue with your successes in representing our people.

[Alarcon] Thank you, Resillez, and greetings to all the comrades.

[Resillez] Thank you, and good-bye. [passage omitted]

[Lopez] In fact, as Comrade Alarcon indicated that the case has not been closed. It has hardly even been opened. The discussion was opened in the Security Council. For now, no draft resolution has been presented, and the discussion was limited to hearing the speeches of the Cuban and U.S. representatives to the council in a formal meeting. Some people may ask themselves: What is going on? Why is there no draft resolution? Why does this debate not go further?

To be able to evaluate this situation, perhaps we should keep in mind something that our commander in chief said on the day we received our heroic sailors. He said that this had been a skirmish. It was a skirmish. It was not as serious as it could have been.

Even so, the fact that the entire group of nonaligned countries and the USSR supported the discussion of the skirmish in the Security Council, was very important. That is, the idea was to sit the United States down so that it would have to listen to all of Cuba's arguments censuring the piratical attitude that they, with their ambition to be the absolute international policeman, have adopted. This fact is very important in and of itself. It is the only forum where David can make Goliath sit down and listen to him. He has to listen. After they spoke, Cuba replied with its arguments, and they were silent. They had no more arguments after Comrade Alarcon's words. It has been left at that. We have not taken any additional measures. However, it still remains as an element of warning that that is not the way to do things. Because Cuba is not defending only its rights there. You have to look at the context in which this occurred: the context of the recent invasion of Panama, in which all, absolutely all, the principles of the UN Charter were violated, destroyed. After the Panama invasion came the attempt to blockade the Republic of Colombia by air and sea, also with the excuse of drug trafficking. That is, this is the application of all the old doctrines of the big stick, of wanting to turn the entire Caribbean into an American mare nostrum, the whole manifest destiny policy.

All that is what underlies these positions, and Cuba is not defending only Cuba's rights. It is defending principles as universal and valid for all nations as the freedom of navigation, freedom of trade, and the safety of sailors on the high seas, against actions that are, I would say, state piracy. This was not even an action carried out by pirates, it was state piracy. So it is important to point this out, to state it. Fortunately, there were no serious damages in this attack, because that ship could have exploded. Here we saw some of the moments filmed by CNN, the national news channel....

[Iglesias, interrupting] No, the pictures were from the Coast Guard.

[Lopez] Yes, CNN showed them, taken by the Coast Guard. Certainly, I do not know if all U.S. Coast Guard ships carry movie cameras to film what they do, or if this was part of the whole provocation they had set up, and they took along special camera crews.

[Resillez] Yes, that caught the attention of many political observers.

[Lopez] For me that was...[rephrases] That really caught my attention; why were all those camera crews there? We saw how they fired on the stern of the ship. However, those were only a few moments, because the shots hit the prow, all over. That is, they really fired to try to stop the ship, to destroy it. This criminal action has no justification under any type of law, not even with the stale permission from Panama they presented 24 hours after they had been pursuing our ship and harassing it. [passage omitted]

[Sanchez] Really, that very fact, that very decision, first to try to get a seat on the Security Council, second to name someone like Ricardo Alarcon—who is one of the most brilliant diplomats we have, and also the most experienced in the activities of the United Nations—show that we think the United Nations is important. We do not think it is a useless instrument; it is really the most important international forum, the broadest international forum that exists right now.

What is happening? We have passed through times of hegemonies in human history. In the last 40 years, we have passed through eras of the cold war, bipolar worlds, multipolar worlds, unipolar worlds. However, we have also gone through a modern process in which the principle of the independence, the sovereignty of nations—whether they are small or tiny, whether they are more powerful or less powerful—has been reaffirmed. The colonial world has practically disintegrated; there are a few remnants that we hope will end up being eliminated. International life, the international situation, and the world in fact has a new image, a new situation, new circumstances.

(?To build) an effective and stable peace, these circumstances require the democratization of its institutions and the democratization of an institution like the United Nations. That is what we are aiming for. That is what we, the small countries, all have to work for. But we also have to show the large countries that they must behave correctly, that they must assume their responsibilities, that, as our commander in chief once said, they must cease that philosophy of plunder so that the philosophy of war will cease.

We have to struggle in international life and in fora as important as this—the United Nations—so that each country will really play the role that belongs to it, the role that belongs to it as an independent entity, independently—if you will excuse the redundancy—of its size, its military strength, its economic strength, the size of its population or its territory. That is the goal toward which we are aiming. The United Nations is not like this yet, but it is close enough, as Pablo Milanes [a Cuban singer] would say. [passage omitted]

U.S. 'Defeat' at Human Rights Meeting Noted

FL1402141090 Havana Radio Rebelde Network in Spanish 1141 GMT 14 Feb 90

["Our Opinion" commentary read by Rafael Berastegui]

[Text] The new defeat suffered by the United States and its allies at the international UN Human Rights Commission based in Geneva, Switzerland is additional proof of the Cuban revolution's international prestige. The revolution is shining especially bright this month in New York with the temporary presidency of the UN Security Council.

The hostility of U.S. imperialism, which for 33 years blocked Cuba's access to the UN executive organ, was buried with a majority vote of member countries. At the end of 1989, they granted Cuba one of the 10 nonpermanent posts of the Security Council. According to the alphabetical rotation system, Cuban Foreign Vice President Ricardo Alarcon de Quesada is holding the presidency of the council during February.

In Geneva, Cuba, supported by regional groups, during the last hours defeated U.S. intentions to ask the UN secretary general to report on the human rights situation. The goal was to attempt to reestablish the anti-Cuban propaganda campaign thwarted in 1988 when an international commission, at the invitation of Cuban authorities, confirmed that in our country, rights, even those related to economic matters which are being questioned in practice in many places in the world, are guaranteed for all.

The Geneva victory could not have been more significant. It took place the day before 14 February. This day, which large commercial companies in many countries use to promote huge profits, is an occasion to honor clean, free, and unlimited love. By the way, this is an additional homage because the first socialist revolution of the Western Hemisphere is in itself a daily homage to love, human fraternity, and social justice.

Arrival of U.S. Battleship at Base Noted

FL1402131590 Havana Radio Rebelde Network in Spanish 1013 GMT 14 Feb 90

[Text] The U.S. Navy battleship Wisconsin has arrived at the Guantanamo Navy Base area. This is a provocation to our country. There are several warships in Cuba's eastern waters.

Commentary Addresses Cristiani's Visit to U.S.

PA1402172890 Havana International Service in Spanish 0000 GMT 11 Feb 90

["Our America" commentary read by Manolo Ortega]

[Text] Smartly dressed and speaking nearly perfect English, Salvadoran President Alfredo Cristiani has again visited the United States, where he tried to appear at the Congress and the United Nations as a statesman aware of his rights.

This is, however, a critical moment for the Salvadoran president, and he knows it. However, this point was also stressed by the large numbers of people who booed him in nearly every large U.S. city he visited. Although the ghosts of the assassinated Jesuits shadowed him all during his tour, the Nationalist Republican Alliance representative, just as his predecessor Jose Napoleon Duarte did, flew to the United States to try to convince the legislators, particularly the Democrats, that he intends to resume the dialogue for peace and check the Army's criminal aspirations. Waving the human rights flag has been the most important thing for Cristiani, particularly because he is aware that with this action he can continue to receive Washington's financial support for his government.

According to to some experts, Cristiani went further than his predecessor. He asked the UN secretary general to help in the resumption of talks with the guerrillas, replaced several military officers of doubtful reputation, and assured he would severely punsih eight soldiers accused of assassinating the six Jesuit priests. We must keep in mind that, prior to his trip, the Salvadoran president succeeded in curbing a coup attempt staged by Army reactionary groups. Members of the Salvadoran opposition have coincided in their view that never before had a head of state challenged the military hierarchy to such an extent, a hierarchy that opposes all negotiation with the guerrillas. The experts also said, however, that the country's internal situation has never been so serious.

The rebel offensive launched in November is a landmark, after which everything will be different in El Salvador, beginning with the government party, which was left in a very delicate situation in the eyes of influential U.S. power circles. The guerrilla drive also demonstrated that only two alternatives are left for the country. If serious peace negotiations are not initiated, the counterinsurgency policy will be aggravated. This could even give the United States a pretext to intervene directly in the country.

Although President George Bush said he would continue to aid El Salvador, a large number of legislators for a long time have been questioning what use the nearly $4 billion delivered to the Salvadoran Army in 10 years of war has been. If for the White House the alternative is to continue to give military aid to El Salvador or resign itself to an eventual victory of the rebels, for Cristiani the situation is even more difficult because, to get more money, he must ensure that human rights are respected. This is equivalent to influencing the most reactionary military officers and guaranteeing the fulfillment of the famous economic recovery plan advocated by his party. These points are nearly impossible to comply with in a country immersed in war. If the economy is weak, respect for human rights is even weaker. Anyway, the U.S. Government is planning to increase aid for the Salvadoran Government. This contributes to putting any plans to end the war far into the distance.

Nicaraguan Election Preparations Assessed

PA1402165790 Havana International Service in Spanish 0000 GMT 10 Feb 90

["Our America" commentary read by Manolo Ortega]

[Text] With a few days to go before the Nicaraguan general elections are held, several international observers, including former U.S. President James Carter and OAS Secretary General Joao Baena Soares, have expressed their satisfaction with the development of the electoral campaign.

However, the opposition continues to accuse the Sandinist National Liberation Front [FSLN] of fraud. The accusations have reached the point where the LA PRENSA newspaper—owned by the National Opposition Union [UNO] presidential candidate Violeta Barrios de Chamorro—publishes charges of alleged threats to UNO members. Former President Carter's words were clear when he stated that he had not seen any evidence of fraud. The statements by former Colombian President Adolfo Lopez Michelsen, who is another international observer, were even stronger than Carter's when he said that the Nicaraguan elections will be an example for many countries. During the entire electoral campaign, the opposition has tried to appear the victim of supposed pressure and threats. Through other means it has also tried to give the impression that the whole process is illegitimate. This process has been carried out with a great deal of effort by the Nicaraguan officials and by all the Nicaraguan people, for whom aggression as well as attempts to undermine their desire for peace have not stopped.

In this sense, it is convenient to note that only three days ago, Elliot Richardson, the UN secretary general's personal representative to the Nicaraguan elections, gave a report to Javier Perez de Cuellar, in which he expresses his concern for the opposition's efforts to delegitimize the Nicaraguan electoral process. The document exposes the opposition's almost systematic objection to all electoral activities, and insists that these political organizations have been trying to delegitimize the elections and the international observers. The UN secretary general's personal representative also stated that the counterrevolutionary groups's armed actions cause serious concern because they hinder the electoral process. The armed actions have had intimidatory effects on activists and candidates of the government party. This is the third report of Perez de Cuellar's personal representative on the Nicaraguan elections and, as in previous reports, he has positively evaluated the Nicaraguan electoral process.

Despite the evident approval of international observers, the United States continues to criticize what it has called election intimidation, supposedly dcarried out by the FSLN against the opposition. Recently, State Department spokesperson Margaret Tutweiler repeated the alleged intimidation arguments, but failed to mention OAS Secretary General Joao Baena Soares' report that stresses the normality of the Nicaraguan electoral process. The suspicious insistence with which the U.S. Administration echoes slanderous lies to discredit the Nicaraguan election appears to be similiar to the destabilizing pressure exerted against Panama for almost three years. The U.S. Government has not discarded the idea of continuing armed invasions of other countries and the search for excuses that will allow it to go in that direction. This task, however, could be very difficult, as the cleanliness of the Nicaraguan elections is increasingly more evident.

Barbados

PRC Official Pledges Additional Assistance

FL1402234890 Bridgetown CANA in English 2246 GMT 14 Feb 90

[Text] Bridgetown, Barbados, Feb. 14, CANA—China's vice foreign minister on Wednesday pledged additional assistance to Barbados' "development thrust," the Government Information Service here reported. The promise was made during talks Liu Huaqui had with Prime Minister Erskine Sandiford.

China is providing an interest-free loan to the Government of Barbados for construction of a gymnasium. The information service said Sandiford voiced concerns over recent events in China, but gave no details.

It said the Chinese official "explained the position of his government on those matters and indicated that China was pursuing a path of economic and social reform and was now experiencing stability."

China has been under heavy fire for its bloody suppression of a pro-democracy movement.

Haiti

Sylvio Claude Criticizes Electoral Law, CEP

FL1402182490 Port-au-Prince Radio Soleil Network in Creole 1000 GMT 13 Feb 90

[Passages within quotation marks recorded]

[Excerpts] The Electoral Law the Provisional/Permanent Electoral Council [CEP] devised in January was published in the papers 10 February. We already have reaction from sectors of the political class. [passage omitted] The Reverend Sylvio Claude, leader of the Haitian Christian Democratic Party [PDCH], feels this electoral law is undemocratic and unconstitutional. He cites, as an example, Article 47.

[Claude] "This law is undemocratic and unconstitutional. I will take just Article 47 to show you why it is an unconstitutional law. Article 31.1 of the Constitution says that electoral competitions should be among political parties and groups. Political parties and groups! It says nothing about independent candidates or groups that are not political groups.

"Just listen to what they say in Article 47; this was not in the draft law: To be accepted as a candidate to the presidency of the republic, one must be presented by a political party, or group of political parties, or any group holding 10 percent of the seats in the parliament.

"Any group. That little phrase is unconstitutional. It violates the Constitution. Any group that wins 10 percent of the seats for deputy has a right to run a presidential candidate. Any group—with no qualifier after it! So, it could even be a group of evildoers. As long as the group wins 10 percent of the seats in the chamber, it can run a candidate for president. It can be a macoute group or any other kind. That is what their law says.

"Now these same people keep talking about the need to limit the number of candidates. They say they would like for there to be only three or four candidates. And then they come up with this matter of independent candidates! They do not limit the electoral competitions to political parties or groups, the way the Constitution stipulates.

"Also, there is something else they have forgotten. There exists a law regarding the functioning of political parties that says for a political party to participate in elections, it must have received legal recognition."

Rev. Claude criticizes the formation of the departmental electoral bureaus [BED], which include many tht are not credible, and declares that no elections are possible under the current government and CEP.

[Claude] "Let's forget for a moment about the unconstitutionality—which is flagrant! Everyone can see it clearly. These people in the BED's are so obviously engaging in macoute business, Avril's business! The BED's are composed of macoutes. Just look at who is part of the Gonaives BED: Richard Jean Noel, former magistrate! I would like to see Jovin deny this, for he said this isn't true! Vice president: Edouard Berrouet, former magistrate and former president of Conseil National d'Action Jean-Claudiste [allegedly the vehicle for Jean-Claude Duvalier's political ideas]; Ulrick Cajuste, lawyer. Who is Cajuste? The fiance of Hilda Coq, representative of the Department of the Public Prosecutor. And [laughs] in Mirebalais, they have chosen Mompoint Ledoux, who is a friend of mine. Who is he? He has always been justice of the peace. He is the godson of Mrs. Max Adolphe [former head of the Volunteers for National Security, also known as Tontons Macoutes]. He is also a former prefect. And that is what they have done all over Haiti. So what kind of elections are they going to hold? I say that under Avril, under this CEP, no elections are possible, because these people together are running the Haitian people around. Anyone willing to participate in such an election is a crooked wheeler-dealer. Such people cannot hold elections.

"The CEP...[changes thought] First of all, certain members have admitted that yes, they do have problems. If you have problems, you should go ahead and say that the government is giving you problems, that certain members are giving you problems! What they [not further identified] want done is what is supposed to be done. You cannot just present this kind of electoral law!"

Rev. Claude also criticized the $77,000 the CEP is asking political parties to pay in fees for candidates to run in elections for president, senators, deputies, magistrates, and Administrative Councils for the Communal Section [Casec]. According to Rev. Claude, this is a way to weaken certain political parties that cannot afford the fees. Claude also spoke of manipulation in the Thomazeau area, where there was a meeting over the weekend to tell peasants not to vote. The section chief will secretly give them a ballot to cast for the person chosen.

[Claude] "Saturday they [not further identified] held a meeting in Thomazeau. The military district commander said such meetings were held throughout Haiti on the same day. The people were told they had better not vote for anyone in that election; that even if someone gives them a ballot for some other candidate, the Casec representatives and the rural police agent's assistants are going to give them, in secret, a little ballot so they can vote for the person who is already president [as heard], and for deputies and senators .

"There you have the kind of elections they want to hold in Haiti! Clearly. Avril said if he did not feed the people, if the people could not read their candidate's names, elections were not possible, that the elections would be crooked. But now they have proved the elections are going to be crooked. That is what I would like for every political leader and every voter to understand: what kind of a situation they are in, so they will say no to elections held by Avril and this Electoral Council."

The general opinion remains that there is no possibility of real elections being held under Haiti's current political situation if nothing is done by the government and the CEP to give the voters confidence. The Electoral Law published by the CEP appears to have increased political tension, with quarreling between Gen. Prosper Avril's military government and several opposition political parties since the 20 January events, during which many members of the opposition were abused, manhandled, and sent away. [passage omitted]

Released Prisoners Describe Mistreatment

FL1402180990 Port-au-Prince Radio Metropole in French 1500 GMT 13 Feb 90

[Report on news conference by four released political prisoners with unidentified reportersat the Confederation for Democratic Unity Headquarters, KID, on 13 February]

[Text] [Announcer] Three former prisoners arrested on 1 November 1989 in addition to Frantz Patrick Beauchard, all accused of plotting against national security and released on 7 February, met the press this morning, 13 February. They described their mistreatment during their arrests and detention. Marcus?

[Reporter Marcus] The former prisoners held a news conference at the KID headquarters. They gave an account of the events leading up to their arrest on 1 November 1989 and what happened from the time of their arrest until they were released on 7 February. Jean Auguste Mesyeux, Marineau Etienne, and Patrick Beauchard denounced the way the Haitian judicial apparatus functions. In a preliminary statement read at the news conference, Patrick Beauchard, K. Plim [also known as Evans Paul], and the other two prisoners said:

[Marcus switches to Creole] With the idea of putting an end to having to dress wounds and count bodies, we political prisoners who have emerged handicapped from the gristmill of the macoute government are saying to all those [not further identified] sectors: True solidarity today lies in the unity and cooperative action of all partisans of democracy gathering strength to overthrow the macoute government, which constitutes a public danger to all citizens who are aware. [switches back to French] They recalled their interrogations at the office of the chief of police under the command of a member of the Army general staff, and the damage inflicted on them.

[Begin unidentified speaker recording, in Creole] (?Etienne) lost his right eardrum. He will never hear out of that ear again. In addition, he has practically lost his right eye—even though you see it open. And he has a broken finger. Evans Paul has five broken ribs, a disabled right foot, and head and stomach problems. Patrick Beauchard has head and ear problems. Jean Auguste Mesyeux has foot and kidney problems.

Those acts provoked deaths in our families. Also, our families were intimidated, like the way they shot over the head of the 65-year-old mother of (Gethrie Figaro) of the 17 September People's Organization; the arrest and mistreatment of Bony Beauchard [Patrick Beauchard's cousin]; and the acts of destruction committed at the home of the mother of Mrs. Patrick Beauchard in the central plateau.

Immediately after her husband was arrested, Mrs. Marineau Etienne was dismissed from the Immigration Service where she had worked for the past 10 years. Attorney Jean Claude Nord, who had worked for the Statistics and Data Processing Bureau for the past nine years, was dismissed for defending us.

All these occurrences show how the government, the Duvalierist macoute system, is a power without a steering wheel or brakes, a menace hanging over the head of the Haitian people, a public danger for all honest people in Haiti! For it does not acknowledge a single one of the rights people should have. In view of the disastrous political situation, we believe all sectors that want democracy must take all necessary steps without delay and without demagogy to overthrow the macoute system and establish the methods and principles of the democratic game. [end recording]

[Marcus] We point out the former prisoners also severely criticized the conduct of the officials of the Ministry of Information and Coordination, whom they claim participated actively in their interrogations at the office of the chief of police back at the time of their arrest, last 1 November. They also criticized the conduct of certain journalists from the government press. We will come back to this news conference on Soir Actualites [1800 newscast].

[Announcer] Thank you, Marcus.

Further Report

FL1502143090 Port-au-Prince Radio Soleil Network in Creole 1000 GMT 14 Feb 90

[Report on news conference by four released political prisoners with unidentified reporters at the Confedertion for Democratic Unity Headquarters on 13 February]

[Excerpts] [First announcer] At a news conference held 13 February at the headquarters of the Confederation for Democratic Unity, Marineau Etienne, Jean Auguste Mesyeux, Evans Paul, and Frantz Patrick Beauchard asked the Haitian people to unite to put an end to the Duvalierist system.

[Second announcer] Eight days after their release, Mesyeux, Etienne, Paul, and Beauchard asked all sectors in Haiti to unite to form a single bloc to overthrow the government of General Prosper Avril. [passage omitted]

The former prisoners said their arrests came three weeks after they declared the National Assemblage was another government looking for a way to prevent the macoute government from continuing to sow terror in Haiti. These arrests came one month after all sectors of Haiti said no to Gen. Avril's policy through the 27 September strike called for by the National Assemblage. [passage omitted]

The former prisoners said that given the way a trap was set for them, in addition to the persecution that forced lawyer Joseph Maxi, head of the Haitian Human Rights League; Chavannes Jean-Baptiste, leader of the Papaye Peasants Movement [MPP]; and several members of the 17 September People's Organization to live in hiding for more than three months, they see that already the government was intending to declare martial law, which it did on 20 January. According to the former prisoners, regarding the persecution of attorney Joseph Maxi, (Agathan) Brutus, a friend of Maxi's, used to visit Maxi's home and spy on him without Maxi's realizing it, for Brutus is a detective. Brutus also set up a plot with Bismarck Jean-Pierre, a National Palace soldier, to have them arrested at Arcachon 32 on 1 November 1989, where 40 National Palace soldiers headed by Sublieutenant Delius Joseph and Adjutant Merandieu Faustin were hidden and awaiting them.

It is no secret to anyone that they were very mistreated at the moment of arrest. One of the former prisoners, Evans Paul, will give us further details.

[Begin Paul recording, in progress] ...with many heavy-caliber weapons and sticks in their hands, without asking any questions, they started beating on us and slapping us around, punching us, and kicking us. [passage omitted] They searched us and took everything off us: jewelry, money, identification, documents, and so forth. That is when they took the key to the Autonomous Organization of Haitian Workers' jeep out of Mesyeux's pocket. A few of them took some women (?home) in a jeep and then came back to continue mistreating us. Meanwhile, they tried to make people watching them think they had just discovered weapons in the vehicle.

They piled us into a pickup on top of one another. Some of them climbed up on top of us, beating us all the way from Arcachon 32 to the headquarters of the Port-au-Prince police, where approximately 50 more soldiers came out of the National Palace courtyard to reinforce the mistreatment. In front of the police headquarters they stomped us, beating us on the head, the testicles, the kidneys, the ribs, the bottoms of our feet, all over. They lit lighters and stuck them in our noses and singed the hair on our heads before dragging us and dumping us in the waiting room at the police station.

A few minutes later, they began interrogating Marineau Etienne. They stomped him brutally, humiliated him, and strung him up. Meanwhile, Delius Joseph and two other thugs were manhandling him in the office of the chief of police under orders from General Andre Jean-Pierre before the eyes of the entire police general staff and the head of the Traffic Department. [end recording]

[Second announcer] According to the former prisoners, the reason MPP leader Chavannes Jean-Baptiste was subjected to such persecution was because they found his calling card in Marineau Etienne's pocket when they searched him. [passage omitted]

Very soon, the four former political prisoners will publish a dossier on the terrible conditions of the prisoners held at the National Penitentiary, where they saw prisoners hunting rats for food.

MDN Calls for Provisional Civilian Government

FL1402182090 Port-au-Prince Radio Soleil Network in Creole 1000 GMT 13 Feb 90

[Excerpts] When Hubert de Ronceray visited New York on 10 February, the Mobilization for National Development's [MDN] permanent representatives to the United States and Canada met in a special consultative assembly and unanimously adopted an eight-point resolution ratifying the joint declaration made by civilian and political leaders Antoine Izmery, Louis Roy, Robert Leger, and Hubert de Ronceray before the U.S. Congress on 30 January 1990. They urged all MDN members both inside and outside Haiti to plan Hubert de Ronceray's return to Port-au-Prince soon. [passage omitted]

The MDN representatives in Boston, Canada, Chicago, Connecticut, Miami, New Jersey, and Washington expressed satisfaction over the positions taken by American, Latin American, and European governments condemning the de facto government of General Prosper Avril. [passage omitted] They invited all Haitian institutions including the Catholic and Protestant Churches and the nation's youth, unions, people's, political and peasants organizations to demonstrate to encourage the quick departure of the military government and to install a provisional civilian government that would be given the task of organizing elections within a maximum of six months under international supervision. They urged all MDN members inside and outside Haiti to take appropriate measures to organize the leader's stay abroad and plan his return to Haiti jointly with other leaders exiled at the same time.

This information was contained in a press release dated 10 February 1990 from the MDN's information service. [passage omitted]

Meanwhile, the Unified Party of Haitian Communists [PUCH] reports that its second in command, Max Bourjolly, expelled from Haiti last 21 January when the military government's emergency measures were in effect, was to have returned to Haiti yesterday, 12 February, aboard Air France. However, according to the PUCH, Bourjolly will return to Haiti on 19 February.

Meanwhile, we have just learned that individuals armed with heavy-caliber weapons were seen at Bourjolly's residence in Petionville last night. No one knows why they were there. [passage omitted]

COH Leader's Disappearance Blamed on Police

FL1402191590 Port-au-Prince Radio Soleil Network in Creole 1000 GMT 14 Feb 90

[Excerpt] Idli Cameau, secretary general of the Haitian Workers Committee, [COH] disappeared after the state of siege was lifted, says COH member Patrick Dacius. The government newspaper L'UNION listed Idli Cameau as one of the men the military government was seeking to kidnap. [sentence as heard] Since then, Cameau's family and the other members of the COH have not had any news of Cameau and do not know where he is. However, Dacius believes the police know something about the disappearance of the COH's secretary general.

[Begin Dacius recording] Since L'UNION announced the police were seeking Idli Cameau, neither his family nor we have seen him. It is rumored that he left. Some people say he was arrested at the border. However, what makes us think he is here in Haiti, even though we have not seen him, is that the police are seeking him, and we have been asking the police where they have put him. If he had left, he would have gotten word to his relatives that he was all right, because he gets along well with them.

During the entire state of siege, we were with him, met with him to discuss things, and so forth. However, immediately after that...[changes thought] What I am wondering is: Could it be that they captured him even before they announced that they were looking for him? They usually send press releases to the radios to say they are looking for someone. Why, this time, was it announced in the paper L'UNION that he was being sought? [passage omitted] [end recording]

Jamaica

Opposition Criticizes Dismantling of Ministry

FL1402183690 Bridgetown CANA in English 1804 GMT 14 Feb 90

[Text] Kingston, Jamaica, Feb 14, CANA—Opposition spokesman on industry and commerce, Douglas Vaz has described as "surprising and regrettable," a decision by Prime Minister Michael Manley to dismantle the Ministry of Industry and Commerce.

The official news agency, JAMPRESS, reported on Tuesday that the main subjects previously assigned to the ministry have been transferred to the Ministries of Development, Planning, and Production and Agriculture. Also, three junior ministers have been reassigned. The Ministry of Development, Planning, and Production headed by Deputy Prime Minister P.J. Patterson will now have responsibility for industrial development, but will retain its present title.

The Ministry of Agriculture will be now known as the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce. The changes came in the wake of the February 3 firing of Claude Clarke as head of the ministry.

Vaz said he found it surprising that the government which says that private sector investment and development should be the engine of growth would dismantle its most strategic ministry. He said he failed to see the logic behind the move expecially in the way the various responsibilities were farmed out.

President of the Jamaica Manufacturers Association (JMA) Anthony Barnes said that the move was surprising and would diffuse the impact that the ministry could have had on the productive process. He said that attaching industrial development with the Planning Ministry would not serve the best interest of industrialists. He also described as a "strange marriage" the placing of responsibility for commerce with the Agriculture Ministry.

Other re-assignments announced by Manley include the transfer of the Consumer Affairs Division to the Ministry of Labour, Welfare and Sport, motor vehicle policy to the Ministry of Public Utilities and Transport, public accountancy to the Ministry of Finance, and Caribbean Community trade to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade. In addition, several subjects of a legal nature have now been assigned to the Ministry of Justice.

Details of the subjects and departments which will be assigned to this ministry and the Ministry of Development, Planning, and Production and the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce are to be announced shortly, JAMPRESS said.

St. Lucia

Compton on 'Threat' to Banana Industry

Says Government Will Act

FL1402012290 Bridgetown CANA in English 2336 GMT 13 Feb 90

[Text] Castries, St. Lucia, Feb. 13, CANA—St. Lucia's Prime Minister John Compton says his government will go all out to avert a major threat to the banana industry of the English-speaking Caribbean posed by the Dominican Republic's decision to export fruit to Europe.

"This is a most serious situation, one which every St. Lucian should recognise, and one in which the government will leave no stone unturned in resolving," Compton said.

Caribbean Community (Caricom) leaders have accused the Dominican Republic of turning its back on an agreement not to ship bananas to Europe. The deal was said to have been in return for Caricom support for Santo Domingo's bid to gain access to the Lome trade and aid pact linking Europe and developing nations in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific.

In a radio and television address, Compton said that in the interest of the economic survival of the islands "this apparent violation must not be allowed to go unchallenged." He said that all Caricom states, "even those not involved in the banana exporting trade," have already demonstrated their solidarity in meeting this threat.

"They have agreed to take all necessary action on the diplomatic front to ensure that the Dominican Republic lives up to assurances solemnly given," he said. Government officials here have said joint diplomatic initiatives were currently underway involving regional governments and the Windward Islands Banana Growers Association (Winban).

Rejects Assurances

FL1402225690 Bridgetown CANA in English 2127 GMT 14 Feb 90

[Text] Castries, St. Lucia, Feb 14, CANA—St. Lucia's Prime Minister John Compton says assurances by the Dominican Republic that it no longer intends to export bananas to Europe are not sufficient to ease the fears of the English-speaking Caribbean banana producing states.

"I am like (the biblical) St. Thomas, when I see I will believe," he said. "...Let it be known that if these assurances are not adhered to, then the whole relationship between the Dominican Republic and Caricom (Caribbean Community) will be placed in doubt," he added. Compton said that the dispute with the Dominican Republic is just another example of how Latin America uses the Caribbean to serve its own interest.

He referred to their opposition to Barbados' United Nations Ambassador Dame Nita Barrow's bid for the UN presidency and what he called "the manipulation of the Organisation of American States."

"The Caribbean/Latin American relations only comes into focus when the Caribbean support is needed, and after that the whole thing is forgotten."

"This is not the only occasion when we have been used for convenience and after Latin America would treat us as appendages," he added.

Banana producers of the 13-member Caricom are to meet within the next two weeks to discuss the controversy with the Dominican Republic.

El Salvador

FMLN Says Talks 'Could Be Held' in Feb, Mar

PA1402130890 Madrid EFE in Spanish 1248 GMT 14 Feb 90

[Text] Mexico City, 13 Feb (EFE)—The Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) and representatives of President Alfredo Cristiani's government will meet in New York at an upcoming date to begin negotiations that could lead to the end of the war in El Salvador.

In a news conference in Mexico City today, FMLN Commander Ferman Cienfuegos said that "the meeting between the two sides, for which there is still no agenda, could be held in February or March, with the presence of UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar."

He added that although there is no definite agenda for the New York meeting, the demands by the Salvadoran guerrillas "have been a purge of the Armed Forces and reforms to the judicial system."

He said if negotiations are held and the war is ended, one of the objectives of the Salvadoran guerrillas is to establish "a survival economy and a democratic political system."

Cienfuegos, who is commander in chief of the People's Liberation Forces (FPL), one of the five FMLN member organizations, said the "FMLN's offensive in November opened possibilities for negotiation and democratization to end the war."

He said the changes in East Europe, the U.S. isolation of the Salvadoran Army after the assassination of five Jesuits, the bombing of civilian targets, and international pressures are factors favorable to negotiation.

Rebel Actions Cut Electricity in San Salvador

PA1402182890 Paris AFP in Spanish 1636 GMT 14 Feb 90

[Text] San Salvador, 14 Feb (AFP)—Official sources have reported that 50 percent of the Salvadoran capital was left without electricity today after the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) guerrillas sabotaged five high voltage primary lines.

The Electric Light Company of San Salvador (CAESS) said the zone affected by the sabotage is the capital's western sector, where the upper class neighborhoods are located.

FMLN sappers dynamited several sections of the five 115,000-volt lines, which supply the capital with electricity from the main hydroelectric plants.

Despite the sabotage, the supermarkets and main shopping centers continue to operate normally because they have their own emergency generators. However, traffic has been affected because the traffic lights have stopped working, causing huge traffic jams.

The Lema River Hydroelectric Executive Commission (CEL) reported that there is a 25-percent reduction of electric power at the national level.

The destruction of the electric towers forms part of the sabotage campaign that the guerrillas have been carrying out for the past weeks and that has caused heavy losses to the state and private enterprise.

In an attempt to counteract the rebel actions, the Army today began to carry out intensive patrols of the streets in the capital and the main cities in the interior, where soldiers are searching vehicles and individuals suspected of being members of urban guerrilla groups.

Guatemala

Students Clash With Police in Guatemala City

PA1402193690 Panama City ACAN in Spanish 1845 GMT 14 Feb 90

[Text] Guatemala City, 14 Feb (ACAN - EFE)—A police commander was injured and three students were arrested during a clash between students and riot police in the center of Guatemala City today.

Dozens of students of the Central Boys Institute and the Business Institute staged a peaceful march in front of Congress to protest the lack of equipment and teachers in those schools.

Riot police arrived when the high school students began to burn tires outside the Congress building.

Police sources said that when the students saw they were surrounded, they threw rocks at the police, hitting Commander Abel Montenegro in the forehead. Several windows of the building were shattered. Officer Montenegro was hospitalized at the National Police Hospital.

The sources said the security forces arrested at least three students who were responsible for the disturbances.

Guatemalan Vice President Roberto Carpio, who arrived at Congress shortly after the disturbances, accused the students of carrying out acts of vandalism.

* Congress To Raise 1990 Budget

90EM0079E Guatemala City PRENSA LIBRE in Spanish 4 Jan 90 p 4

[Text] Congress will pass new lines of credit to support the 1990 budget and also approve an increase in the budget. The adjustment is required because this year's budget was not passed, which forces the Executive Branch to operate on the 1989 Budget.

This announcement was made by Deputy Jorge Cordon Franco, chairman of the congressional Finance Committee, who said that there is actually a gap between the

3.6 billion quetzals that were budgeted for 1989 and that will be used for 1990 and spending that the government has to cover this year.

Cordon says the gap is due to variations in the rate of exchange and the fact that Congress did not pass the 1990 Budget, which amounted to 3.838 billion quetzals.

Cordon adds that Congress will therefore have to pass new lines of credit to beef up and finance the budget ceiling of 3.6 billion quetzals.

The Executive Branch will also have to review its needs, make adjustments, and establish priorities through a coordinating process so that Congress will be able to pass an increase in the budget, the chairman of the legislative Finance Committee said.

Cordon added that the budget increase proposal must be drafted by the Executive Branch, which must exercise great caution in doing so. In other words, Cordon said, it must not be excessive in its requests and funds solicited must be those strictly needed to cover and compensate for the current imbalance.

The deputy added that the Executive Branch must also be careful when it comes time to request the budget increase, ensuring that it is not exaggerated and that it is aimed at meeting the people's basic needs.

* 17 Political Parties Registered

90EM0079B Guatemala City PRENSA LIBRE in Spanish 4 Jan 90 p 2

[Text] The Civil Registry (RC) confirmed yesterday that 17 political parties have been authorized to participate in the election campaign this year and did not rule out the possibility that more groups might soon be registered as legal entities prior to the general election summons.

The new parties authorized are the United Revolutionary Front (FUR) headed by Carlos Alberto Duarte, the Popular Alliance-5, whose founder was Danilo Barillas (recently assassinated), and the soon-to-be-registered Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG), which will back the presidential candidacy of General Efrain Rios Mont.

Several Fail To Meet Requirements

The official institution also announced that several committees were practically stymied because they had failed to meet the requirements set forth by the Political Party and Election Law. Consequently, they could soon be canceled.

Among these groups are the Christian Socialist Party (PCS) headed by Mario Julio Salazar Asturias, whose deadline for presenting 4,000 signatures is 18 January, and the National Integration Party (PIN), which has until 21 January.

The RC also believes that cancellation also threatens the Nationalist Party (Panac), whose general secretary is Marta Beatriz Altolaguirre Larraondo and whose deadline is 12 April of this year, and the National Advancement (FAN) of former Mayor Federico Abundio Maldonado Gularte, which has until 5 May.

Other groups that might meet the same fate are the Popular Democratic Force (FDP) of Francisco Reyes Ixcamey, the Organized Popular Force (FPO) of Hector Ronaldo Villavicencio Calderon, and the Guatemalan Women's Party (PFG), led by Floridalma Tysbee Payeras de Munoz.

In the same situation are the National Front for Change (FNC) of Rodrigo Enrique Franco Lopez, the Democratic Revolutionary Union (URD) of Victor Humberto Gonzalez Gamarra, the National Democratic Organization (OND) of Federico Guillermo Salazar Valdez, and the Guatemalan Reform Party (PREG) of Jose Abigail Morataya Leiva.

Certain leaders are trying to revive their committees and meet the requirements, but they have very little time, the RC said. Still active are the Nationalist Unification Movement (MUN) of General Hector Mario Lopez Fuentes and Reyes Ixcamey, but little time remains for them to become legal entities, according to the official report.

Authorized Parties

The duly authorized organizations are the Revolutionary Party (PR), the Authentic National Confederation (CAN), the National Renewal Party (PNR), the National Center Union (UCN), the National Unity Front (FUN), the Democratic Institutional Party (PID), the Democratic Party of National Cooperation (PDCN), and the National Liberation Movement (MLN).

Also, the Organized Nationalist Union (UNO), the Democratic Party (PD), the People's Alliance-5 (AP-5), the Social Democratic Party (PSD), the Party of National Progress (PAN), the United Revolutionary Front (FUR), the Christian Democratic Party (DC), the Movement of Emerging Harmony (MEC), and the Solidarity Action Movement (MAS).

* Assembly Industry Exports Double in 1989

90EM0079D Guatemala City DIARIO DE CENTRO AMERICA in Spanish 26 Dec 89 p 2

[Text] By the end of this year, the assembly industry totaled $47 million in value-added earnings, announced Carlos Rafael Tercero Muxi, director of the Ministry of Economy's Sole Export Department.

The official explained that exports had totaled $42,954,400 by November of this year, a considerable increase over 1988, when the figure was $20,516,000.

The industry's growth means, he said, that this economic activity is one of the most important of Guatemala's nontraditional categories, comprising 12.2 percent of this total.

* Value of Sugar Exports To Increase

90EM0079F Guatemala City EL GRAFICO in Spanish 14 Dec 89 p 5

[Text] Guatemala's sugar exports to the international market in 1989 show a highly favorable trend for the country's economy, resulting in greater foreign exchange revenue compared with 1988, according to a recent Bank of Guatemala report.

In fact, the country's central banking institution's Bulletin No 8 contains an analysis of the development of traditional exports from January to June 1989 compared with the same period of the previous year and views prospects for the remainder of the year.

The document notes that the behavior of sugar exports during the first 6 months of this year compared with the same period of 1988 shows a favorable trend, with an increase of 1,340,600 quintals (24.3 percent), going from 5,523,900 in 1988 to 6,864,500 in 1989.

The Bank of Guatemala document explains that this situation is mainly due to the fact that the sugar quota assigned to the country by the U.S. Government rose from 963,700 quintals in 1988 to 2,002,400 in 1989 and part of 1990. It should be noted in this connection that the 1989-1990 sugar quota was set for 21 months, while that of 1988 was for 12 months.

A contributing factor was higher sales to the world market, particularly to Mexico, Ecuador, and the USSR.

The average per-quintal price also evolved favorably during the same period, going from $8.25 to $10.04. The increase in volume and average price meant that the total value of sugar exports in June 1989 will be $68.9 million, some $23.3 million (51.2 percent) higher than in 1988, when the total was $45.6 million.

The international price of this product showed a favorable trend because for the fifth consecutive year, there was a gap between world supply and demand.

In fact, according to expert estimates, world production for the 1989 season could go as high as 107 million metric tons, while it is thought that consumption will be 109 million metric tons due to the growing demand of the USSR and the People's Republic of China and weather-related problems in the United States.

In terms of prospects for 1989, it is estimated that sugar exports could amount to 9,742,900 quintals at an average price of $11.78 a quintal and a total value of $114.8 million, some 47 percent higher than the 1988 figure of $78 million.

Sugar exports during the first 6 months of 1989 represented revenue of 2,335,600 quetzals in export duties.

* Tourists Spend $150 Million in 1989

90EM0079C Guatemala City PRENSA LIBRE in Spanish 17 Dec 89 p 20

[Excerpts] Over 354,600 foreign tourists entered the country from January to October of this year, spending nearly $120 million, Roberto Gonzalez Perez, public relations official for the Guatemalan Institute of Tourism (Inguat), announced yesterday.

Gonzalez also said that some 405,000 tourists came to Guatemala last year, spending over $124 million in the various branches of commerce in the country, according to INGUAT information.

The tourist official added that projections for the end of this year are for 450,000 visitors spending some $150 million on hotels, taxis, handicrafts, restaurants, and different types of service workers.

Gonzalez emphasized that monthly statistics were as follows: January, 39,592 tourists; February, 33,595; March, 37,288; April, 30,236; May, 31,682; June, 32,118; July, 44,707; August, 45,576; September, 28,684; and October, 31,125.

Compared with last year, the absolute variation in the number of visitors is 27,384 for the same period from January to October. Gonzalez said that Inguat's activity abroad has been expanded with the contracting of agents in Europe, chiefly Switzerland, Germany, France, and Italy, where the various tourist sites in our country are being promoted. [passage omitted]

He added that concerning hotel accommodations, there are plans to increase capacity by 15 percent, meaning 1,000 more rooms for 1991.

* ORPA Comandante Discusses URNG

90EM0079A Guatemala City PRENSA LIBRE ('Domingo' Supplement) in Spanish 17 Dec 89 p 6

[Interview with Dr Hector Nuila, comandante of the Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA), in San Jose, Costa Rica; date not given]

[Text] Nearly a year after the publication of a lengthy interview with the commander in chief of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) came another opportunity to speak with one of the leaders of the armed rebel movement in Guatemala.

The circumstances surrounding the interview, of which we are now publishing a summarized version, were related to the meeting of presidents held a week ago in San Jose, Costa Rica.

An emissary arrived at the site where some 150 newsmen awaited information about the dialogue of the Central American presidents and asked for the PRENSA LIBRE correspondent. When contact was made, the following conversation ensued:

"Dr Hector Nuila sends you greetings and would like to invite you for coffee this evening."

"Dr Nuila?"

"Yes. You spoke with him a year ago when the URNG command met in this city to speak with the National Commission for Reconciliation."

"Tell him I accept and that I will be happy to have coffee with him tonight."

The envoy withdrew without further ado except to say he would be back later to take the reporter to the appointed place for the meeting.

That night, when the lights of San Jose were already burning and the streets were beginning to frame the end of another day, the middleman returned and signaled to the reporter to emerge from the protected conference site.

After a short ride, the car stopped in front of a restaurant where the final chapter of this contact in Costa Rica began. The instructions were precise: "Take a seat in the lobby. Dr Nuila will arrive shortly. Adios."

The car left and about a half hour later, the comandante of the Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA), Dr Hector Nuila, arrived.

Their conversation began.

[PRENSA LIBRE] In the view of the URNG, what is the current situation in Guatemala?

[Nuila] As part of the major deterioration in the overall situation, the counterinsurgent government of Vinicio Cerezo has led the country to a crossroads of economic decline. At the present time, given the lack of any economic plan that would provide minimum conditions for development, one sees that the crisis has reached the acute stage after 4 years of government. For example, the inflationary spiral has rendered the government incapable of offering any coherent solutions and now merely seeks other options as a result of external pressure from the IMF.

Likewise, there are other elements that drive up the cost of living, halt production, destroy incentives to produce, worsen unemployment and, in the end, generate social deterioration that is the product of the political vacuum which Christian Democrats, as the political aspect of counterinsurgency, create in every aspect of life in our country.

The political vacuum of which I speak has forced the Army to try to fill it through repression, endeavoring to contain the people's protests. This is not a new measure, but rather, a mere continuation of an attitude that is already many years old.

Far from becoming a fair and immediate way out, it has led the country to a degree of greater polarization, with the risk of subsequent confrontations of even greater magnitude. The possibility of Guatemala experiencing negative repercussions in the future is very great indeed and those solely responsible are the government and its army because they have offered no coherent way out of the crisis.

In general, this means that the counterinsurgent maneuver that brought Vinicio Cerezo to power has failed politically as well as economically and militarily inasmuch as they proposed to defeat the URNG the first 2 years. Not only did they fail to do so, but they created conditions so that we would grow stronger, gain in strength, and expand the zone of operations.

[LA PRENSA] You are speaking of the URNG's growth, but the government denies such a thing.

[Nuila] In 1989, we maintained an average of five confrontations a day with the Army and at least seven casualties each day. One can therefore say that the Guatemalan Army suffered some 2,800 casualties in direct fighting with the URNG. In addition, we damaged 35 of their helicopters, shooting down a Pilatus aircraft and three helicopters. I have to tell you that an A-37B crashed in fighting as a result of an improper maneuver as he was bombing the slopes of the Acatenango Volcano.

This is all of particular importance because one of the reasons given by our leaders for the abortive coup on 9 May was the inability of top Army officials to conduct the war. For example, it was claimed that the URNG had been allowed to neutralize the action of the Air Force. As proof, I would refer you to an article that appeared in the September issue of SOLDIER OF FORTUNE containing statements by FAG [Guatemalan Air Force] pilots—who are naturally not identified—that 80 percent of all helicopters operating in combat zones are damaged.

That is why we say that the counterinsurgent regime has failed. We are active in 13 of the 22 departments, 70 percent of the national territory. It is the region where 66 percent of our nation's population lives.

[LA PRENSA] Is it not contradictory to continue a war such as the one you are in when nearly everywhere else in the world people are moving toward democracy? East Europe is an interesting example of the current trend.

[Nuila] What is happening in Europe is not the main concern of the URNG. Revolutionary war in Guatemala seeks to establish the foundations for building democracy in our country, which was cut down with the invasion of July 1954. We never think about importing models from other countries, whether or not they have yielded results. We are simply working on a national plan that will guarantee the construction of real democracy in the country.

[LA PRENSA] Within the framework of the Central American summit conference, there was talk of inviting the USSR and the United States to intervene in the search for peace in the region. It is said that since they are the presumed backers of the irregular groups operating in the region, their endeavors would have much greater success. What is the URNG's opinion on this matter?

[Nuila] We think the United States should stop backing counterinsurgent regimes such as that in Guatemala. We have little to say about the USSR because the URNG has never had enough contact with it to cause it to intervene. We have sufficient moral authority to move ahead with our ideas and plans.

If Gorbachev and Bush think they will solve the conflict, they are very mistaken. The United States could help by ceasing to aid repression, often disguised as replacements for the Army's organic weapons, helicopter spare parts, and so on.

[LA PRENSA] What position would the URNG adopt if regionalization of the conflict were achieved and it received equal treatment from the international community?

[Nuila] All of Central America is an area of conflict due to its very objective conditions. The region obviously has a fairly common history: The fact that conflicts have developed somewhat simultaneously and achieved similar results does not mean that the revolutionary forces were responsible for the regionalization. Every revolutionary group emerged in its own country for its own reasons and purposes. Each one of them sought its own growth and development and each one has written its own history.

Our attention is drawn to the fact that there is an attempt to partially regionalize the conflict. We find it interesting, for example, that Cerezo wants to be a loyal, neutral arbitrator and pacifist adviser when he is one of the ones least faithful to the Esquipulas Accords. He has tried to keep the case of Guatemala from being discussed at any of the summit conferences.

Those who want to find an overall solution to the conflict are therefore mistaken because they have excluded the case of Guatemala.

[LA PRENSA] One of the issues treated at the summit conference was the possibility of asking the United Nations to send a peacekeeping force, the "Blue Helmets," to Central America. They would control the borders so as to isolate every conflict in each individual country and promote national dialogue. What is the URNG's opinion on this?

[Nuila] In the particular case of Guatemala, such a measure would make it possible to clear up many mysteries about the fact that our supplies come from the region. The United States would see that we do not receive outside aid.

[LA PRENSA] On Monday of this week, Coyolate Bridge was destroyed. Should that be attributed to the Guatemalan guerrillas? I am asking you this question because there are signs that military activity in the southern region of the country seems to be steadily intensifying and concentrations promoted by the CUC [Committee of Peasant Unity] have been detected.

[Nuila] The URNG's responsibility is confined to military actions strictly speaking. With respect to reactions of the organized people's movement, we have to make a clear distinction because we never meddle in them, not even in terms of political influence or leadership.

The people's reactions are determined by the national crisis. The Guatemala peasant movement had actions of a different type that were finally neutralized by pacts that were never kept. At the end of last year, there were attempts to mobilize around Escuintla right at the time of the sugar cane harvest. The Army intervened and cordoned off the region to prevent newsmen from coming in. They brought the situation under control by means of repression and coercion.

Military operations in areas of conflict are carried out by the URNG. The taking of Rio Bravo, the sections of the Pacific highway, the 3-day seclusion in Peten, destruction of Coyolate Bridge, and the closing of the Pan American Highway are all attempts to hinder the process of repression and give the people's organization sufficient room to make itself heard and be taken into account at the bargaining table.

[LA PRENSA] We are reaching the end. What predictions would you make as to the URNG's future activity?

[Nuila] Concerning the capacity and development of the URNG, we can infer that our actions will increase as the result of national necessity. We must make the people's rights prevail in Guatemala.

Therefore, we cannot tolerate that a democracy be built by virtue of the kindness of the enemies of the people. The current intensity of our operations is solely the result of existing conditions.

Nicaragua

Ortega Warns of Plans To Disrupt Elections

PA1402171390 Managua Domestic Service in Spanish 1200 GMT 14 Feb 90

[Text] There are now two plans to attack the Nicaraguan electoral process. The first consists of ambushes, kidnappings, and intimidation of peasants so they do not vote for the Sandinist National Liberation Front [FSLN], Daniel Ortega, the president of peace, said on 13 February. The second plan consists of conducting a campaign to confuse and ignore the democratic development of the Nicaraguan electoral process, in order to talk about fraud after 25 February, Ortega said after meeting with Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo at the Cesar Augusto Silva Convention Center.

Daniel Ortega, the president of peace and reconciliation, called on politicians participating in the electoral process not to play into the hands of pro-imperialist plans, which go against the democratic development of the elections. I hope this electoral process concludes without violence, and that those planning sabotage desist, Ortega stressed.

Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo yesterday insisted that the contras must release the thousands of Nicaraguans being held in camps in Honduras. The prelate commented on the suffering of the kidnapped Nicaraguans, after meeting with President Ortega, who told him of the government decision allowing Catholic Church priests to offer services for Sandinist People's Army and Interior Ministry units, as the Episcopal Conference had requested.

U.S. Holds 'Intransigent Stance' on Elections

PA1402170290 Managua BARRICADA in Spanish 10 Feb 90 p 2

[Article by Ignacio Gonzalez Janzen: "American Night]

[Text] The countdown is about to end: 25 February is drawing closer and everything is set for the elections. The open door process has been monitored by different international missions, whose reports dispel any doubts regarding the seriousness of the preparations to have free and just elections. The third ONUVEN [UN Observer Mission for the Verification of Elections in Nicaragua] report represents unmistakable proof of this.

However, the U.S. Government is still insisting, with a few days to go before the elections, in adopting an attitude that combines meddling with disputing the results beforehand. No substantial changes or eloquent signals have sufficed to produce a reconsideration of its position , a reconsideration in line with the transparency of the electoral process. On the contrary, spokesmen and champions of the Bush administration insist on making monotonous comments.

Even the well-balanced questions by influential U.S. newspapers like THE WASHINGTON POST, THE NEW YORK TIMES, THE MIAMI HERALD, THE BOSTON GLOBE, or THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER as to what the White House will do in the face of a legitimate victory by the Sandinists go unanswered.

There was not even a convincing reaction when THE WASHINGTON POST said the U.S. Government "could be deliberately exaggerating its charges with the intention of misleading international public opinion."

Margaret Tutweiler, U.S. Department of State spokeswoman, replied that her government's intention "is not to deny the legitimacy of the elections but to make them more honest, open, and legitimate." Meanwhile on the same day, that gray eminence, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, said that "almost none of the preconditions for having honest elections have been met in Nicaragua." Bird of ill omen Kirkpatrick not only wants to discredit the electoral process but to cast doubt on the observers' work. "We should not be surprised," she predicted, "that a government prepared to manipulate the elections may also want to manipulate the observers."

U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, in a reply to a question by U.S. Senator Christopher Dodd before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said a possible improvement in relations with the U.S. Government depends on if the United States determines (that was the word used) that the elections were "free and just," among other demands.

It is obvious that the UNO [National Oppositon Union] syndrome is worrying U.S. political circles, which are confirming the genetic limitations of its offspring. However, the Bush administration is clinging to its intransigent stance of refusing to accept even the possibility of a Sandinist victory, and is insisting on the lie that it is either the "victory of the opposition or an electoral fraud."

Here we have again "an American night." This is an old trick employed by filmakers to shoot a night scene in the daytime. The U.S. film industry developed this trick—hence the name—to alter reality, to arbitrarily recreate it.

At any rate, the problem is that the situation is nothing new. Nicaragua has been suffering from a long "American night" for a decade and has had to pay a very high price to live under a full sun, without filters.

In view of the prolonged aggression against Nicaragua, and on the eve of the elections, it is worth remembering what Abraham Lincoln said when asked what he thought of the U.S. war against Mexico and the annexation of Texas in 1848. He replied: It was a historic aberration, a crime against humanity.

U.S. Official 'Continues To Contact' UNO

PA1402154890 Managua BARRICADA in Spanish 11 Feb 90 p 14

[Report by Martha M. Gonzalez]

[Text] Esteli, Nicaragua—A U.S. Embassy official continues to contact UNO [National Opposition Union] politicians in Somoto and Esteli to give them support so they may confront their imminent defeat on 25 February.

John W. Fhearburn, who sometimes identifies himself as an administrative official of the embassy and at other times says he is second secretary, met with UNO Somoto leader Salvador Hernandez on 8 February.

At the meeting, Fhearburn congratulated Hernandez for the jeep they sent him from Managua. The jeep was part of the vehicle shipment sent to our country, which was financed with U.S. funds.

To encourage Hernandez, the U.S. official told him that he was not to be frightened by the recent FSLN [Sandinist National Liberation Front] mobilization in Somoto, as it was only a regional event.

Apparently, Fhearburn is the U.S. Embassy represetative assigned to support UNO in this region. Less than a month ago, he met with UNO leaders, CONAPRO [National Council of Private Enterprise] and COSEP

[Higher Council of Private Enterprise] members, Monsignior Julio Cesar Videa, and ONUVEN [UN Observer Mission for the Verification of Elections in Nicaragua] observers.

The U.S. official was seen on 3 February at the FSLN closing campaign rally in Somoto. He also attended the Esteli rally.

According to confidential sources, the U.S. Embassy official is trying to influence the opinion of ONUVEN observers and UNO politicians so they will not accept the FSLN victory. He has stated: "I am convinced UNO is going to win these elections because it has all the media in its favor."

However, he met with members of the Regional Electoral Council, and after listening to their explanations on the development of the electoral process and the voting mechanisms to be used, the official accepted that it was difficult for fraud to occur.

The Regional Electoral Council members informed the U.S. Embassy delegate about the latest contra terrorist actions. One of these actions was to blow up four electric towers, which left San Rafael del Norte and Yali residents without electrical service.

Mr. Fhearburn said he did not know about the conflict areas or about UNO's armed contra terrorist activities.

Ortega Holds Election Rally in Matagalpa

PA1502003190 Managua Domestic Service in Spanish 1918 GMT 14 Feb 90

[Campaign rally by President Daniel Ortega in Matagalpa on 14 February—recorded; broadcast in progress]

[Text] ....join us this morning from the northern departments. There are some people from Jinotega here. Where are the people from Jinotega? [Crowd shouts: "Here!"] See? There are a lot of people from Jinotega. There are approximately 150 people from Jinotega here. Where are the residents of Matagalpa Department? [Crowd shouts: "Here!"] Where are those arms? Where are those flags? Where are those voices?

How could the GN [reference to former Somozist National Guard] - UNO [National Opposition Union] say that Matagalpa supports the GN - UNO? How can the GN - UNO say that Matagalpa will vote for the GN - UNO? [Crowd shouts: "No!"]

The GN - UNO came here a few days ago. The GN - UNO came here on Sunday, 11 February. They chose the smallest square in town for their rally. We have chosen the largest square in town to hold our rally. [Crowd chants: "Daniel! Daniel! Daniel!"] Above all, we have made a tour, a long tour, to cleanse the town, to disinfect the town, which had been infected by UNO, the GN - UNO, on Sunday. It had to be disinfected quickly. [applause]

Today, this human river flowed through town and cleansed Matagalpa. It has cleansed Matagalpa, removing every stain of Somozism, every stain of counterrevolution, every stain of treason, because the people of Matagalpa, the people of Carlos Fonseca, are people who have stood out in Nicaragua's history for their heroism, fighting spirit, courage, dignity, firmness—and they have never been cowardly people! [applause, shouts] The GN - UNO are the cowards! The people of Matagalpa are courageous! [Crowd shouts: "Yes!"] The GN - UNO are traitors! The people of Matagalpa are patriots! The GN - UNO are Somozists! The people of Matagalpa are Sandinists! [shouts, applause] What for the GN - UNO? [Crowd answers: "Death!"]

You are brave and worthy Nicaraguans, people of Matagalpa. That is the great difference. We held a massive rally in Chinandega with over 100,000 Chinandegans. They mobilized and overflowed the square. They overflowed three squares in Chinandega. Then we held another rally—another massive rally—in Jinotega. In Jinotega the people also overflowed the streets and square, and over 100,000 Jinotegans mobilized. [applause, shouts]

We held a rally in Esteli after that. In Esteli, over 100,000 Estelians mobilized. In Granada, and now here in Matagalpa, when we began going through the streets, we had no doubt that over 100,000 Matagalpans, over 100,000 sons of Sandino, would mobilize and come to the rally. [applause, shouts].

The people of Matagalpa voted a few years ago. In what year did the people of Matagalpa vote? [crowd response indistinct] On 19 July 1979, the people of Matagalpa threw Somozism out and began governing with Sandinism. [applause, shouts] Now we are in the midst of an election campaign that will end on 25 February 1990. It is a few days away. How many days away? [Crowd answers: "Eleven!"] Eleven. It is 11 days away. There are 11 days left before the election.

However, who doubts that the people of Matagalpa have already voted? For whom did they vote? [Crowd shouts: "The FSLN (Sandinist National Liberation Front)!"] Did the people of Matagalpa vote for Somozism? [Crowd shouts: "No!"] Did the people of Matagalpa vote for the counterrevolution? [Crowd shouts: "No!"] Did the people of Matagalpa vote for the GN - UNO? [Crowd shouts: "No!"] Then for whom did the people of Matagalpa vote? [crowd answer indistinct] The people of Matagalpa voted for change. They voted for the revolution. They voted for economic and social change in Nicaragua. They voted for peace.

Do we want peace, or do we want war? [Crowd shouts: "No!"] Do we want peace? [Crowd shouts: "Yes!"] The GN - UNO is war! It is death! If not, let the peasants in Waslala, the peasants in northern Nicaragua, the peasants in Matagalpa say so. Who has murdered the peasants? Who has destroyed cooperatives? Who has murdered children in the countryside? Who has ambushed the mothers? Who has destroyed transportation? Who has destroyed schools? Who has destroyed health centers? The GN - UNO! The GN - UNO! the GN - UNO! [Ortega repeats himself] Who can doubt this? The GN - UNO has meant death and betrayal. So, for whom will Matagalpa vote on the 25th? [crowd answer indistinct] Look, I think all of us here already know who Nicaragua's president-elect is. [Crowd shouts: "Daniel!"].

The people also already know who the vice president-elect of Nicaragua is and who the people are who will be elected to deputy seats in northern Nicaragua, in Matagalpa. Let us see: Doris Tijerino. Who will be voting for Doris here? [Crowd shouts: "I will!"] Carlos Zamora. Who will be voting for Zamora here? [Crowd shouts: "I will!"] Benigno Mendiola. Who will be voting for Benigno? [Crowd shouts: "I will!"] Jose Ivan Rivera. Who will be voting for Jose Ivan here? [Crowd shouts: "I will!"] Hermona Rodriguez, Jose Adam Riveras, Orlando Rizo. Who will be voting for Orlando Rizo? Gladys Fol? Who will vote for Gladys? For Dodi Rivas? Do we or do we not have female candidates? Where are the women of Matagalpa? Look at all the female candidates we have.

Rigoberto Mairena Ruiz, Francisco Javier Saenz, Leoncio Rayo, Alejandro Reyes, Chulo Blandon, Barco Largaespada, Jaime Ones Perez, Ulises Oliva, Alfonso Lopez, Francisco Gonzalez, Carolina Valle, Primitivo Zeledon, and Ricardo Ofegi. These are the people's candidates who were elected by the people this sunny morning in Matagalpa on Friendship Day. We are all in love with the dignity, the sovereignty, and the independence of the fatherland. We are all in love with Matagalpa, with Nicaragua.

Where is the mayor of Matagalpa? Margin? Here is Margin. The mayor of Jinotega is also visiting. There are approximately 100 people from Jinotega with us. Where is the mayor of Jinotega? Omero?

Here is Pablo Garcia Figueroa, chief of the Matagalpa Indians, a man with the Indian blood that gives us life, a blood all of us Nicaraguans are proud to have. Here also is the Indian queen, Maria Francisca Mendoza. [applause] They represent national pride. They represent our national traditions. They represent our national culture. They have known how to safeguard our national values, and this is why we have gathered here, filled with the pride and courage that our Indian heritage gives us. This is the heritage of all the Nicaraguans who will vote on 25 February in what box number? [Crowd shouts: "Five!"]

Well, let us have a little talk, even under this sun. Are you tired of the sun already? [Crowd shouts: "No!"] It is those of the GN - UNO who are tired of the sun. [crowd response indistinct] Later, later. Now I want to have a little chat with you. It will not speak long. You are familiar with the story, which I will not relate at length for you. I will not tell you the whole story. You know about a town that [words indistinct] [crowd shouts indistinct] Good.

Well, I met with Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo yesterday. I was accompanied by Humberto, whose is defense minister, and Tomas, who was born in Matagalpa and is minister of the interior. The three of us met with Cardinal Obando y Bravo, who was accompanied by the bishops. Cardinal Obando y Bravo did very good work here in Matagalpa. He and I were born in a little town called La Libertad, deep in the interior of Chontales. Look at this remarkable coincidence. The first cardinal in Nicaragua's history was born in the little town of La Libertad. The first Nicaraguan president, a president of the people, was also born in La Libertad. What a happy coincidence! [applause, shouts]

So we talked with Cardinal Obando y Bravo yesterday. First, however, please lower the flags and placards so the comrades in the back can see. Please, lower your flags and placards. Lower your flags and placards, please. There is another placard over here. Lower it, please. Good. Listen. I told Cardinal Obando y Bravo that the church can send priests to the barracks to offer religious assistance to the soldiers, the cubs, the Patriotic Military Service boys, and the police. Those who so desire can receive spiritual attention and attend mass. The great majority of the Nicaraguan people is Christian. Of this great majority of Christians, a considerable number are Catholics and Evangelicals. We also told Obando y Bravo and the priests that they can visit the prisons to give spiritual assistance to the prisoners. Obando y Bravo was greatly pleased with this decision, which I made after meeting with Obando y Bravo and other bishops of the Episcopal Conference a few days ago.

At the time, I told Obando y Bravo that the prison doors would be opened prior to the elections and that not a single contra or Somozist guard would remain in prison and that this would be a token of peace and generosity by the Sandinist revolution. I have kept this promise because not a single prisoner is left in prison. I also told Obando y Bravo yesterday that from Matagalpa, Nicaragua, I would demand that the Americans, the Yankees, and the contras release those who have been kidnapped, release those who have been kidnapped [repeats himself], to end the suffering of the Nicaraguan mothers whose sons have been kidnapped. This was properly pointed out by Obando y Bravo yesterday when we began our talk with the reporters.

Another point that is very important and that I want all of you to be very well aware of is the following: It is not cususa [homemade rum]. Even though Matagalpa's cususa is very good, I am not talking about cususa. If I drank cususa I would get hoarser, and I would not be able to talk to you. Cususa is not recommended when one has to do a good deal of talking.

I must explain to you that I told Cardinal Obando y Bravo the following—I will say this here even before telling the reporters. I told him: Look, a few days ago—I believe it was on 10 February in Masaya—Today is the 14th, Wednesday the 14th. Tuesday the 12th, Monday the 11th, Sunday the 10th, Saturday the ninth. [days and dates as heard] On the ninth, the GN - UNO arrived in Masaya with its traveling rally participants [portables—reference to opposition rally participants who allegedly travel from town to town to swell the crowds at opposition rallies]. They arrived in Masaya with these rally participants, who are paid with the Yankees' blood-stained money. What can it matter to us that they arrived in Masaya? The people of Masaya are not with the GN - UNO.

The GN - UNO staged its event, as usual in a small area to give the impression that a large number of people were present. They choose the smallest places, the smallest squares. They made a frenzied speech. Days before, in the GN - UNO's newspaper, which is known as LA PRENSA, they published several articles. The headline of one of those articles was "The Death of a Bureaucrat," which explained what Daniel Ortega's death would mean and how costly Daniel Ortega's death would be. In other words, these people spoke in terms that were not in any way Christian. They exhibited a great deal of hatred. They were wishing for my death.

I have often said that I will not be kept from traveling in the war zones, even if I expose myself to being killed by the contras, because the revolution in Nicaragua lives and will live as long as the Nicaraguan people live. They can murder Daniel Ortega, but the revolution will stay alive in Nicaragua. [applause, chants]

They also published another article, or rather a justification. In this justification, they praised the criminal activities of groups paid by the GN - UNO to destroy Sandinist campaign material. They published an article on this subject, to the effect that it is all right to destroy campaign material. This means that it is all right for the Sandinists to destroy all of the GN - UNO's campaign material because they say it is all right to destroy it. It seems that this is what they want.

This GN - UNO newspaper later published statements by this lady who they have made their presidential candidate and also by a gentleman who is their vice presidential candidate, in which they say that if they win the elections on 25 February, they will send us the complete bill [cuenta completa]. [shouts]

They said in the newspaper that they will take the peasants' lands away, that they will dislodge the CDI's [Industrial Development Centers] to return the homes to the Somozists, that they will take all of us out of our homes. [shouts] I told the cardinal about this the way I am telling you. I said to the cardinal: Look, I have been tempted to say this: If this is how the election campaign is going to be, if you all say this is what you will do if you win, what else is left to be said? If you all say that if you win you will send us the complete bill, I can say that if we win we will send you a complete bill. [crowd shouts] We will send a complete, complete bill.

Let them go without a newspaper, that will be complete. Let them go without a press, that will be complete. [crowd shouts] We will turn the lady's home into a CDI. That is a complete bill. We will turn the vice presidential candidate's home into a CDI; that is complete. We will turn the homes of the GN - UNO members into CDI's; that is complete. Into schools; that is complete. If this is what they want, they need not string us along! They need not string us along! They need not string us along! They need not string us along! They need not string us along! They need not string us along! [applause, cheers]

Yes, because they are talking in such a way that we have to answer them as I am now doing. I challenge them from Matagalpa to state—seriously and officially before the international observers, before the international media, officially, this week, during a news conference—that they are prepared to settle accounts with us. Then I will immediately and officially say that we will also settle accounts with them. [shouts, applause] I understand that when they say this during a demonstration it means that they are officially saying it, but I will still give them the opportunity to state it officially. I will pretend that they have said this simply guided by their radical position, because they are radicals, extremists, and lunatics.

Therefore, I will give them the benefit of the doubt, but they have to clarify this. They have to clarify this. [repeats himself] They must clearly state what they mean. If they officially tell me that they are prepared to do that, if that is the name of the game, Messrs observers, then let us put our cards on the table. We are talking about fully settling an account here, and we will fully settle the account the day after the elections. [applause, shouts]

We did not start this. I was not the one who started it. Quite the contrary, I opened the prisons' doors, released the guards, released the contras. They, in turn, became bold and began to act like buffoons, because that is what they are. They are buffoons and, as buffoons, they are crybabies. [applause, shouts]

Therefore, I publicly challenge them before the international observers, the international media, to clearly state in the next few days if it is true that they are going to fully settle the account with us or not. If that is the case, I bet you that we are going to fully settle the account on 25 February! [applause, crowd chants: "Five! Five! Five!"]

I went to see the cardinal and he told me: Look, you have to rise above all this. He added: Do you know what I would tell them? I would tell them that I will not seek an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. I told the cardinal: I agree with you, but I have to publicly state this. Before saying that I will not seek an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, I want them to clearly tell me what their position is. They must clearly state their position. [applause, shouts]

We have never said that we will fully settle the account with them. We have not said that. They are saying crazy things. Thus, they have to clearly state this, because they have said it in the GN - UNO newspaper, LA PRENSA. It has been stated by this woman and it has been stated by that man, the one who is running for vice president. Consequently, even if they have already lost the elections—because they lost them on 19 July 1979—we cannot let them go around talking like this.

If I talked like this, I can imagine the scandal that it would provoke. Today I am doing it in the most formal and official way. Let them clearly state if on 25 February, on election day, what is at stake is that on 26 February the one who wins will fully settle the account with the other. Let them clearly state this. Let them clearly state this. [repeats himself]

It will be up to them to decide whether they want the two of us to bill each other in full. I will be greatly pleased to do so. [applause, cheers] It is important for the producers of Matagalpa and Nicaragua to take into consideration the radical speeches that the GN - UNO has been delivering that are not conducive to stability in Nicaragua. How can there be stability with an organization of mercenaries who are speaking of billing their opponent in full during the elections? This is incredible. So we will have to determine who is extremist. The Somozists and the contras, those who style themselves conservatives and communists [as heard], are embedded in the GN - UNO. The organization is full of them. They are the same scoundrels delivering the extremist speeches. It is the contras and Somozism, live and in full color. This is why the people will have nothing to do with them.

I am calling on the Matagalpa producers: Let us see who you vote for. Will you vote for reconciliation and peace or war? I am sure and convinced that most Matagalpa producers have already made up their minds to vote for peace and reconciliation by marking box number...? [Crowd chants: "Five! Five! Five!"]

We have already won the elections, and at no time have I thought about billing them in full. I have not mentioned the subject. It is they who are foooling around with us, and they are doing a poor job of it. Within the next few days, they will have to establish their position. They will have to state their position very clearly in the eyes of the international reporters and observers. Otherwise, shouts, groans, and cries will come later. I say this very formally here. This is not a campaign speech but a reply to a position, a threat of war that these people have made.

I also explained to Cardinal Obando y Bravo that the contras had been infiltrating some organizations to try to hinder the electoral process but that the Army is taking measures to prevent this. I told him also about a GN - UNO plan. Because they know they have lost the elections, they are planning to report fraud and to insist that the elections be annulled. However, they are the fraud. The Nicaraguan people will never vote for the GN - UNO.

What happened here in Matagalpa to the barracks of the Somozist guard? What happened to those garrisons? What became of those barracks? Are the Somozist guard barracks still in Matagalpa? Are the Somozist guard barracks still in Matagalpa? [repeats himself] The only way for those Somozist barracks to rise again would be through the GN - UNO. However, the Somozist guard barracks will never be erected either in Matagalpa or Nicaragua. Never again. Only the barracks of the people, who are here expressing their support for the revolution, will rise here.

All of us must vote on 25 February. We cannot stay at home. We must go at first light to be the first in line. The lines are going to be long, so we should not go to sleep the night before. We will keep watch the entire night and be the first to cast our votes. This is what we are going to do.

We will vote on the 25th. In what box are we going to mark our ballots? In box number five. That is the box. The box has a number five on top. It says FSLN in blue. Then it says FSLN on top of the red and black banner. Then there is a circle, a round marking. That is where you have to put your mark—two crossed lines, like two crossed matches. You do not have to write viva Matagalpa, or viva Guaslala, or viva Matiguas. That cannot be done because those votes will be lost, and we cannot waste votes. We cannot lose a single one.

Time flies this afternoon. I want to invite all my brothers from Matagalpa Department, all my brothers from northern Nicaragua, all my Nicaraguan brothers to vote for peace on the 25th by marking slot number... [Crowd shouts: "Five!"] Our vote for unity goes in box number... [Crowd shouts: "Five!"] For reconciliation? [Crowd shouts: "Number five!"] For an improved economy? [Crowd shouts: "Number five!"] For more schools and health centers? [Crowd shouts: "Number five!"]

When are we going to vote? [Crowd answers: "On the 25th!"] Where are we going to vote? [Crowd answers: "In box number five!"] When? [Crowd answers: "On the 25th!"] Where? [Crowd answers: "In box number five!"] [Ortega repeats these two questions and the crowd responds to them in the same manner as above 10 times]

We are going to vote on the 25th by marking box number five. We are going to demonstrate that in Nicaragua, the dignity, heroism, will, and courage of the people of Nicaragua is stronger, more powerful, than the bullets and the dollars of the Yankees, of the Somozists, and the contras. We will demonstrate this to the peoples of Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia, Africa, and South Africa—whose people have been able to achieve freedom for Nelson Mandela because of their fighting spirit and their heroism and because of international solidarity. The people of South Africa will be free like the Nicaraguan people, like Matagalpa, like Nicaragua.

We are going to demonstrate all this by voting in box number... [Crowd shouts: "Five!"]

We are going to show the world that Nicaragua will remain free, that Nicaragua will continue defending the liberty won on 19 July 1979 by voting in slot number... [Crowd shouts: "Five!"]

We are going to tell the world: Here is Matagalpa! Here is Nicaragua! Here are the heroes and the martyrs. Here is Carlos Fonseca, Sandino, German Pomares, Camilo. We are going to do this by voting on the 25th in box number... [Crowd shouts: "Five!"] In box number... [Crowd shouts: "Five!"]

That is the way. That is the way. [repeats himself] [Crowd shouts: "That is the way we vote here!"]

Everything will be better! Everything will be better! Everything will be better! [Crowd shouts: "Everything will be better!"] Because this is the decision of the people of Matagalpa, because this is the decision of the people of Nicaragua, because this is the mandate of Augusto Cesar Sandino.

Viva Matagalpa! Viva Nicaragua! Free Fatherland... [Crowd shouts: "Or death!"]

Viva Sandino!

Let us deliver this baseball equipment here. Four sets are for San Dionisio, four for San Isidro, two for Chahuitillo, six for Matagalpa, and here are five sets for the Little League. This is for playing good baseball. Do we want these sets to strike out? [Crowd shouts: "No!"] Are we going to hit home runs on the 25th? [Crowd shouts: "On the 25th!"]

Commander Nunez on Elections, U.S. Relations

PA1402195890 Managua Sistema Sandinista Television Network in Spanish 0200 GMT 14 Feb 90

[Interview with National Assembly President Carlos Nunez by Javier Reyes in Nicaragua on 13 February—recorded]

[Text] [Reyes] We have noted a triumphant tone in the most recent messages delivered by the various Sandinist candidates. They are already talking about election winners. Commander Carlos Nunez, first Sandinist Front candidate to an Assembly post in Region Three, is here with us. Do you share that triumphant attitude, Commander Nunez? And why are those candidates discussing their victories if we are still 12 days away from election day?

[Nunez] Today, 12 days from election day, Managua, the capital of Nicaragua, is ready to elect the maximum number of Sandinist legislators and councilmen and to make Sandinist presidential candidate Daniel Ortega win by an overwhelming majority.

[Reyes] In other words, Commander, you believe UNO [National Opposition Union] is not really a dangerous enemy or opponent in these elections?

[Nunez] I believe the UNO members already feel defeated. The international community, the foreign press, and the people of Nicaragua have asserted that defeat. We only hope that the UNO members will be honest enough to admit their defeat, and above all, agree to do what the UNO presidential candidate said she would do: shake Daniel Ortega's hand as a sign of peace. I believe that will be the right time to strengthen the Nicaraguans' concerted efforts. I believe the UNO candidate, as a defeated candidate, should as a sign of peace shake the hand of Daniel Ortega, who will be reelected president of Nicaragua.

[Reyes] Commander Nunez, you have a triumphant and confident attitude regarding a Sandinist victory. Nevertheless, we have been at war with the United States for eight or 10 years. What leads you to think that the United States will recognize a Sandinist victory?

[Nunez] Our attitude is not simply triumphant. It also reflects the importance that the Nicaraguan elections have for Central America. These are not just any elections. In our opinion—and I believe the international community shares our opinion—the holding of free, honest, and clean elections, along with the presence of the observers here in Nicaragua, means the end of the war and the attainment of peace in Nicaragua.

We have recently heard some U.S. Government officials make some constructive statements. Thus, I believe we must be optimistic not only about achieving peace in Central America, but also about reaching an understanding with the U.S. Government.

[Reyes] To a certain extent, it is a contradiction to talk about winning the elections by a wide majority while there is also talk about making a concerted effort with the loser. Nowhere in the world does a group that wins elections by a wide majority talk about making concerted efforts with the loser, and in the case of Nicaragua, scientific polls have shown that the Sandinists will win by just such a majority.

[Nunez] We should not talk about winners or losers as if we were talking about a war in which winners will settle accounts with the losers. It is a mistake to think in those terms. In addition, when the Sandinists talk about making concerted efforts, we are not only talking about making concerted efforts or reaching agreements with some or all political groups participating in the elections. We are talking about making concerted efforts with all of the country's groups in order to reconstruct Nicaragua. Obviously, if the country's political forces are willing to make a small contribution to the country's reconstruction, we will gladly agree to them marching along that path with us. We firmly believe that the country's reconstruction must result from the work of all Nicaraguans.

[Reyes] Will those political, concerted efforts depend on the number of votes that each party obtains, or will they be efforts made along with all political groups regardless of their political power?

[Nunez] We can make concerted efforts with all groups. I do not limit it to political leaders who may be able to conduct the kind of negotiations you are describing. I include all groups. We cannot remain at an elite level. That is a mistake. The government, the opposition, and the economic elite should go to our rank and file. That is where our strength lies.

[Reyes] Thank you very much, Commander Carlos Nunez.

Chamorro Says UNO To Accept Observers' Report

PA1402183090 Managua BARRICADA in Spanish 9 Feb 90 pp 3, 4

[Text] The National Opposition Unity [UNO] on 8 February announced that if the vote count is performed honestly and if the international observers proclaim the Sandinist National Liberation Front's [FSLN] electoral victory, UNO would recognize the final results of the 25 February elections.

In a news conference held yesterday, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro said in the name of UNO: "Just like in Costa Rica, if the international observers tell me that Daniel has won, I would personally greet and congratulate him and tell him to do it better from now on. Why not?"

During a speech, which was brief because Luis Sanchez [Nicaraguan Socialist Party leader] decided to allow only four questions to be asked by international reporters and none by local reporters, Violeta described as "very good" the third report that the UN observers delegation released on the electoral process, saying the electoral organization has improved. "This is how they see it."

A number of local reporters futilely asked Sanchez for an opportunity to ask questions. Sanchez' preference for the international media led him to restrict the country's freedom of press and expression.

However, forcing his way in, so to speak, a local reporter asked the UNO presidential candidate about negotiations to support those people held by the contras. She replied that had Ortega granted full amnesty to all of the political prisoners and the contras outside the country, the contras would have released those people the government says they are holding. "In addition, this has to do with those who are out of the country, not with me."

The UNO candidate denied there are any internal problems in the alliance. Despite Antonio Lacayo's bowed head, she said: "That is propaganda the Sandinists have been publishing through their media and therefore irrelevant. Ours is a great unity."

Nevertheless, the official UNO delegation visiting the FRG has admitted to the existence of "internal disagreements among the parties that make up the alliance."

Dona Violeta also expressed support for the reliability of the final report on the election results to be released by the electoral observers of the United Nations, the OAS, and the Freely Elected Ex-Presidents Group headed by former President Jimmy Carter. She said: "It is they who will have the final word." Despite the more and more visible surprise of a small audience that celebrated some epithets that Mrs. Barrios applied to the FSLN candidate during her remarks, she pointed out: "If the FSLN achieves a clean victory, why should we not greet and congratulate it?"

Again and again, Dona Violeta explained to the reporters that she spoke "as the candidate for and in the name of UNO, which I represent."

12 Feb Press Review on Election Campaign

PA1502010590

[Editorial Report] The opposition newspaper LA PRENSA on pages 1 and 24 carries a report on a rally led by National Opposition Union (UNO) presidential candidate Violeta de Chamorro and vice-presidential candidate Virgilio Godoy in Matagalpa on 11 February, which was reportedly attended by more than 60,000 people.

Mrs. Chamorro is quoted as saying at the rally: "Countrymen, we are only 14 days away from voting for Nicaragua's salvation. Matagalpa is a clear example of how the people will vote so that our country will no longer suffer under the Sandinist government." The newspaper reports that Mrs. Chamorro also reiterated her campaign promise to repeal compulsory military service and to declare a general amnesty if she is elected.

LA PRENSA also reports on page 4 that UNO leaders in Chontales have announced that everything is ready in that area for the upcoming elections. According to LA PRENSA, local UNO coordinator Chester Gonzales has asked election observers to monitor election proceedings closely in La Embajada area, located 54 km from Boaco, because there are only going to be two voting booths in an area with more than 1,000 registered voters. Local UNO representatives are cited as saying that all UNO election officials have already been fully trained to perform their specific electoral tasks.

LA PRENSA reports on page 7 that approximately 200 people attended the presentation of the UNO economic plan in Jinotepe, though no date of the event is given. The newspaper says that reporters who attended the presentation were reportedly "fascinated" with the plan and asked many questions. The daily adds that many of those present applauded the bravery of Enrique Sanchez, who participated in the debate "without fear of expressing his ideas." Sanchez is cited as having said "privately" that he thinks the UNO plan is feasible.

The same paper on page 4 reports that UNO legal representative Hernaldo Zuniga has sent a letter to the Supreme Electoral Council to report violations of the Electoral Law in Region 4. The letter points out that the FSLN has scheduled a rally on election day, which the newspaper says, "is strictly prohibited by the Electoral Law." The Zuniga letter also claims that the dates and places for UNO rallies are being disallowed by the government "without prior notice."

LA PRENSA also reports on page 4 on an incident in Buena Vista on 10 February. According to LA PRENSA, Felix Cardenas, a young UNO activist who had just returned from the UNO rally in Masaya with a group of opposition sympathizers, was shot to death by a man who apparently did not like hearing them shouting opposition slogans.

Columnist Analyzes National Salvation Issue

PA1402165890 Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish 9 Feb 90 p 2

[Article by Silviano Matamoros Lacayo: "A National Salvation Government"]

[Text] The Nicaraguans are living through an electoral period saturated with proposals and political government programs that easily confuse the people.

We frequently hear some politicians say that the government elected in February must be a government of "national consultation, national salvation, and reconciliation."

What do the Nicaraguans know about a government of consultation, salvation, and reconciliation?

Are we to forget everything that has happened to us during the last 10 years? Are we going to support any kind of government in the name of a false reconciliation to reap any kind of results? Have we not had enough experience from the past, and are we not like we are now because we did not know what we were getting ourselves into?

The Nicaraguan people have every right to specifically and clearly know if the so-called government of national salvation or national consultation being mentioned by certain politicians is, after all, the government that the people need. The politicians should not try to manipulate these concepts to benefit parties, much less people.

The only government of national consultation possible in our homeland must be a government that pledges to reduce the Army by 70 percent; a government that intends to abolish militarism and the Patriotic Military Service; a government that pledges to write a new constitution to rectify the dictatorial and twisted nature of our current constitution; a government that allows a private and competitive television channel; a government that separates the party, army, and state concept; a government that separates the state branches; a government that talks about Nicaraguans rather than classes; a government that offers a future, stability, and opportunities to all our youths; a government that respects the church and private enterprise; and a government that respects free unions and university autonomy—in sum, a government that respects human rights in the broadest sense of the word and a lawful government with democratic concepts that brings happiness, culture, and health to Nicaraguans.

We cannot accept the fact that there are businessmen who call themselves patriots and who rush off toward an "economic consultation" for opportunistic reasons, without measuring the consequences.

Likewise, we cannot accept the fact that there are serious political parties that, talking about favoring the people, want to convince them of how good it would be to have a national salvation government without democratic identification or commitment.

Consequently, the Nicaraguan people must be clearly aware of the meaning of a national consultation government, and they should never allow or accept that anyone surrenders them, tied up and crucified, in the name of a reconciliation that will never come.

Regardless of who may win, the only consultation the Nicaraguan people need must be the genuine Western democratic type, free of fear and within a lawful regime. To do the contrary is to betray the people's most sacred principles, regardless of who may do it.

Sandinist Relations With Washington Discussed

PA1402173090 Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish 7 Feb 90 p 2

[Unattributed article: "The Washington-Managua Conflict"]

[Text] In their relations with Washington, the Sandinists have always acted deceitfully and have created the frictions that suited their purposes. At present, they are at the farthest point in their relations with the United States, but refuse to break the relationship for good because they know that their only hope, economically speaking, lies in Washington agreeing to coexist with them.

From the outset, the Sandinists have handled this confrontation artfully. Since the initial Manzanillo talks, they have tried to use high-level political tactics to keep the Yankees busy and portray them as fools, while they, the Sandinists, consolidated their military power and completed their regional domination plans.

The United States, however, regarded the Sandinists as fools, who are determined to play a game for which they have not been trained or are not sophisticated enough. Since then, Daniel Ortega, while cursing the Yankees, has also painfully humbled himself by requesting to meet with the present head of state at the White House to discuss, at the highest level, the U.S. difficulties with Sandinist Nicaragua.

But this has proved impossible. Under the Republican administration initiated in 1989, the United States has regarded the Sandinists as what they are, a Soviet appendage added to the Cuban appendage. The Sandinists have failed spectacularly in this also, because although they make a daily fuss of their nationalist policy for Washington's benefit, they have always ended up by doing what the United States considers right at a particular time. The Sandinists are conducting an electoral process at present because this is what the U.S. policy has determined is right.

'Sandinism Represents More Confiscations'

PA1402190690 Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish 12 Feb 90 pp 1, 24

[Editorial: "Sandinism Represents More Confiscations"]

[Text] The Sandinist Government's indifference is obvious when viewing the demand of the three minors in Jinotega, who have asked for the return of their property that was arbitrarily confiscated at the personal instructions of Vice President Sergio Ramirez.

The confiscated farm, El Aguacate, has thus become—at the height of the electoral campaign—a clear example of the arbitrariness of the military regime installed by the FSLN [Sandinist National Liberation Front] throughout the last 10 years.

The victims of this decision, which Ramirez adopted on the spot and all of a sudden, are not powerful landowners, or "turncoats," or "counterrevolutionaries." They are three minors whose father left them this farm, which has a very limited production, so they may survive without anguish.

Ramirez arrived and promptly ordered that the property be turned into another state-owned farm. All the appeals on behalf of the defenseless minors have been disregarded.

That is why it is claimed the Sandinists have shown more defects than the previous dictatorship. In this case, Vice President Ramirez has acted arrogantly, disregarding the law and personally deciding on the confiscation of a legally-acquired property by issuing a verbal order.

We must remember that during the political meeting between the FSLN and the opposition parties in August 1989, President Daniel Ortega promised not to order any more confiscations. We must also remember that, prior to that, Ortega had promised many times he would not order any more confiscations. However, a personal decision impulsively adopted by Vice President Ramirez is enough to overrule all these promises, and no one is exempt from such a detrimental decision. The law created by the Sandinists says that any property may be declared for public use and transferred to the state. In other words, the Sandinist Government has actually abolished private property, and whoever has something now owes thanks to the Sandinists' gracious concession.

This is the situation Sandinism has created in Nicaragua. It is one of the many evils they brought to the country in 1979, and it is one of the many evils we are fighting against in our attempts to install a law-abiding and legal regime in Nicaragua, with a change of government on 25 February.

According to private economists, the Nicaraguan Government has at its disposal 8 million manzanas, which it has not touched since 1979, because they are still a Sandinist Government reserve. Likewise, it has not distributed a single inch of the best land confiscated from Somoza and the Somozists. All the confiscated land has been taken away from persons who tilled it, who inherited it from their parents, and who legally owned it.

Referring to the case of El Aguacate, the violation is aimed at defenseless persons, at minors who lack the monetary resources needed for a legal battle. A presidential order would be enough to revoke the order and make justice prevail. If this attitude of rectification in favor of justice does not occur at the height of the season for electoral promises, one can easily guess what the Nicaraguans can expect if Sandinism remains in power after 25 February.

* FSLN Views Post-Victory Scenarios

90EM0090A Managua BARRICADA in Spanish 8 Feb 90 p 2

[Article: "Unconditional Prediction of UNO Defeat"]

[Text] With or without excessive optimism or from a purely objective standpoint, we Sandinists do not harbor the slightest doubt that we shall be victorious on 25 February. For Sandinists, the only uncertainty is whether the win will be by an overwhelming percentage (67-70) or what we would consider a convincing figure for an undeniable victory, let us say 60 to 67 percent.

All polls aside, whether scientific or rigged, and even discounting the margin of the election results, while taking the Sandinist victory for granted, naturally, predictions of the behavior of the reactionary rightist opposition immediately following the election are beginning to be much more interesting.

Will the "Made in the USA" opposition accept the election results? Will that opposition turn out to be even the second-ranking election force or will it be forced to fight it out with other parties? How will the opposition conduct itself in the National Assembly and how much weight will it carry in that body?

On the First Point

The very logic of the seal of American paternity on the reactionary UNO [National Opposition Union] alliance would lead us to expect that it will be the Bush Administration that will decide whether UNO is to accept the evidence of its defeat or remain tied to the false claim of rigged election results. In this connection, the more reliable American press has already begun to consider possible changes in the Yankee government view of the situation in Nicaragua and election results which, from that perspective, will favor President Ortega, Sandinist Front candidate.

If that perception continues to be supported by an objective examination of the Nicaraguan election situation, then despite ideological resistance to tolerating it, the U.S. Government might consider the defeat of its puppet coalition inasmuch as it would be too much to hope that it would recognize a Sandinist victory. It is a question of shade rather than color. It could consequently order UNO to continue trying to undermine the revolutionary government by parliamentary means, in particular, by trying to worsen the economic situation by sabotaging harmony.

On the Second Point

Viewing the coming election defeat of UNO as a "given," it is essential to reveal one of the main reasons. This coalition, proceeding party by party, does not have sufficient organic capacity even to be guaranteed second place in the elections.

We have no doubt at all that some will say our bias is exaggerated. However, aside from the fact that partiality and objectivity are not necessarily at odds, the data we are about to give are not distorted, as a result of which they may be useful to those wishing to deal with the issue honestly.

Of the 11 legally authorized parties in UNO, 8 have operated to date with no election support based on which they might speculate about possible votes. In 1984, the National Conservative Party, the Popular Conservative Alliance, the Democratic [Party] of National Trust, and the Neoliberal and National Action parties were mere factions or wings about to split from abstentionist political parties. At the time, they did not enjoy legal status and were, naturally, known by other names.

It is of interest to note that in order to be legalized as parties in May 1989, these five groups had difficulty meeting the minimum requirement of presenting a national leadership and nine departmental leaderships. Some presented departmental leaderships with barely five members or even three. Overall, they did not comprise 70 leadership boards and some groups gained legal status with 38 persons.

The Constitutional Liberal Party held the title of "winning party" based on the sole fact that it existed when the revolutionary triumph occurred. The Social Democratic Party was formed 2 months after the victory and was legalized with few requirements.

The remaining three of the UNO's 11 to obtain election credentials in 1984 can speculate very little about possible votes in the coming elections. The Independent Liberal Party, which won the most votes of the three before it experienced the miracle of having the PLIUN [Independent Liberal Party for National Unity] formed "from its rib," won 105,560 votes for president and 105,497 for the National Assembly. The Socialist Party, whose presidential candidate at the time (he is now with the FSLN [Sandinist National Liberation Front]) was Domingo Sanchez (Chaguitilio), won 14,494 votes and 15,306 for president and National Assembly respectively.

Who wants to draw up the balance sheet? Is it even necessary in order to realize the real strength of organizations comprising UNO?

Splits and Yankee Pressure

Answers to these questions should be based on these data in order to reveal something very real: UNO is nothing more than a big, costly political-publicity show, a strawman stuffed with noise, dollars and other resources supplied by the United States.

But there are other questions: Should this fact cause us to conclude that the organic weakness of UNO parties should yield voting results that are equally squalid?

The answer is "No," because the simple fact is that there are no mechanical reflexes in politics, and furthermore, the Nicaraguan political situation does not allow one to expect them. Other factors are present here, factors created precisely because of the American presence with its military, economic, political, propaganda, diplomatic, and other pressures and all the international impact this implies, all aimed at helping the pro-Yankee coalition. Herein lies the cause because in these elections, we are facing the United States and not merely its local agents.

This is also the reason why we must not expect that the basically social orphan nature of UNO parties will be translated into orphan votes, but it is undeniable that a small, weak engine cannot drive a very large vehicle.

The big American machine operating in UNO's behalf is what has produced the fuss around its candidate and its goal of putting an end to the revolution through a few lessons, mainly economic. This could also operate in favor of a deceived—or rather, manipulated—vote of minority sectors not yet informed of the causes of the economic situation and still marked by broad political-ideological traces due to their Somocism, their frustrated ambitions, their economic interests, and other factors making them potential election clients of the reactionary right. This is why they are worked on by election propaganda.

This and none other, especially accidental, is the reason that UNO and its mentors are promoting speculation about an election victory, and it is the Yankee patronage and the whole machine serving it that that divulges the speculation.

UNO and these elements alone could make a second place possible, but not so easily, or at least not without other opposition forces trying to steal the possibility, which no longer seems possible.

On the Third Point

Our opinion about the possible weight of the contra-UNO opposition in the National Assembly and its behavior is related to [line of text illegible] that the United States could see its meddling succeed, winning a second place for UNO. If it also so happens that the United States orders it to continue its plan by adapting to the reality of the undeniable victory of the FSLN, UNO could be guaranteed some 16 representatives in the National Assembly, with the prospect of winning a few more.

In addition to the data we offer, we do so based on the recomposition of election results due to the presence of forces that previously abstained, as well as the new electoral system that will be put into effect. UNO will basically be made up of the two representatives who now belong to the Communist Party, two from the Socialist Party, some eight more from the Democratic Conservative Party, and another four from what is now part of the independent liberal bench.

The number of seats that UNO could win will not allow it much freedom to maneuver, which will place it in an uncomfortable position due to the fact that frustration over its election defeat will heighten its aggressiveness. At the same time, when its ambitions have settled down, it may limit its tendency toward opposition exclusivity and try to bring in a handful of conservative democrats, Christian socialists, and others "from the center." However, insisting on its hegemony over these elements would bring about failure.

National Assembly

The somewhat widespread idea of the possible formation of parliamentary factions made up of ideological trends is the least acceptable if we consider the fact that splits are not preeminently caused by "principles," but rather, personal and group interests. If this were not so, there would not be so much division, nor would "principles" be taken so little into account when splits occur. Only lip service is paid to them.

If we apply to this prediction the individual element, partiality, the desire for importance, and ambition, we shall see in the people's representative body a Virgilio Godoy suffering from both his ego and the need to build his image for the future, for 1996. He will be tormented by having to sit as an alternate because one can already guarantee that Madam Violeta will not be present in the National Assembly due to her obvious political inexperience and the psyc..ological effect caused by her defeat, plus her injured personal and class pride.

We shall see an Alfredo Cesar and an Eli Altamirano parading their victory, showing [illegible] hegemony over the rightist bench and, naturally, also working for 1996. The UNO bench will initially have to debate whether to stay together or go it alone, representing its respective politicians. If they do not solve this dilemma before 25 February, it will during the first days of the new parliament occupy the UNO bench, which will delay for a time its accommodation within an atmosphere of conflict that will not be the one of which they dreamed.

We believe the majority of the 11 parties will resolve to remain together for one decisive reason: the Yankee plan that is already costing the U.S. Treasury so much and which they cannot abandon so easily. However they wish to arrange it: Either separate or in disarray, the National Assembly will console the defeated.

Panama

Public Force Involvement in Prison Riot Denied

PA1502015790 Panama City Circuito RPC Television in Spanish 2330 GMT 14 Feb 90

[Text] [Announcer] A serious event that could be the omen of an even worse situation for Panamanian society occurred at noon today when dozens of inmates from the former Modelo Jail, now called Penitentiary Guard, challenged the personnel and escaped from the prison. An alert was issued after the escape, which occurred during the absence of the prison's director, Captain Alberto Soto. Several U.S. Army units quickly arrived and with the Public Force members they began to look for the prisoners. Given the journalists' insistence, Captain Alberto Soto agreed to explain the circumstances surrounding this event, which has increased the Panamanian population's uncertainty and fear.

[Begin recording] [Soto] A group [Human Rights Delegation] of 12, who had arrived for a visit, was being accompanied by a penitentiary official. A conversation between the group and a few of the common criminals, those held in the gallery, began. Some members of the group began to make promises that they could not fulfill. The prisoners' enthusiasm rose, and they began to beat on the gallery door, which eventually was knocked down. Another group of prisoners from another gallery was passing the area on their way to the dining room. They availed themselves of the opportunity and fled through sentry point No. 2.

[Reporter] How many escaped?

[Soto] We are still figuring this out.

[Reporter] When did this occur? Have any been captured yet?

[Soto] Most of them have already been captured.

[Reporter] How many?

[Soto] Most of them have been captured.

[Reporter] When did this occur?

[Soto] Around 1100.

[Reporter] Are they common criminals captain?

[Soto] Most of them are back in prison.

[Reporter] There are reports about shooting. Is this true?

[Soto] Correct. The people at the sentry station had to act.

[Reporter] Was this the result of personal negligence?

[Soto] Absolutely not, absolutely not.

[Reporter] How can you explain the event?

[Soto] We have been asking the journalists, the lawyers, and the national and international organizations to recognize that this is not a museum. It is not a museum, but has been taken for one. All types of [human rights] groups have come here, but they have not solved any problems. That is what has happened. I sometimes....[corrects himself] I have always cooperated with the media when they have approached us, both the news media and the national and international organizations.

However, everyone ignores....[corrects himself] everyone worries about what concerns them and ignores the type of security which must be maintained in a prison. We are not talking about those who fled today; we are talking about the type of prisoner we are seeing these days. They are different from those we have had in the past. These men are dangerous and we must adopt the necessary measures so that they cannot escape. We must follow the authorities instructions. I believe that this is the main problem. We think that this is a museum and we have to come here to see....I do not know what.

[Reporter] How many escaped, Captain? How many have been recaptured?

[Soto] I have no idea. We have just controlled the riot and we will issue a communique in due time. We do not have the exact numbers right now.

[Reporter] Do you believe that there are any Public Force members involved in the riot?

[Soto] Absolutely not. My people are professionals. [end recording]

[Announcer] This is the lateral area of the Penitentiary Guard's building where a sentry post is located and through which the criminals managed to mysteriously escape. Given the dangerous nature of the convicts, a search operation was launched in the area around the prison. U.S. soldiers and Panamanian policemen captured two alleged fugitives near the Republic of El Salvador School.

Upon learning that shots had been heard during the breakout, RPC Television's personnel went to the Santo Tomas Hospital and located one of the most wanted prisoners. Quick and efficient action is expected from our authorities because the situation has caused alarm among the citizens.

According to the investigations, no civilian or military prisoners from the previous regime were among those who escaped. In addition, everything seems to be calm at El Renacer Prison where most of Noriega's former officers are being held.

Given today's events, members of the new Public Force and the U.S. Army are now engaged in a thorough search operation to recapture the criminals who escaped today. Our news team managed to film the recapture of several criminals who were returned to Modelo Jail. A large scale Panamanian - U.S. operation was being carried out this afternoon in areas like Chorrillo, Huerta Sandoval, El Rancho, in the cemetery area, the old Jardin Orgullo de Azuero, and other areas where the escaped criminals are presumably hidden.

The criminals were initially seen in groups in the Santa Ana and Calidonia areas but later divided up into groups of two to avoid drawing attention to themselves. Late this afternoon, a joint Panamanian - U.S. mission inspected the Modelo Jail. Panamanian and U.S. officers consulted on the matter and will presumably work together to prevent future disturbances that might endanger the lives of cititzens.

Officers consulted by RPC Television believe that police surveillance must be stepped up inside and outside the Modelo Jail. Better control could prevent events like today's, which cause alarm and concern among the citizenry. Referring to this, people living around the Modelo Jail are asked to cooperate. Also, if they know the whereabouts of any criminals, they are asked to report it to the Public Force authorities for everyone's benefit.

Public Force authorities said this evening that the operation will continue throughout the night to apprehend other criminals who are still at large. Meanwhile, metropolitan police Commander Lieutenant Colonel Armando Palacios Gondola gave the latest report on the Modelo Jail breakout.

[Begin recording] [Gondola] We adopted the necessary measures immediately after the event occurred and in coordination with the Technical Police and all of the Metropolitan Police precincts. We detected the movements of some fugitives in the areas around Modelo Jail, particularly the destroyed sectors of El Chorrillo. Some of them escaped and moved toward the Veracruz area. Fifteen of the 30 prisoners who escaped were recaptured during the afternoon. The first report that we received indicated that only common criminals were involved.

[Reporter] Are there any former military officers involved in the riot?

[Gondola] As far as we know there are none.

[Reporter] The reports mention 40 to 70 fugitives. What can you tell us about this?

[Gondola] The latest information we have says that there were 30.

[Reporter] What immediate actions will be adopted to prevent this type of situation from recurring? Is there any indication that some Public Force members are involved in the action?

[Gondola] We cannot ascertain this from the first reports. We have no information that Public Force members are involved. It was an internal riot involving the prisoners and we are stepping up the security measures to support the penitentiary system. [end recording]

Legislation To End Money Laundering Approved

PA1502024690 Panama City ACAN in Spanish 0013 GMT 15 Feb 90

[Text] Panama City, 14 Feb (ACAN-EFE)—The Panamanian Government has approved regulations aimed at preventing drug money from being laundered in the country's banking system, it was announced today by Vice President and Planning Minister Guillermo Ford.

According to the measure approved on 13 February by the Cabinet Council and which will be regulated by the National Banking Commission (CBN, state-owned) in the next 2 weeks, every operation in excess of $10,000, including deposits and withdrawals, must be accompanied by a form which has been filled out.

Ford said that those who violate the regulation will be subject to fines ranging from $100,000 to $1 million and added that the measure is aimed at creating a "serious and reliable" banking system.

Until now, the banks in Panama only had to report deposits in excess of $50,000. The new regulation coincides with the one in effect in the U.S. banking system.

The U.S. Government has been exerting pressure on the new Panamanian authorities, who assumed power on 20 December following the U.S. military invasion, to impose control measures on the financial system, which is comprised of approximately 120 banks, with the intention of preventing its use for possible "money laundering" operations.

The planning minister said that the measure coincides with the "moral principles" proposed by President Guillermo Endara. These principles are intended to "make decency prevail" in the country. He added that "if this coincides with other countries' requirements, then it is even better." "We are not afraid to do anything that will lead to the decent use of the banking system and make it more reliable," he emphasized.

The Panamanian vice president admitted that there is a possibility that some banks "will initially resent the fact that they have to fill out a form" for every operation in excess of $10,000, but he added that "they all want the banking system's image to improve, and they will eventually welcome the decision."

Edgardo Lasso Valdes, president of the private National Banking Association, who had opposed reforms to the current legislation, has said recently that "the end of banking secrecy would be the end of the financial center in Panama."

New Opposition Newspaper Begins Publication

PA1502134990

[Editorial Report] On 27 January 1990, a newspaper ostensibly named PRIMERA PLANA [FRONT PAGE] went on sale on the streets of Panama City. The masthead carried the words "1RA PLANA" in 1-1/2 inch letters with the words "EL PERIODICO" in 1/4-inch letters running diagonally across the letters "LAN" in PLANA. The inside pages and the editorial box on page 3 also identified the paper simply as "1RA PLANA," without the small diagonal banner reading "EL PERIODICO." Each of the eight pages that this issue consists of is marked "Panama, Occupied Territory, January 1990," and a box on page 7 reads: "This newspaper is an effort that we all must share. Please copy it." The editorial box identifies Ruben Dario Murgas Torraza as the director and Jose Didimo Escobar Samaniego as the associate director of 1ra PLANA. The newspaper carries news reports, articles, and poetry attacking the Bush and Endara administrations as well as the U.S.intervention and military presence in Panama.

Many of the articles and stories are sarcastic in tone, and a feature on page 2 entitled "In Other Words" appears to be a spoof of the popular "In a Few Words" column by Guillermo Sanchez Borbon carried by the Panama City newspaper LA PRENSA. An article by Escobar Samaniego on page 2 is entitled "Squealing Has Become a Virtue of the State." A report on a news conference offered by Murgas Torraza shortly after the U.S. intervention is carried on pages 3 and 7 is entitled: "The Martyrs Are Ours." A report on a statement by Mario Rognoni entitled "The Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) After Noriega" is carried on page 6. All three men are considered PRD stalwarts and close Noriega associates. Murgas Torraza is a former director of the official station Radio Nacional and the Noreiga-regime newspapers MATUTINO and CRITICA; Escobar Samaniego is a former secretary of the formerly government-financed Federation of Panamanian Students; and Mario Rognoni is a former commerce minister under Noriega.

Center pages 4 and 5 carry a report by Carlos Fuentes entitled "The Lessons of Panama" attributed to the Spanish newspaper EL PAIS. Pages 4 and 5 also carry newsbriefs under two separate headings "What One Does Not Know Here in Panama No. 1 - Year One, No. 1, First and Second Week of January 1990;" and "What One Does Not Know Here in Panama No. 2, Year One, No. 2, Third Week of January 1990." These newsbriefs cite stories from British and U.S. sources such as REUTER, THE GUARDIAN, THE WASHINGTON POST, THE NEW YORK TIMES, and others. Additionally, 1RA PLANA claims that a page-8 story on alleged links between drug traffickers and members of the Endara government is based on a report that appeared in the Oakland, California newspaper THE TRIBUNE.

On 11 February, however, a 12-page newspaper of very similar physical and editorial characteristics was observed being sold at several Panama City locations for 25 centavos. The paper's masthead, inner pages, and editorial box identified the publication as "EL PERIODICO," and highlighted boxes on pages 3 and 4 saying "El PERIODICO is EL PERIODICO" appeared to reiterate that El PERIODICO is the publication's name. As in 1RA PLANA, each page of El PERIODICO is labeled "Panama, Occupied Territory, February 1990," and the masthead identifies this issue of this previously unheard of newspaper as "Issue No.2." The editorial box—in this newspaper carried on page 4—lists the same director and associate director as 1RA PLANA, but adds: "Address: We do not dare print it." Nonetheless, the same editorial box has a notation "Composed and laid out in the workshops of ULTTIMAS NOTICIAS," and page 12 carries the notation: "Printed by Servimpren, S.A." ULTIMAS NOTICIAS is a local tabloid with offices in the Bella Vista area of Panama City.

El PERIODICO also carries the "In Other Words" column on page 2; the "This newspaper is an effort that we all must share. Please copy it" announcement on page 12; and the "What One Does Not Know Here in Panama" column—unnumbered and undated on this occasion—on center pages 6 and 7. In El PERIODICO this column cites stories from the LOS ANGELES TIMES, the Bogota newspaper El TIEMPO, and the "U.S. Armed Forces publication EARLY BIRD," and others. On page 8 EL PERIODICO also carries a 1,200-word REUTER dispatch, datelined Washington, on the U.S. Armed Forces' use of "high technology" military equipment during the "invasion of Panama," as well as a front-page story that the paper attributes to the Spanish publication INTERVIU.

An editorial by newspaper director Murgas Torraza on page 4 of El PERIODICO states in part: "The EL PERIODICO team does not want to stage opposition. It merely wants to practice journalism. If, during this endeavor, we happen to oppose government actions, it is because we deem them wrong. Period."

Argentina

Foreign Ministry 'Cautiously Optimistic' on Talks

PY1502023290 Buenos Aires TELAM in Spanish 2313 GMT 14 Dec 89

[Text] Buenos Aires, 14 Feb (TELAM)—An Argentine Foreign Ministry source today reported: "Negotiations between Argentina and Great Britain aimed at normalizing diplomatic relations have made progress but are not finished. The Argentine Government would rather not release any advance information until the talks are over."

This was the Foreign Ministry spokesman's comment on a report by the official Italian news agency to the effect that tomorrow Argentina and Great Britain will announce the exchange of ambassadors, thus normalizing the dipolomatic relations that were severed in 1982 because of the Malvinas war.

The source told TELAM: "Our people are feeling cautiously optimistic toward the negotiations and would rather not release any advance information until the Argentine-British talks are over."

He added: "So far there are no conclusions. During the first day of talks in Madrid the two parties stated their positions. These positions will be considered tomorrow at the residence of the Argentine ambassador in Madrid, and a joint document will be issued."

The Argentine delegation headed by Lucio Garcia del Solar and Jorge Vazquez and the British delegation led by Crispin Tickell will continue their talks tomorrow in Madrid.

Menem, Government Popularity Poll Revealed

PY1402180090 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS in Spanish 1230 GMT 14 Feb 90

[Text] Buenos Aires, 14 Feb (NA) — According to a poll published today by a Buenos Aires morning newspaper, President Carlos Menem has a popularity level of 48 percent, while that of his government is only 17 percent.

The poll indicates that Menem has the same degree of popularity as he had in April 1989, just before the May elections.

Notwithstanding, his degree of popularity has slumped strongly compared to October 1989 when it stood at 80 percent, just two months after he was installed as president.

The poll indicates that the management of the economy has the approval of only 11 percent of the population, while support for the economic plan totals 22 percent.

The poll was carried out by the Mora, Araujo, Noguera, and Associates Enterprise, and is published in today's edition of LA NACION.

New Head of Social Action Secretariat Named

PY1502002090 Buenos Aires BUENOS AIRES HERALD in English 14 Feb 90 p 1

[Text] (NA-DYN)—Health Minister Eduardo Bauza yesterday appointed Oscar Fappiano as new head of the Social Action Secretariat under that ministry, the post left vacant by Ruben Cardozo, who was forced to resign on account of the solidarity bond scandal.

The apointment of the former Formosa deputy was decided yesterday morning in a meeting Bauza held with President Carlos Menem at the Government House.

He was also Interior Secretary during the time when Bauza headed that ministry.

Fappiano was one of several candidates for the post, which included Health Undersecretary Pedro Basualdo and National Social Emergencies Director Alberto Conca.

Bolivia

Paz Leaves for Summit; Opposition Opposes Trip

PY1402222890 Madrid EFE in Spanish 2000 GMT 14 Feb 90

[Excerpt] La Paz, 14 Feb (Efe)—Bolivian President Jaime Paz Zamora today departed for Cartagena where he will attend the presidential antidrug "summit." In Cartagena, Paz Zamora hopes to gather support for a "national strategy for alternative development" that will require an investment of $3.4 billion in the next eight years.

The Bolivian Congress met today to discuss the approval of Paz Zamora's trip to Cartagena. The Bolivian Congress did approve the trip, but it did so only 60 minutes before Paz Zamora was scheduled to leave for Cartagena from El Alto Airport and only after the opposition had withdrawn from the floor of Congress.

The opposition believes the government violated the democratic game because, despite repeated requests, it did not officially inform Congress of the plan that will be submitted at the Cartagena summit and of the agreements signed during the preparatory meeting that was held from 10 to 13 January in Santa Cruz (Bolivia).

Minutes before departing for Colombia, Paz Zamora said: "I would like to reassure the Bolivian people that my mission in Cartagena will be successful."

He added: "I am carrying with me the proposal of the Bolivian people—a proposal that protects our sovereignty and makes a commitment to the international community in the struggle against drug trafficking."

The Bolivian Government today issued a document entitled "National Strategy for Alternative Development," which will be submitted at the summit. [passage omitted]

Government To Reject Chemical Use Against Coca

PY1502021090 La Paz EL DIARIO in Spanish 9 Feb 90 p 1

[Text] Alternative Development Under Secretary Osvaldo Antezana has told EL DIARIO that "Bolivia will not accept the use of herbicides to eradicate coca plantations if the proposal is raised at the antidrug summit."

Antezana said that the United States has accepted the Bolivian alternative development project, which, among other proposals, calls for the replacement of coca plantations with other crops without the use of chemicals. He also noted that Law No. 1008 of special regulations for coca and controlled substances bans the use of chemicals and calls for the mechanical eradication of coca plantations.

A total of 668 hectares were eliminated during January—100 hectares more than in December. Antezana said that at this pace Bolivia will fulfill the goal of 6,000 hectares by next December.

He also said that during the antidrug summit Bolivia will seek financial aid for the implementation of the Coca Crop Substitution and Development Plan that will provide other sources of income for some 60,000 families engaged in coca production.

Congress Rejects Foreign Troops, Herbicides

PY1402025090 Madrid EFE in Spanish 0130 GMT 14 Feb 90

[Text] La Paz, 14 Feb (EFE)— The Bolivian Congress today approved a resolution rejecting the participation of foreign troops and the use of herbicides in the antidrug struggle.

The resolution states that "the consumer countries as well as the producer countries are responsible for the struggle against drug trafficking" but rejects the "presence of foreign troops and the use of herbicides."

The document goes on to point out that in the countries that produce the coca leaves used for cocaine, the struggle against narcotics "can only be carried out through alternative developments and the search for a new legal industrial use" for this plant.

The resolution goes on to say that the "economic sacrifice" the elimination of coca plantations will represent "should be offset by fair prices" for legal exportable goods, "effective economic cooperation, and the opening of permanent markets for substitute crops." It also warns that Bolivia "should not repeat the nefarious experience of World War II in which it subsidized sales of tin and other raw materials to the United States without obtaining any benefit in exchange."

According to political observers, the document issued by the Bolivian Congress endorses the "coca for development" theory that President Jaime Paz Zamora will present tomorrow at the antidrug "summit" in Cartagena de Indias, Colombia.

The only time a group of 170 soldiers of the U.S. South Command came to Bolivia to help fight drug trafficking was in July 1986, but their stay of 120 days was termed "unconstitutional" because their presence was only authorized by Congress after their arrival.

Document on Alternate Development Outlined

PY1402192090 La Paz La Red Panamericana in Spanish 1130 GMT 14 Feb 90

[Text] According to a study carried out by the Bolivian Government, the coca growth replacement in Bolivia will require a $3.5-billion investment over an eight-year period. This study is included in the document on the national strategy for alternative development in 1990. This document, which is part of the national antidrug strategy, has been prepared by the Economic Policy Design Department [UDAPE], belonging to the Planning and Coordination Ministry. Experts from the Foreign, Campesino Affairs, and Interior Ministries, and from Harvard University in the United States, have cooperated in the drafting of the document. The document on the national strategy for alternative development was delivered to the Foreign Ministry yesterday in the presence of members of the National Council Against Drug Abuse and Illegal Drug Trafficking [CONALID]. This document contains a detailed study of the economic impact of coca production in Bolivia during the 1970's and the second half of the 1980's.

The estimates show that the growth of coca and manufacture of coca by-products in 1987 reportedly brought $1.422 billion to 61,000 peasant families. Approximately $500 million of this amount is reportedly kept in the country, while the rest would be sent abroad.

The study states that in the affected regions there is a strong tendency toward cultivating only coca leaves. Thus, coca growing in the Chapare represents almost 93 percent of the value of all agricultural products there. This tendency is reinforced by the high income obtained from coca and its by-products.

Foreign Minister Carlos Iturralde has said that the proposal to be submitted by President Paz Zamora at the Cartagena summit on 15 February will be based on the document on national strategy for alternative development. Considering the magnitude of the coca production in terms of income, jobs, and earning of hard currency, the new replacement strategy will demand a significant investment to return the replacement costs.

Iturralde said that the elimination of coca production will cause the GNP to drop $939 million. Approximately $3.5 billion will be needed to replace this income if the return of the principal is considered to be 27 percent.

[Begin Iturralde recording] We have estimated that the value of the coca economy stands at $3.4 billion [words indistinct] $3.4 billion over an eight-year period. This does not mean that this is the amount we will request. We have analyzed the 1987 figures on coca production. [end recording]

The study says that in view of the difficult situation of the Bolivian economy and the strong negative impacts the coca crop replacement will cause, the refinancing of this stock will demand a foreign capital that can meet the goals outlined in the replacement program in terms of the eradication period, types of programs, length of the investment, and capacity for the economy to absorb new investments.

UDAPE adviser Esamuel Doria Medina said this is a structural program that demands a long-term strategy. He added that a social transition plan that can reduce the social costs of the coca production replacement should also be considered.

Doria Medina said the social emergency program will have to involve construction programs that provide temporary jobs for peasants who discontinue the coca leaf productions. He added that the financing of the emergency program will require the support of the international community.

[Begin Doria Medina recording] We should not forget that the 1989 Vienna Convention established the principle of coresponsibility [word indistinct] coca-growing countries and coca-consuming countries. The financial aspect of the coresponsibility must be considered. It is important to make clear that we should not allow the country to become more indebted by implementing this program or allow the Bolivian people's consumption to decrease even more. [end recording]

The document also states that the quick spread of coca farming and the uncontrolled use of precursors have caused serious ecological damage. Therefore the strategy should include a program to prevent major damage and to repair damage already caused by those activities.

Iturralde explained that the interdiction and other activities provided for in the antidrug-struggle program allow for the participation of police organizations and the possibility of intervention by the Armed Forces if each country makes this decision in an absolutely sovereign way.

Over 4 Tons of Cocaine, 2 Major Labs Seized

PY1402124690 Madrid EFE in Spanish 0342 GMT 14 Feb 90

[Text] La Paz, 13 Feb (EFE) — It was officially reported today that the Bolivian Police have seized four tons of cocaine, the largest ever single drug bust in the country, in the Central Valley of Chapare. They also announced that during the past few days they have destroyed two important drug-producing laboratories.

These actions were announced just two days before the drug summit that will be held on 15 February in Cartagena de las Indias, Colombia, with the participation of Bolivian President Jaime Paz Zamora, Colombian President Virgilio Barco, Peruvian President Alan Garcia, and U.S. President George Bush.

Social Defense Under Secretary Gonzalo Torrico, who is charged with the coordination of the fight against drug trafficking, has reported that the 12-February operation was conducted 10 km from the village of Isidoro, in the tropical area of Chapare, 400 km east of La Paz.

In addition to the four tons of basic cocaine paste, members of the Special Antinarcotics Force seized three electricity generators and discovered a cocaine-refining laboratory in the same place.

An unspecified number of people are being held on suspicion of producing narcotics, Torrico added.

It has also been reported that on 9 February another "very large" laboratory was found in Isidoro where 10 installations, with electricity generators used for drying the drug, laboratory equipment, a health center, a recreation room, and a kitchen were dismantled.

The high-ranking official indicated that on 2 February another 733 kg of basic cocaine paste were seized in the village of Isinuta, also in Chapare.

The Chapare region contains 80 percent of Bolivia's coca plantations and is the second largest producer after Peru.

Torrico said this means that "drug trafficking has increased in the country," because, he added: "it is estimated the two laboratories that were destroyed so shortly one after the other must have produced a large quantity of drugs."

The official stated that the increase in drug production can be attributed to an increase in demand in the United States and Europe, a lack of border controls—allowing in the chemicals needed to produce cocaine—and a consequent increase in the illegal cultivation of coca.

Brazil

January Consumer Price Index Up 68.19 Percent

PY1402123690 Brasilia Radio Nacional da Amazonia Network in Portuguese 1000 GMT 14 Feb 90

[Report by Nielmar de Oliveira from Rio de Janeiro]

[Text] With a 68.19-percent INPC [National Consumer Price Index] reported for January 1990, the cumulative INPC for the past three months totals 277.76 percent, for the past six months 851.87 percent, and for the past 12 months 2,337.64 percent.

According to IBGE [Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics] experts, the 68.19-percent INPC for January represents an increase of 16.91 percent over the 51.28-percent INPC reported for December 1989.

These figures indicate a dramatic increase in the price of foodstuffs, up from 54.59 percentage points in December 1989 to 75.21 percentage points in January 1990.

Another sector that exercised strong pressure on the January 1990 INPC was the transportation and communications sector, which registered a 75.91-percent increase.

The clothing sector registered the lowest increase: 46.28 percentage points. This helped to keep the January 1990 INPC below the 70-percent mark.

Two Bolivians Caught With 90 Kg of Cocaine

PY1402161690 Brasilia Domestic Service in Portuguese 2200 GMT 13 Feb 90

[Text] The Sao Paulo Federal Police made its greatest seizure of cocaine at the Cumbica Airport when they arrested two Bolivian drug traffickers who were trying to ship 90 kg of pure cocaine. The shipment is reportedly worth $4 million in the European market and $900,000 in Sao Paulo.

The drug was found in suitcases at the Guarulhos International Airport, in Cumbica. The suitcases belonged to the Bolivians (Falo Guianes Baiace), 39, and Carmelo Vargas Sangelo, 53, who have been arrested and who face from three to 15 years imprisonment for drug trafficking.

The seizure of 90 kg of pure cocaine was the largest ever made at the Guarulhos International Airport, in Cumbica. Police Delegate Roberto Precioso Junior believes that the cocaine was to have been shipped abroad. According to him, the Federal Police are investigating the case further to determine possible connections with international drug organizations.

Chile

* Aylwin's Cabinet Selection Process Reviewed

90ET0097A Santiago EL MERCURIO in Spanish 21 Jan 90 pp 1d, 2d

[Article by Blanca Arthur]

[Text] Patricio Aylwin was moved to tears when he stood before his fellow Christian Democrats. This was the last time he would participate in a meeting as a member. His voice trembling and his eyes glistening, he told them that he hoped to meet with them again in 4 years to tell them that "we have come through."

Just this week, the future chief executive took decisive steps to face the challenge he will have before him beginning in March. The nomination of the undersecretaries completed the front-line team that will accompany him in his government. This was no easy task, because whether or not he will be able to say 4 years from now that he has successfully carried out a mission that goes beyond his Christian Democratic Party [DC] will depend in large measure on his ability to select appropriate cabinet officials.

It is true that he has been given the power to decide on his own who will be on his team, but that freedom has its limits. In his decisions, Aylwin has had to blend a variety of elements, ranging from ensuring the political representation of the CPPD [Coalition of Parties for Democracy] to acceding to the formal demand of women after they were excluded from the cabinet. And all of this without neglecting to choose technocrats who are specialists in the various fields.

Today, now that the team of ministers and undersecretaries has been assembled, the question is what stamp it has put on the future government...to what extent party quotas were imposed, and to what degree candidates were selected on the basis of their abilities or their field of specialization. And finally, why certain people were selected and other competitive candidates were left out.

Selection Criteria

It seems redundant to say that the cabinet is a political cabinet. Even Aylwin has admitted that. But at the same time, he has been unable to hide his annoyance with the president of National Renewal [RN], Sergio Onofre Jarpa, for his statements criticizing the number of Socialists in the cabinet and the quotas that were imposed. In fact, when he was asked what he would say to him, he responded, "I think he ran off at the mouth."

The root of the problem is that although Aylwin has tried to ensure the representation of the political sectors of the CPPD, the quota system as it is traditionally understood has not prevailed. Today the term being used is "parity," meaning that certain areas will not be yielded to a single party. In practical terms, this means that when the minister is from one party, the undersecretary must be from another, with a few exceptions. The idea behind this is that all sectors in the CPPD are committed to each and every task of the new government.

Along these lines, there are some individuals who stand out as key men in the formation of the cabinet, but what Aylwin was trying to do is form a coalition government. It is no coincidence that the top leaders of the parties most representative of the CPPD have been given ministries. Aside from the DC, there is the president of the Party for Democracy (PPD), Ricardo Lagos; the president of the Radicals, Enrique Silva Cimma; the second-in-command of the Arrate Socialists, Luis Alvarado; the true leader of the Almeyda faction, German Correa; Social Democratic leader Rene Abeliuk; and the head of PAC [Center Alliance Party], Carlos Hurtado. Since they are more or less the same people who served on the Executive Committee of the CPPD, this implies that the conglomerate is ceasing to exist as such. There will not, therefore, be a party committee in addition to the government. In other words, the CPPD will hold its meetings at La Moneda at cabinet sessions.

What About the Technocrats?

Looking at the ministry through this prism, where field of specialization did not necessarily matter, it was assumed that the team of undersecretaries would be put together primarily on the basis of technical criteria. It was not for nothing that the CPPD had more than 1,000 professionals preparing the government program by expanding on the campaign platform, and all indications were that this group would be the source of most of the undersecretaries. Was it? Partly. There are names that emerged from the technical committees; there are others that did not. The composition of the team was definitely determined by the make-up of the ministerial cabinet.

In fact, it was impossible not to consider political affiliations, both because of the "parity" formula and because there were some people who had been excluded but who made their wishes known. This was the case with the Humanists, who managed to get one undersecretary (Pia Figueroa). This appointment also satisfied another demand, that women be included on the Aylwin team. The tensions among the different currents of the DC were also felt.

These circumstances and others were taken into consideration by Aylwin to put together his government team. It is still surprising how some apparently trivial situations managed to delay the decision until Thursday, when "white smoke" finally went up with the designation of the undersecretaries, after intensive negotiations and tensions in the political sphere of the CPPD.

Trouble at Interior

There was practically no surprise about the nomination of the political ministers. The "trio" of Krauss, Boeninger, and Correa was not disputed by anyone. The designation of the undersecretaries in this area was more complex, however. Indeed, it was what caused the most delay in the final composition of the team. At the Interior Ministry, the presence of Christian Democrat Krauss was a sure thing, and the undersecretary was to be a Socialist. The name of the person was also a sure thing: Ricardo Solari, of the Almeyda faction, general secretary of the Broad Party of the Socialist Left [PAIS]. But what distinguished him most was his participation in the presidential campaign organization. Along with other Socialists such as Enrique Correa or Gonzalo Martner, or Radicals such as Isidro Solis, and some Christian Democrats, he had what is called a "CPPD" spirit, and beyond his party affiliation, he was a devoted Aylwinist.

Nevertheless, problems arose. The first one is that some found it inappropriate—to put it one way—for a leader of the most leftist sector to be nominated for a post involving problems of public order and security. According to one ranking official, it would be unthinkable, for example, for him to participate in meetings along with the top police and security officers of the Armed Forces. And more than one person observed that it was even possible that legally Pinochet should nominate him, since the undersecretary of the interior is to act as a witness in the transfer of power. Some well-known Christian Democrats saw it as a problem of judgment.

Management of Funds

But the solution did not seem obvious, as the DC did not for any reason want to give up the other undersecretary post, that of regional development. This is because that office handles all the funds for the regions, no small sum of money. It is even said that the alarm was sounded when Ricardo Lagos asked for the Ministry of Public Works, planning to form a duo with another Socialist in that post. This would have enabled him to build bridges and roads throughout Chile, which could pave the way for him in '94....

The answer was no. But that did not resolve the dilemma of what to do with the undersecretariats in the Interior Ministry. In fact, it sparked an internal debate in the DC. It was clear that they could not keep both undersecretariats. Some contended that the Development Undersecretariat was the most sensitive, because these funds are vital for carrying out social programs, which could yield political benefits. The other side claimed that it was more important to have the political undersecretary on their side, because the development undersecretary, after all, has superiors to answer to.

After a long tug of war, the upshot was that the former position won; at the last minute, Christian Democrat Belisario Velasco was nominated for the political post, and Gonzalo Daniel Martner (the Daniel is to distinguish him from his father, the chief of the National Planning Office in the Popular Unity government) was proposed for undersecretary of regional development.

DC Punishment?

The nomination of Velasco caused a great deal of surprise. It did not conform to the line that was reflected in the designations of the DC members themselves, in which the Aylwinists led by Hamilton, Gutenberg Martinez, and Andres Zaldivar prevailed. For this reason, although Velasco was part of the campaign team in the CPPD, he was a Freist in the battle for the presidency of the party, and it is an "open secret" that they are the least favored, and in general have been excluded.

Two cases demonstrate this clearly; one is that of Carlos Figueroa, who was in charge of publicity in the Aylwin campaign. Although he was even a minister under Frei, this time there was no room for him in the cabinet. It is said that he was offered the post of ambassador to Italy, but he did not accept. The other is that of Genaro Arriagada, who despite his role as a key man in both party and ideological activity in the DC and the opposition in the past few years, was also excluded from important jobs. Reports are that he was offered the post of ambassador to the OAS, but he declined in spite of his contacts in the United States. After all, it would be a bitter pill to swallow, being in Washington in a second class embassy while a PAC member, German Riesco, was serving as ambassador to the United States.

Why was Velasco spared what some regard as the "punishment" that was meted out to Figueroa and Arriagada? The answer is that he was always in the "chascon" [entangled] sector, so he would never have been with Aylwin, but with Gabriel Valdes. The other two, in contrast, were potential Aylwinists, but they decided that Frei should enter the scene. This development posed a serious threat to Aylwin's presidential candidacy.

Against that backdrop, Martner finally ended up as the other undersecretary, even though there was opposition all the way in the DC. He had had run-ins with DC leaders when some statements of his were publicized in which he said that the DC had committed itself to the program and was reneging. But he is regarded as a capable man and an outstanding technician, and that view finally prevailed.

Near the President

Meanwhile, Ricardo Solari moved only a few meters in La Moneda, because he ended up as general undersecretary of the presidency, Edgardo Boeninger's number two man. This job may be as important or more important than the post at Interior, because the truth is that the power of that ministry can be great in terms of its influence on presidential decisions. It can be said that "men make the job," and no one doubts Boeninger's or Solari's abilities. Moreover, it should be noted that a proposal has been advanced to turn the General Secretariat of the Presidency into a new ministry. In fact, the post of undersecretary did not exist, and it was also given added significance when the official announcement of the list of undersecretaries included the names of the heads of two divisions: Pedro Correa in the legislation division, who will be responsible for contacts with the legislators of the CPPD; and Isidro Solis in the studies division. To be sure, there are rumors that this was done more to maintain the political balance and to make room for these two individuals. Correa, of the PAC, had been left out of the cabinet when he was vetoed by farmers, and Solis, of the Radical Party [PR], was almost nominated for the two undersecretary posts at Interior as a way of resolving the DC-PS conflict. From the team of the "CPPDists," he finally ended up...where he ended up.

Third Political Team

This spirit also prevailed in the selection of the only political ministry that was finally given to the Socialists: the General Secretariat of Government to Enrique Correa. Although it is said that Carlos Figueroa had his sights on that ministry because of his experience in communications, Correa was not in the least danger of being overlooked. He had been the executive secretary of the CPPD in the campaign, where he was responsible for ironing out differences among the various parties. He was also the assistant coordinator of the team of specialists who prepared the platform. He has definitely been an Aylwinist Socialist from the beginning, and he had established his turf. Indeed, he and Boeninger have been key men in determining Aylwin's appointments.

It was more difficult, however, to decide who would be his right-hand man. The parity formula indicated that it should be a Christian Democrat, and several nets were cast in that direction, toward different fields, of course. One field was journalism, given the necessary relations between this ministry and the mass media. It was assumed that the president of the Journalists Association, Jaime Moreno Laval, was a sure thing, as he had been a successful press chief during the campaign. But suddenly other names began to surface. The post was offered to historian Sol Serrano, who did not accept, and finally the nod was given to an eminently political leader, Edgardo Riveros, one of the vice presidents of the DC. This is definitely a political duo, and it will affect the communications sector that is being restructured. At the head of the new National Social Communication Division (Dinacos) will be Eugenio Tironi of the PPD, while the name of Jorge Navarrete is no longer disputed as head of National Television.

Sensitive Area of Defense

Although politically these three ministries, which are headquartered at La Moneda, appear to be the most significant because of the characteristics of the future government, special importance is also attributed to the Defense Ministry, for the obvious reason that it will be in contact with the Armed Forces...including Pinochet himself, during an especially sensitive period. Aylwin was well aware of this, and that was why his first choice was to offer the post to Sergio Molina, a moderate conciliator par excellence. He preferred the National Planning Office (Odeplan), however. Aylwin finally decided on Patricio Rojas, who was interior minister under Frei and was close to the Armed Forces as a result of the Tacna incident of 1969. It has already been revealed, however, that the military is somewhat upset over his initial statements about whether Pinochet should stay on.

In any case, he will not have that much influence. Although he is supposed to preside over the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Armed Forces Law did not make any changes in this regard, so it is assumed that the body will remain as inoperative as it has always been since it was created during the Alessandri administration. All indications are that in this area, Aylwin himself will be in direct contact with the commanders of the different branches of the military and with the Carabineros. This has been made clear in the case of Matthei and Stange, whom he has asked to stay on, and also in the case of Pinochet, with whom he discussed this matter in their meeting. And there is no reason to believe he will have any problems with Merino's successor.

To be sure, the Navy has shown an independent and stalwart attitude in the last few days. First of all, it was the branch that did not accept all the agreements that the government and the CPPD had reached on the Armed Forces Law, which even endangered the formula for transferring power in its present form. It was also the Navy that vetoed the undersecretary proposed by Aylwin: Socialist Augusto Varas, an expert on military matters for the CPP-D...but one who has written about the need to restructure the Armed Forces. Instead, PAC member Tomas Puig, who had worked on one of the political committees in the CPPD, was named to the post. The other undersecretaries had no problems: Christian Democrat Carlos Hunneus, director of the Center for Studies of Contemporary Reality (CERC) and a specialist in transitions, was selected as undersecretary of war; fellow Christian Democrat Mario Fernandez, an expert on Latin American politics, was appointed undersecretary of aviation; and Jorge Kindermann, who as mayor in the Frei administration had close ties with the Carabineros, was put in charge of that police organization.

Justice and Human Rights

Like defense, the position of justice minister will be of special importance in the coming term. For a long time it was taken for granted that Social Democrat Eugenio Velasco, who chaired the justice committee that worked on the CPPD platform, would be named to the post. But he apparently fell into disgrace over the controversy he stirred up regarding the pardon of political prisoners. After that, the decision became difficult. The outstanding criminal law expert Alfredo Etcheberry was among those considered, but he was also rejected. He was hurt by the fact that his statements on the repeal of the amnesty law reportedly set off Matthei's "rocket," running the risk that the Armed Forces would refuse to accept any trial.

In any event, the candidate had to be someone linked to human rights, and Aylwin finally decided on constitutionalist Francisco Cumplido, a man who is sensitive to the problem but who has been characterized by his conciliatory spirit and his willingness to seek consensus. Of course, consensus has been his specialty, but in the area of political reform. As coordinator of the Political Reform Committee of the CPPD, he participated in the negotiation of agreements with the government for constitutional reforms and the Armed Forces Law. Apparently his main task in the cabinet will be to promote initiatives for legal reforms. Some people warned that at least in the undersecretary position there must be someone with more court experience. This cost German Molina, of the Human Rights Commission, the job he had already been offered, and attorney Marta Worner was named instead. She met all the prerequisites for the job: more ties to the courts, director of the human rights pastoral of the Archbishopric of Concepcion, a Socialist, and...a woman.

Contact with the World

The least surprising, but not the least coveted appointment was that of the foreign minister. Since the presidential campaign, Aylwin had promised the job to the president of the Radicals, Enrique Silva Cimma, who had led his command. Given his good contacts abroad (he is vice president of the Socialist International), no one opposed his nomination, although there was no shortage of rivals for the position, including Ricardo Lagos. But Silva Cimma was immovable. Nor was there any doubt about his number two man, Christian Democrat Edmundo Vargas, who has carried out various missions abroad in international organizations related to human rights. This is an area that will be dealt with in a markedly different manner in the Foreign Ministry, as it is rumored that the attorney for the Vicariate of Solidarity, Roberto Garreton, will be placed in charge of the Office of Human Rights.

All in all, it seems clear that there will be no controversy over this ministry's mission in foreign relations. There may, however, be a conflict over internal relations in the CPPD. Just as there was plenty of competition for the job of foreign minister, the numerous "class A" ambassadorships are also highly coveted, and the candidates are falling all over themselves going after these jobs. The matter is being resolved formally with proposals by Silva Cimma, Vargas, and the director general, Carlos Portales of the Socialist Party. But it is a fact that this is one of the most difficult decisions remaining for Aylwin. In handing out these appointments, he has to reconcile the criteria to compensate individuals or sectors that feel left out, with the need to choose the most ideal candidates to represent Chile during this period, and at a time when the world is in a state of upheaval.

In this area, the task of Sergio Molina at Odeplan will take on more significance. It will consist basically of planning projects that will attract foreign investment. He began this job during the campaign, making contacts abroad. He faces a great challenge to meet economic expectations. That is why a Socialist, Alvaro Garcia, has been named assistant director of Odeplan, as his resume includes a stint at the United Nations.

Economic and Social Commitment

There is no doubt that the future authorities are apprehensive about how to deal with the economy, as confirmed by the fact that one of the priority measures is legislation to increase taxes. One man already assumed the responsibility for facing this problem some time ago: Alejandro Foxley, who realizes that it will be a political challenge—he knows politics as well—and has managed to wield some influence in the formation of the economic-social team of the cabinet. The choice for economy minister was just as obvious as he was: Socialist Carlos Aminami, with whom he worked coordinating the economic sphere in the CPPD.

Foxley's line, which has been echoed by Aylwin, is that the Socialist sectors must be drawn into a commitment to the policies that will be pursued, but they do not necessarily have to occupy the front-line positions. One example is the Labor Ministry, where a battle was under way until it was decided to make Rene Cortazar (also from Cieplan [Center for Research on Economic Planning]) minister and Socialist Eduardo Loyola undersecretary. The duo was undisputed (they were the technical coordinators) but there was intense pressure to make Loyola the minister. Nevertheless, Foxley's position prevailed, as he argued that in the face of an eventually unpopular economic program, the head of the ministry that is a liaison with the workers must be a Christian Democrat, since this is the sector most sensitive to social unrest. And the Socialists made the commitment to hold the second chair.

Labor, Education, Other Fields

This parity formula has been applied to the economic-social area in general, although with a different criterion than in the political sphere. In fact, Foxley also managed to get another Christian Democrat as his undersecretary, Pablo Pinera, brother of RN Senator Sebastian Pinera of Santiago. In exchange, Jorge Marshall, a Socialist like Ominami, was named undersecretary of the economy. He was the assistant coordinator of the Industry Committee. To be sure, the more controversial post is the other undersecretariat of that ministry, fishing. Because of the conflicts that the new law may provoke, a thorough search was launched until a specialist in the field who was also a Christian Democrat was found: fishing engineer Andres Couve.

In this context, all indications were that in the other social ministries the technical criterion would prevail and that specialists from the CPPD committees would be named to the posts. But as has been noted repeatedly, the defeat of the PPD leader threw the cabinet out of kilter, because Aylwin decided to put him in, offering him the Education Ministry. Of course Lagos would have preferred to be foreign minister, or public works minister, but after some thought he decided to accept the offer. Some say that there he will be more vulnerable to being "burned," because he will not have enough resources to respond to the demands of the sector. They say that this was a good move on Aylwin's part. Other versions, however, point out that Lagos is not disposed to making wrong moves, especially after his trip and fall. According to these versions, he accepted because he wants to show his willingness to cooperate with the government and to establish his legitimacy in the democratic game. He has already started to act on this challenge. It went without saying that Lagos' number two man would be a Christian Democrat. Finally, it was decided that the most appropriate person would be Raul Allard, a man with a solid background, a master's degree in international law, former rector of UCV [Catholic University of Valparaiso] and assistant coordinator of the CPPD's platform.

In another ministry in this sphere, housing, it was decided to bring the independents on board, and Alberto Etchegaray was appointed. It is felt that in fact the Catholic Church is being brought on board with him, given the new minister's ties. Although Etchegaray did not participate in the CPPD, he is a DC sympathizer and is involved in this area. As a complement to this, the technical criterion was applied to the undersecretary appointment, and architect Joan McDonald was named. She belongs to the DC, but she is above all a specialist in the field, and was a member of the committees that put together the platform. A technical criterion was also applied in the Health Ministry when the team that had dealt with this area in the CPPD, Dr Jorge Jimenez (DC) and Dr Patricio Silva (PR), was appointed.

Exceptions and Surprises

Such was not the case in Agriculture, on the other hand. Attorney Juan Agustin Figueroa's appointment came as quite a surprise. In fact, he had been intended for the Justice Ministry, but Cumplido was then chosen, and since the Radicals wanted two ministries, they had to be given the next opening. Agriculture was open because the farmers themselves had vetoed the candidates of the opposition right, German Riesco and Pedro Correa. That was how "Cucho" Figueroa ended up there, with Christian Democrat Maximiliano Cox, an agronomist and consultant to international organizations, in the number two spot.

This criterion for political representation also had something to do with the appointments in two other social ministries: Public Works and Transportation. After negotiations, adjustments, and maneuvers, PAC businessman Carlos Hurtado ended up in charge of Public Works, and the undersecretary position went to a sector that had been somewhat excluded when Christian Left leader Sergio Miquel was appointed. Meanwhile, the quota allocated to the Almeyda faction of the PS in the cabinet was filled by naming German Correa minister of transportation. His right-hand man will be Christian Democrat Sergio Gonzalez, who will be undersecretary of transportation per se, but in fact the more controversial undersecretary position is in telecommunications, which was left vacant for the time being.

In this distribution of political jobs, finally, National Property went to Luis Alvarado of the Arrate faction of the PS. His undersecretary will be Humanist Pia Figueroa, daughter of Gonzalo and an expert on ecology and the environment. The Production Development Corporation (CORFO) went to the Social Democrats with the appointment of Rene Abeliuk, who had worked in the CPPD, but in political-institutional affairs.

To close out the picture, there remains the case of Juan Hamilton, whose defeat in the legislative elections has upset the balance in the formation of Aylwin's team. It is said that he simply took over as leader of Aylwinism and imposed himself. Not only did he decide to make himself minister of mining, but he reportedly played a key role in the last-minute ouster of Sergio Bitar of the PPD, who had been a "sure thing" on the National Energy Commission first, and then in the Copper Corporation (Codelco), from which he was also bumped. Without explanation, it was announced that Christian Democrat Alejandro Noemi would take that job.

Of course, aside from the influence he wielded to dominate his own area, he is the head of the DC team that has a decisive influence on Aylwin, who cannot forget the way Hamilton plowed through the turbulent waters of the DC to make sure he was elected president of the party, a key step toward the candidacy that would eventually take him to La Moneda....

* Ministers-Designate on Their Roles, Views

* Correa's Views

90ET0100A Santiago EL MERCURIO in Spanish 21 Jan 90 pp 4d, 5d

[Interview with future Secretary General of the Government Enrique Correa by Raquel Correa: "Slowing Down"; date and place not given]

[Text] "Correa, where are you from?" The question takes him by surprise, but he reacts immediately, bursting into laughter.

"From the Ovalle Correas, just like my Cousin German. Mine is a typical middle class provincial family," he says. "My father was an attorney's assistant, my uncle an accountant....My brothers and sisters and I (two girls and two boys) were educated at public schools."

He adds, laughing, with a contagious smile, "We are of the landless Correas. We lived in Ovalle, and we rented our house. My father had some rights to a small mine that went bust...."

There have been some rather unusual episodes in Enrique Correa Rios' life, such as exile (in East Germany and Italy), plus a vocation that brought him very close to becoming a priest.

Correa (44 years old, degree in philosophy, married to Maria Victoria Paz, six children "trying for a girl," which they got just a year ago) entered the seminary when he got his "bachillerato" degree. He probably would have taken the vows were it not for his father's illness, which forced him to ask for a temporary leave. He was already wearing a cassock and had made a solemn promise—not the vows—of poverty, obedience, and chastity.

He got a job as a radio announcer and teacher. He really does have a good broadcasting voice, and now that he will be the voice and the face of the next government, he is trying to overcome his very Chilean pronunciation of the "ch" (knowing how hard it is, it would not be surprising if by March he were hissing a "sh"...). But it was at that time, there in Ovalle, that the future minister of communications found his true vocation, politics. He worked in Frei's presidential campaign, and became president of the Christian Democratic (DC) Youth.

[EL MERCURIO] And now, does your religious vocation seem incompatible with your political vocation? There are certainly plenty of priests who are involved in politics....

[Correa] (He laughs heartily again.) And I am also involved with the Church. I have always remained close to the Church, and I have been active in it.

A Socialist (of MAPU [United Popular Action Movement]) and a Catholic, the next minister secretary general of the government is a character right out of an Italian novel. He has an admirable capacity and dedication to his work. He served as Boeninger's right-hand man throughout the period that led up to the election victory in December. No one knows when, how, or where he manages to get the right document at just the right time, but the fact remains that "El Gordo" always has it ready.

He confesses that during his exile he went through what he calls his "process of socialist transformation."

"My experience with socialist countries ultimately convinced me that in order to survive, socialism needed some radical reforms. I had two moments of very strong disagreement: one, the occupation of Afghanistan; and later, even stronger, the events in Poland."

During the long interview, no question got him excited. He did not get worked up over any issue. He calls General Pinochet "president," Colonel Labbe "the minister secretary general of the government," and Aylwin "Don Patricio Aylwin," if not, with precision, "the president-elect." Respectful, calm, one might say that the only thing remaining of the traditional leftist in him is his beard, and not even that.

[EL MERCURIO] Did you keep it so that you would look like a revolutionary?

[Correa] Because I think I look a little better that way (he says, laughing). And so far no one has said anything to the contrary.

He likes film, classical music ("Bach, the Baroque composers, particularly fond of Mahler"), and in reading he does not limit himself to philosophy. "I try to read everything, preferably history," but he confides that lately he has not been able to read much other than thousands of documents.

He contends that he is not seduced by high office, and that he could happily return to his academic work tomorrow, although he admits to "a veritable passion for public service." The last time he did any research not linked to the presidential campaign was at the Diego de Medellin Theology Center. He did an empirical study of the relationship between Christian base communities and politics as an extension of "Church and Dictatorship," the work he wrote with Jose Antonio Viera-Gallo. Before that, he had investigated poverty in a study commissioned by the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA).

Very Eclectic

[EL MERCURIO] You are a practicing Catholic and a socialist. Do you think these two doctrines are related?

He has enormous dark eyes that look gentle, but they light up at the slightest intellectual stimulus. And he usually carries around a notebook in which he writes down ideas or disturbing questions. For the first time during the interview, he takes his pencil and begins writing. But he finally makes up his mind and just answers the question:

[Correa] No. To me they are two independent things. I don't think one's economic preferences or political inclinations can be rigidly tied to one's religious ideas.

[EL MERCURIO] That sounds very eclectic....

[Correa] I probably am eclectic.

[EL MERCURIO] Putting it bluntly, would you say that the Christian doctrine is socialist or capitalist?

Completely alert and concentrated, about to pick up his pencil, he ends up making an inconclusive gesture.

[Correa] The Christian doctrine is older and more lasting than capitalism and socialism, and therefore it has been of inspiration to different political systems. I would consider it narrow to say that the logical evolution of Catholic theology is socialism, nor is it capitalism. For example, now that socialism is in crisis, would theology have to be in crisis too?

[EL MERCURIO] Don't you think the teachings of Christ are more aimed at the poor?

[Correa] In being concerned primarily with the poor and with seeking changes that favor the poor, the first source—in my case—is the Gospel, the practical following of Jesus Christ....Now, from the standpoint of my political convictions, I have also become secularized.

[EL MERCURIO] You have worked extensively in the so-called grassroots church. What is your position on Liberation Theology?

[Correa] I think it is a legitimate theological school within the Church, which was rooted in the events and historic debates of the 1960s. Today it faces the great challenge of adapting to a new phase in history. Its ability to remain relevant depends to a great extent on its ability to renew itself.

[EL MERCURIO] Just like socialism?

[Correa] That's right. And I believe that liberation theologians are the first to believe that....

[EL MERCURIO] Do you admire someone like Camilo Torres, for example?

[Correa] He strikes me as a person worthy of respect, but that is a path I would not have followed under any circumstances.

[EL MERCURIO] Don't you think a priest with a rifle is a good model?

[Correa] I don't think anyone with a rifle is a good model...unless he is legally authorized to carry it.

[EL MERCURIO] You do not find violence legitimate under any circumstances?

[Correa] Not under any circumstances (he answers solemnly).

[EL MERCURIO] Whom would you like the Pope to name archbishop of Santiago?

[Correa] My preference would be Don Carlos Gonzalez; he was my teacher for so many years. I also think Carlos Oviedo would make a great archbishop.

[EL MERCURIO] Do you fear that someone too conservative for this era might be named?

[Correa] I think it is important for the archbishop of Santiago, who has a moral, cultural, and also political role, to be someone who is in a position to have normal and free-flowing contacts with the government.

[EL MERCURIO] If you had to choose between Bishops Hourton and Medina....

[Correa] If I had to choose...I would choose Hourton, naturally.

From Allende to Aylwin

[EL MERCURIO] What image did you have of Patricio Aylwin in 1973 when you were political adviser to former Foreign Minister Clodomiro Almeyda and he was president of the Christian Democrats?

[Correa] I considered him a tenacious opponent of the Allende government. But at that time his effort to bring about a dialogue was quite appreciated. Both through the government and through the Church that promoted it, I was very familiar with that process.

[EL MERCURIO] Why did it fail?

[Correa] I think it was because the intransigencies of both sides—though not of both interlocutors—prevailed. I quite agree with the interpretation of Mariana Aylwin on this point. She maintained that if her father and Salvador Allende had had the freedom and the necessary backing in their respective camps to negotiate what had to be negotiated, the catastrophe probably would have been avoided.

[EL MERCURIO] How did you win Aylwin's confidence, and Aylwin yours?

[Correa] The ties of mutual trust were established during the period between the plebiscite and the announcement of his candidacy, when he was the spokesman for the CPPD [Coalition of Parties for Democracy] and I was executive secretary. We established a very effective daily contact. I was very impressed with his ability to respect deeply the work of the technical groups, to listen to their proposals, as long as they did not try, of course, to usurp the political decisionmaking power that belongs to the leader.

[EL MERCURIO] What did you feel when you saw the Pope appear on the balcony at La Moneda next to Pinochet?

[Correa] I would have preferred not to see him there.

[EL MERCURIO] And what do you think the people of the left felt, those who were exiled, those whose human rights were trampled, when they saw Aylwin with Pinochet at La Moneda?

[Correa] That is normal. It is the meeting of the president-elect and the current president. It is a recognition that Don Patricio Aylwin will assume the presidency of the Republic in March. And that must please everyone.

[EL MERCURIO] Along other lines, the president-elect has opted for the social market economy, while you, on the other hand, said in APSI last June that there will be no social market economy in the CPPD government? What do you say now?

[Correa] That this will be an economy without nationalizations, that the rules of play with regard to property ownership will not change, and that the market will play a very clear role, as it is playing in the modern economies of the world.

[EL MERCURIO] What person do you regret seeing excluded from the cabinet?

[Correa] I would have liked to see Carlos Figueroa in it.

[EL MERCURIO] And what happened?

[Correa] There are always more candidates for minister than there are offices to hold. Actually he was considered for various ministries, and others were chosen....In any case, I think he will have a significant position in the government.

[EL MERCURIO] The exclusion of Sergio Bitar was noteworthy....

[Correa] Yes, Sergio would also have made a great minister. In short, those are decisions the president makes.

[EL MERCURIO] Would you have preferred a younger cabinet?

[Correa] ...I think that in Chile, as in the majority of transitions, the people who played a very important role during the time of crisis will play it again during the resolution of the crisis. That seems appropriate to me, because it is consistent, in some way, with the historic memory of Chileans, and it creates conditions of confidence. That must be combined with the development of the technocracy and the young intellectuals of these years, as was done with the appointments of the undersecretaries in the cabinet.

Clarification of Cabinet

[EL MERCURIO] Prominent members of the future cabinet have acknowledged that it is a political cabinet, representative of the different parties in the CPPD....

[Correa] I would like to clarify that a little. It is indeed a political cabinet, because it is representative of the political currents that make up this government coalition, since there are a significant number of national party leaders with heavy political clout; but above all, it is a cabinet in which the president's decisions have been highly respected, although the president has naturally consulted not only with all the party leaders but also with people from different spheres. The final decision has been left completely up to him. I can attest that until the day before the cabinet was formed, the principal leaders of the parties were not sure what its composition would be. The other clarification is that although it is a political cabinet, the ministers-designate also have considerable technical and academic qualities in addition to their political qualities. Each of them has quite an impressive professional background.

Learning to Get Along

[EL MERCURIO] Which of your predecessors as secretary general of the government do you feel you are furthest from?

[Correa] Uh...I would prefer not to express an opinion on that.

[EL MERCURIO] What would you, who have suffered exile, do to avoid the temptation to take revenge during the next term?

[Correa] Rigorously enforce the idea of reconciliation. Naturally, the country wants the truth, but it doesn't want confrontation. It even fears confrontation.

I think that the key point is to establish the truth about everything that happened, and I am referring to the truth that has been established in the courts according to current legislation.

[EL MERCURIO] If it were determined who killed journalist Jose Carrasco, or who burned Carmen Gloria Quintana, or who murdered Parada, Guerrero, and Nattino...what punishment would you want for them?

[Correa] Whatever the judge decides.

[EL MERCURIO] What picture would you like to hang in the Gallery of Presidents at la Moneda, and which one would you remove?

[Correa] I haven't seen the Gallery of Presidents, but I think that everyone who has ever held that office is there.

[EL MERCURIO] Including Gen Pinochet?

[Correa] Including him.

[EL MERCURIO] What name would you give to 11 September Avenue?

[Correa] Something that had no political connotations.

[EL MERCURIO] Are you playing the role of the man who is above good and bad, the pacifier?

[Correa] No. I am truly convinced that the role of the next government is to normalize the life of this country, to lower Chileans' adrenalin and to learn to get along once and for all, confident that the government belongs to everyone and that the state is a common legacy.

[EL MERCURIO] Haven't you become too bourgeois?

[Correa] (He laughs.) At least I became liberalized....

[EL MERCURIO] And do you think that people in the left are sympathetic to this process of reconciliation and "sparing lives"?

[Correa] I think they are understanding of it. Certainly they are less understanding of some things than of others, but I think they will understand better if it is explained to them. I have continued to teach classes, and the children ask me a lot of questions. I haven't met anyone who has told me that what we're doing is an aberration.

[EL MERCURIO] Basically, what is your explanation?

[Correa] Our obligation, now that the president has been elected, is to take office in a completely normal manner next March. That is our first obligation, and therefore, we must avoid any shock, any interruption that might alter the development of events.

[EL MERCURIO] Isn't it really "not rocking the boat"?

[Correa] No, no. Fulfilling our constitutional obligation and taking office in March in a completely normal manner.

After March

[EL MERCURIO] And what happens after 11 March?

[Correa] Well...we will have to take charge of the government.

[EL MERCURIO] What will happen then to those who demand that action be taken on the deaths of their loved ones, those who demand justice, those who demand pay raises...?

[Correa] We have political proposals for many of those things. Naturally, the government cannot act on all of the demands, but I don't think they will call for a radicalization as great as some people fear....I think people understand very well that things can't all be done in a day. And in that regard the election campaign that we waged served a very important function; it was very pedagogical and not very demagogic. Our commitment, basically, is to democratization, to the participation of the citizenry, to redressing their grievances....

Senate and Designates

[EL MERCURIO] Who would you like to be president of the Senate?

[Correa] Don Gabriel Valdes.

[EL MERCURIO] What would you think if Gabriel Valdes were negotiated for Sergio Onofre Jarpa?

[Correa] It is not up to the government to negotiate the executive positions of the Senate or the Chamber of Deputies. But I think it would contribute to the stability of the country if the executive officers of the Senate and the Chamber were members of the political currents represented there. Anything that favors an agreement of this type is valid, in my opinion.

[EL MERCURIO] Did you think it was wise to give up the presidency of the Senate in exchange for parliamentary agreements with National Renewal [RN]?

[Correa] I thought it was a normal political negotiation. But naturally, I prefer Don Gabriel Valdes.

[EL MERCURIO] And how would you get the strength to get him out, if the CPPD does not have a majority in the Senate?

[Correa] Well, there would have to be a series of negotiations. And I am not assuming, nor do I have any reason to, that the appointed senators will form a bloc with the RN and Independent Democratic Union (UDI) senators....Because the appointed senators are not a delegation representing a party.

[EL MERCURIO] With regard to the appointed senators, there has been an argument about what was agreed upon between the CPPD and RN. You participated in the negotiations for constitutional reform; what is your version?

[Correa] When we were negotiating the process of constitutional reform, we said that we would **not** make the elimination of the appointed senators a prerequisite for approving the reforms. And indeed, we also agreed to an increase in the number of elected senators. But as Don Francisco Cumplido and Jose Antonio Viera-Gallo clarified so well, that did not imply a commitment not to reform the Constitution later on.

[EL MERCURIO] Was there or was there not a commitment to reform the Constitution by eliminating the appointed senators?

[Correa] We consider that it is still completely valid and necessary to reform the Constitution on this matter, so that the Senate will be fully legitimate. We have not made any commitment **not** to undertake a legal initiative in this regard.

[EL MERCURIO] What people want to know is whether RN made any commitment in terms of helping to eliminate the appointed senators.

[Correa] As I understand it—and as our negotiators understand it—we have an agreement in principle with RN on at least two points in the Constitution: the appointed senators and the Constitutional Tribunal. And in February we will begin discussing all of the legal initiatives that the government will have to submit to Congress. That will be the time to revise or update these agreements.

[EL MERCURIO] But is there any document...?

[Correa] No, no. Nothing. It was a gentleman's agreement, a verbal agreement. But it was even included in the memoranda that we exchanged with RN when we began holding talks on the constitutional reforms, **before** the dialogue process began with the government. There was a period of intensive work in the technical committees of the CPPD and RN, and in those memoranda the elimination of the institution of appointed senators is included as one of the necessary reforms.

The Armed Forces Law

[EL MERCURIO] Did you feel betrayed by what happened to the Armed Forces Law this week?

[Correa] Betrayed doesn't seem like the right word to me....A commitment was broken here. We engaged in a negotiation that we thought was serious, and so did RN. We agreed on everything, even the texts that might seem the most controversial, but later the Junta sent us an approved text that has substantial differences.

[EL MERCURIO] Gen Stange said that he was not aware of any agreement....

[Correa] Our agreements were made with the executive branch, not with the Junta, in relation to the message that the executive would send. The explanation that Gen Ballerino has given us is that the Junta made the changes.

[EL MERCURIO] After that, don't you think it was a mistake to confirm Generals Stange and Matthei in their posts?

[Correa] No, no. Not at all. I think this was a setback....

[EL MERCURIO] A setback? Weren't you shoved back by the commanders in chief, two of whom Aylwin asked to stay on and one of whom is the representative of the chief of the executive branch?

[Correa] I think it was a serious setback, but I don't think it casts any doubt on the process we are going through. The process necessarily has to be aimed toward our taking office under the most normal possible circumstances, and toward normal relations between the government and the Armed Forces.

[EL MERCURIO] So between now and March, your policy is to accept any "setback"...?

[Correa] No. We are on a road on which there may be pitfalls, but this does not cast doubt on the course we have chosen. Now, we disagree with this law, and contrary to what we thought a week ago, we are going to get together with RN and other forces in Congress to modify it. And we will give priority to this reform in the legislative package we submit to Congress.

[EL MERCURIO] The future interior minister said that there was no conflict....

[Correa] There is still disagreement on 12 or 14 points in which the initial agreement was not respected. The statement by Minister Labbe in which he mentions that some omitted items do not mean any denial of the constitutional powers of the president of the Republic gives us reason to be calm about the future. But as Enrique Krauss and Edgardo Boeninger have said, even though there is no substantial conflict, we continue to condemn the fact that the terms of the agreement were not included in the final text.

[Box, p 4d] "It Is Not Governments' Function to Politicize Society"

[EL MERCURIO] You have stated that the Aylwin government will be very open and pluralistic with the press. Would you allow Hermogenes Perez de Arce to put on a program critical of the government, or to appear on a panel on National Television?

[Correa] Of course I would.

[EL MERCURIO] So that he could criticize the government on National Television?

[Correa] Yes, yes. And the government will surely also have good defenders.

[EL MERCURIO] Would you agree to have Patricia Guzman return as editor of PRENSA?

[Correa] Sure. She is a very good journalist.

[EL MERCURIO] In what ways would you like to see current press legislation changed?

[Correa] On instructions from President Aylwin, I have named a commission of jurists, chaired by the minister-designate of justice, Don Francisco Cumplido, to prepare a report on this matter. The only thing I can tell you for now is that we will aim at the most substantial possible elimination of the current restrictions.

[EL MERCURIO] So that only the Law on Abuse of Publicity would remain?

[Correa] I can't say specifically yet. I don't want to commit myself to an exact formula, because that would violate the commitment I made to the commission of jurists.

[EL MERCURIO] Why didn't the the CPPD committee of which you were executive secretary ever invite the leaders of the Journalists Association to talk about this matter?

[Correa] In fact there was no predisposition against it; what happened is that the committee that worked on the media was under a lot of pressure because of the Television Law. This is the time to do it; as soon as this interview is over, I will go to the Journalists Association to begin the first round of talks.

[EL MERCURIO] How do you see relations between the press and the government?

[Correa] There must be free-flowing and clear communication between the government and the mass media. And in addition to communicating its policies truthfully, the government has a duty to facilitate the work of the press. I would like us to reach a situation of such openness that every government official felt an obligation to keep the press informed, and that the press also felt an obligation to transmit truthfully the policies announced by the government.

[EL MERCURIO] And what if the press does not fulfill that moral obligation? How would you demand that of it?

[Correa] Publicly. I think that the government should not use private pressure; the relationship between the press and the government should be public. And I hope that all of the private restrictions disappear from the legal point of view, and that every journalist and every medium will assume the responsibilities incumbent upon them under current legislation. There are some 20 provisions restricting the press that must be reformed.

[EL MERCURIO] What will happen to the journalists who were convicted by the military courts?

[Correa] We want to resolve that problem as quickly as possible.

[EL MERCURIO] Pardon them?

[Correa] If it is necessary and possible, yes. In any case, the pardon is a presidential power.

Everyone's Media

[EL MERCURIO] Will you maintain the newspaper LA NACION?

[Correa] Yes.

[EL MERCURIO] What for?

[Correa] We would like to see some very experienced journalists turn LA NACION into an attractive newspaper that would provide a forum for all expressions of national life.

[EL MERCURIO] You also have a radio station, and a TV channel. Do you think it is important for the government to own media?

[Correa] Not the government, no. I think the state-owned media should become public media.

[EL MERCURIO] What do you mean exactly?

[Correa] That even the legal structures should be changed, if necessary, so that they can become media that belong to the entire nation, where everyone has a right to express himself. It should not be a right granted by the government because it feels like it at the moment; it should be a legal right that is duly guaranteed.

[EL MERCURIO] What about the National Social Communication Division (Dinacos)?

[Correa] It will cease to exist under that name.

[EL MERCURIO] What will you call it?

[Correa] No (he laughs). It will have a different name and different functions. We plan to reform its structure, its title, and its function, and we want to have working there a unit devoted primarily to what might be called the government's communications policy: the truthful, comprehensive, and modern broadcasting of its messages and the recommendations to the president and to the ministers, in order to project a coherent image of the government.

[EL MERCURIO] And what would be the difference between that and the Dinacos of today?

[Correa] We have to look a little more closely at what the Dinacos consists of today (he answers prudently).

[EL MERCURIO] This week Col Labbe remonstrated with you for saying that censorship exists in this government.

[Correa] We have different versions of the conversation I had with the minister secretary general of the government. He has his and I have mine, but what I want to do is to emphasize once again that in the next government there will be no censorship or "white guidelines" for the Chilean press.

[EL MERCURIO] And would you say that in this government there has been censorship and white guidelines?

[Correa] It would not be fair or truthful to say that this government has not sought to control the mass media. Censorship was exercised in this government, and that is public knowledge. Hopefully, that will never happen again.

[EL MERCURIO] Will you maintain the mandatory radio and television networks?

[Correa] The government will make very prudent use of the networks. Of course, when the president needs to address the nation, he will do so on a radio and television network, but we will try to keep it to a minimum and communicate through the normal channels, the mass media. We want to avoid odious comparisons.

Other Tasks

[EL MERCURIO] Some have expressed surprise that communication and education were placed under the direction of Socialists.

[Correa] I think that we must bear in mind that the Democratic Socialists are part of the coalition, and they have been a very important factor in the development of the democratic process in the last few years. In addition, everyone in the country knows that we had a coalition here that included Socialists, Christian Democrats, Radicals, Social Democrats...they could hardly question the Socialists' right to be part of a government, to serve in government.

[EL MERCURIO] And will the secretariats of women, youths, and the trade associations be maintained?

[Correa] No. Our plan is to create a National Office of Women at the level of the presidency of the Republic, and to create a National Institute of Youth. With regard to the trade associations, I think the labor unions will have to relate to each other through the Labor Ministry and the professional associations through the ministry that governs each area. But neither the Secretariat of Youths nor the Secretariat of Women will have a political mission. It is not a matter of establishing offices in the government designed to mobilize support; that is the task of the parties in the coalition, the social movements that support the government.

[EL MERCURIO] In other words, you do not intend to make ideological penetration in the next government?

[Correa] It is not governments' function to politicize society in their favor. They must govern for all.

[EL MERCURIO] That's what Popular Unity did....

[Correa] Try to politicize society? That was one of Popular Unity's mistakes.

* Corfo's Future Role

90ET0100B Santiago EL MERCURIO in Spanish 21 Jan 90 p 9d

[EL MERCURIO interview with Corfo Minister-Designate Rene Abeliuk: "Corfo" Will Play an Active Role in Economic Policy"; date and place not given]

[Text] The economic policy of the future CPPD [Coalition of Parties for Democracy] government is in many ways an unknown quantity. Both the composition of the political conglomerate and the previews provided by its technical and political spokesmen raise a number of questions that have not been totally resolved.

If we are to take seriously the criticism that the members of the future government coalition have expressed regarding the economic accomplishments of the outgoing government—as well as the timid recognition of a few successes—a substantial portion of the criteria used by the future officials will be different from those used today.

These differences should be reflected on the many fronts where economic policy is made, such as the Finance Ministry and its services, the Economy Ministry, the National Energy Commission, the Production Development Corporation (Corfo), and even the ministries in the social area and infrastructure.

Among these institutions, the Production Development Corporation stands out. It is there that the state "made economic development" in the early years of the institution. Later it was the armed wing of the nationalization process of the so-called Chilean way to socialism, and most recently, it has been the executor of one of the most characteristic elements of current economic policy, the distribution of property as a means to give the private sector primary responsibility for development.

In this way, the administrative criteria employed by the future officials of the Corporation are a key element for understanding and becoming familiar with many of the rules that will govern economic activity in the CPPD government.

The future minister of Corfo, Social Democrat Rene Abeliuk, gives us a preview of some of those criteria, and discusses the issues for which criteria have not yet been established because "we don't know what Corfo will encounter."

Role of the State

[EL MERCURIO] At the conceptual level, what is the role you assign to the state in the economy?

[Abeliuk] For Social Democrats, that problem was resolved many decades ago. We do not have the conflict that other schools of thought do. We believe in an economy that we call "mixed," and that others call a "social market economy."

The problem is, the current goverment used the concept of the social market economy to label a system that in our opinion had nothing social about it; it was a market economy, pure and simple, and it was quite brutish at that.

[EL MERCURIO] But at the conceptual level, beyond your particular vision of what this government has done.

[Abeliuk] We believe that the basis of economic activity is the private sector. But we also believe that the state, in the economic sphere as in all spheres of social life, has a role to play. We must not get carried away by any extreme ideology.

[EL MERCURIO] But that proposition is very general. From the practical standpoint, nuances must be defined; you must have more specific criteria.

[Abeliuk] Before answering that, one would have to have a very clear idea of the situation that will prevail in March, when we take office, and at this time I am in the process of determining that.

My knowledge of the Corporation encompasses what people know in general about the institution, plus what we know from the studies conducted by the Group of Six and the CPPD. Corfo is an important instrument, but at this time it is impossible to answer your question, because every day one opens the official gazette and finds another surprise that limits, circumscribes, eliminates, or changes something.

[EL MERCURIO] In other words, you can't define anything until you take office? You have no more permanent criterion to apply to cases such as that of Colbun, for example?

[Abeliuk] Those criteria are clearly outlined in the the CPPD platform, and we will operate within those guidelines. First of all, once democracy has been established, there must be a great public debate on the matter of privatization. One of the major criticisms we have had of this process, regardless of whether it is a good idea to privatize one entity or another, is that it has not been discussed, it has simply been done, by surprise.

Here there must be a national debate to shed light on what happened and on what really lies behind the privatizations.

Tools

[EL MERCURIO] Let's say that you've taken office and you are familiar with what Corfo has available to it. How will you proceed? What will be your priorities? Will you reconstitute what you believe is lacking in the institution?

[Abeliuk] That has been decided by the president himself, and by the ministers of finance and economy. It is not up to Corfo to set economic policy. I can express my opinion as a Social Democrat.

When we take power in our hands and find out what is there, what tools we have, then we'll see. Because from our point of view, the tools are essential, because we believe that privatization and nationalization are economic tools.

[EL MERCURIO] Among Corfo's objectives is the promotion of production. How do you see that objective developing, through what mechanisms?

[Abeliuk] In that area Corfo's responsibility is the management of the credits that it is now being required to auction off, and on the other hand, the institutes for research or technological development. All of that must be done in a context. The economic authorities will determine the policies, and Corfo will have to execute them and carry out that promotion role using the instruments that remain or the ones that we are able to reconstitute.

[EL MERCURIO] In other words, at this time there is no clearly defined criterion on this important issue?

[Abeliuk] It is impossible at this time. None of us is in a position to know or determine what we are receiving. I have my first meeting with Guillermo Letelier next week. What I am already feeling, however, is the problem of connections, the lack of tools. And an especially serious problem is the excessive notion of administrative stability applied by this government.

[EL MERCURIO] But in what practical way will Corfo develop the promotional role?

[Abeliuk] There is a lot of room here. We do not want to make a complete turnaround. The situation in Chile today is very different from what it was in 1939. At that time Chile was emerging from the crisis of 1930 in a very weakened condition.

Today the country is different; there is a great private industry. As for promoting production, Corfo has the institutes, if they have survived, and if they have not, there will be ways of creating other organizations to accomplish the same thing. The Plan is no longer with Corfo, it is the responsibility of the National Planning Office [Odeplan]. In the second place, there is another aspect that was given top priority in the the CPPD platform, and that is technological development.

I have no prejudices in this regard; if tomorrow there is a given activity that cannot be developed in any way other than with a state enterprise, and a state enterprise has to be created, it will be.

[EL MERCURIO] Do you think state action is indispensable in all of these areas? Don't you have a more favorable opinion of the system's ability to create mechanisms to fulfill these objectives?

[Abeliuk] The important thing is that these things must be accomplished. I believe that there must be cooperation between the state and the private sector. The question is how to do it. Other instruments will probably be required, because Corfo is a great tool, but its role is to execute, according to general policy.

[EL MERCURIO] In other words, this is yet another matter that you have not yet defined.

[Abeliuk] I am not in a position to specify until I know exactly what circumstances we will be operating under. If we don't know what we are going to receive, we can't be very specific. We have indicated our personal assessments, but we do not have a position on specific issues.

[EL MERCURIO] Along other lines, do you expect Corfo to have more budget support, for it to cease to be an entity that contributes to the treasury, or do you expect it to be bolstered by its own resources?

[Abeliuk] I don't know the balance for 1989. This changes so much, there are enterprises that go from one side of the balance sheet to the other. We'll have to investigate what's there.

Opinion of Corfo's Performance

[EL MERCURIO] In your opinion, has Corfo's performance been adequate in the last few years? If not, how would you have changed it, with regard to the electricity company, for example?

[Abeliuk] I have serious concerns in the area you just mentioned. If the state gets rid of the last important electricity enterprise, Colbun, I wonder what the fate of the Electricity Plan will be. The problem is how to deal with future development, and no one knows. I am worried about it now. Everything will depend a great deal on what happens with Colbun. If it is privatized, the state will end up without an important tool.

[EL MERCURIO] In your opinion, should some of the great private projects of the last few years have been developed in Corfo or another public institution? Projects such as Metanol, La Escondida, and the Chilean Coal Company (Cocar)?

[Abeliuk] That is another issue on which I do not have a clearly defined position. Along general lines, we believe that the Copper Corporation (Codelco) is untouchable.

With newly developed projects, first we must look at foreign investment, which is very welcome. For this reason, it has been said—and Carlos Ominami has said—that Decree-Law 600 would theoretically prohibit it, but it is working. If the investors regard it as positive at this time, why change it? Each individual case must be analyzed separately.

The country must be open to foreign investment. This will be either very positive or very negative, depending on the terms of each pact. We will have to resolve it, looking at the background.

[EL MERCURIO] The criticism suggests that everything would have been done differently.

[Abeliuk] The problem of the criticism derives from the method of governing, in which no one ever took into account what the country thought. That will change in the democratic government.

Privatizations

[EL MERCURIO] With regard to privatizations, so far the date has been indicated as a criterion for acceptance or revision. What other elements will be taken into consideration for these supposed revisions? The price, the mechanism, the results after privatization? Will you try to revert back to the original situation, etc.?

[Abeliuk] We think that in this area the government acted against the country's opinion, so the person who got involved in that knows what he got involved in. It will be necessary to study how the privatizations were done here. Once it is determined how and why they were done, Corfo will issue a report, and the economic authorities and the president will decide.

[EL MERCURIO] You would not have taken the initiative, taking care not to make the mistakes that were supposedly made?

[Abeliuk] Don't ask me. I would have called an election. I would not have made a decision without Congress.

[EL MERCURIO] But the point is independent of the government. If there had been a fully democratic government, would you have proposed that initiative?

[Abeliuk] With Congress, a bill would have to be submitted. We discussed the same thing in the case of the previous government; it wasn't about the social area, but about how it was done.

[EL MERCURIO] The question goes to the basic principle.

[Abeliuk] If you ask me directly, I would never have gotten rid of some instruments. The role of the state in a developed country is very different from that of an developing country, where the state has to make development.

In general terms, I would never have given up some instruments such as the National Petroleum Enterprise (Enap) or National Electric Power, Inc. (Endesa). The Pacific Steel Company (CAP) is very debatable; in the Chilean Chemical and Mining Association (Soquimich) there is another kind of problem. That is the way we Social Democrats are; we don't have the ideological bias that others have. I think the state got rid of some instruments that it will miss.

[EL MERCURIO] What is your opinion of the economic experiences of some neighboring countries that have tried to make intensive use of the instruments of the public sector or have equipped the public sector with more instruments in order to develop policies in the direction that you are proposing?

[Abeliuk] Look, first of all I reject the arrogance with which some Chileans view the situation of some of our neighbors. On the contrary, we must learn lessons from them.

In fact, their economic policies have not succeeded in curing the ills they inherited. It is not just a matter of how they administered their policies; they inherited a disastrous political and economic situation.

[EL MERCURIO] The question is not how the young democracies have managed, but the judgment refers even to previous periods, when it was also thought that development could be spurred by using the tools of the state.

[Abeliuk] I understand you, I know where you're going. The conclusion I draw from the tragedy of our brother countries is that to have a good economy, you must have good political institutions; that is the only way.

The situation in Chile is different. Perhaps if we had taken over the government in 1983, the situation would be similar to theirs. The problem is, these countries have had a tradition of weak institutions. The difference is that in Chile the parties have not been destroyed; this has been a key element that has not been present in the other Latin American countries.

The great mistake made by the Chicago Boys is that they thought the economy could be separated from politics and the institutions. That is an element that Chile did not lose, despite these last 16 years.

[EL MERCURIO] Do you believe that with the political institutions that existed prior to the beginning of this government, Chile would have been able to face the oil crisis of 1975 and the debt crisis of 1982?

[Abeliuk] That is pure speculation. I don't want to issue a judgment on the coup. But if the institutions had been restored more quickly, it would have been easier to solve these problems. Democracy always solves problems better. We have run very serious risks here by maintaining authoritarianism beyond what was logical and reasonable.

My personal opinion is that if the institutions had been restored right away, the situation would have been different. Not the same institution, because no one is defending the Constitution of 1925, which erred in the same way as the Constitution of 1980. The authors were too wrapped up in the problem they had just experienced.

The fundamental mission in Chile is to restore democratic institutions, and the prospects for that are very good. We have very good economic prospects here, in spite of the difficulties. I am very optimistic, as is the president-elect.

* Justice Ministry Issues

90ET0100C Santiago EL MERCURIO in Spanish 21 Jan 90 p 10d

[Interview with Justice Minister-Designate Francisco Cumplido: "We Will Not Use a Broad Brush To Administer Justice"; date and place not given]

[Text] Francisco Cumplido knows that his mission will be "delicate and difficult." The future justice minister begins by pointing out that "the human rights issue is, under any circumstances, a very important and top-priority matter."

[EL MERCURIO] And what is the situation of the political prisoners?

[Cumplido] Obviously, I am especially concerned about the political prisoners, because we have opted to serve the poor and needy, and the political prisoners are, in the good sense of the word, poor.

[EL MERCURIO] Are the differences that arose during the campaign already resolved?

[Cumplido] The general lines of the CPPD [Coalition of Parties for Democracy] platform were approved by the executive boards of the 17 parties. Our commitment is to carry out the basic platform. There may be differences regarding strategies and specific measures, and in a presidential system such as ours, it is the president of the Republic who resolves those differences.

[EL MERCURIO] Some have made a distinction between crimes of blood and crimes of conscience. What is the opinion of the justice minister?

[Cumplido] Some highly differentiated language is used on this subject. There is quite a technical discussion regarding this type of crime. When people talk of prisoners of conscience—and there are norms established by international law and Amnesty International governing this—they are talking about political crimes in which the person has been judged for his ideas, and obviously, no violence has been involved.

Less technical and more journalistic is the concept of "crimes of blood." This refers to homicide of different types, serious injuries, torture, and its psychological and physical consequences. And there are other types of crime that, while not crimes of conscience, require special treatment. One of these is sedition, which is a political crime without the use of weapons.

To clarify the situation, I believe that penal law, international law, has advanced sufficiently that there is no need to do justice with a broad brush. Therefore, justice will be more equitable and fair.

[EL MERCURIO] Do you already know how many and which prisoners fall into each category?

[Cumplido] We have the political will to resolve the situation of the political prisoners equitably and justly. This forces us to make distinctions whose fundamental bases are already in the platform. To apply these abstract concepts to reality, we are trying to put together all the background information to determine the magnitude and characteristics of each individual situation and of all of them. It would not be right for me to give you a figure at this time.

[EL MERCURIO] With regard to the antiterrorist legislation, the CPPD's platform speaks of "changes." What changes will be made?

[Cumplido] We did not agree with the Antiterrorism Law in the terms in which it was passed. I questioned it publicly. The terrorist behaviors that were included go far beyond what legal doctrine encompasses. The government itself agreed that it was not correct, to the extent that it modified the law, eliminating some of the elements of the crime. We have not been able to evaluate the juridical and human meaning of these changes, although in principle it seems to us that the law has not been able to establish the true meaning of terrorist conduct.

The basic point, then, is to define it. For some it is an ideology, for others a method of action, and for others it is possible to describe specific crimes that are manifestations of terrorist conduct. For me it is a method of action, and not just political. The important thing is to define terrorist conduct.

[EL MERCURIO] What is your definition?

[Cumplido] I don't know if this will be accepted by the president, so this is not final. It consists of threatening the life (homicide, for example), the physical or psychic integrity (injuries, torture), or the freedom (kidnaping) of the victim, but using methods that are ostensibly cruel and indiscriminate for the purpose of provoking in society a pedagogy of intimidation, or mere fear. In other words, not just any violence.

Once an agreement has been reached with the president on the concept, we will examine the legislation and introduce all the necessary modifications to bring it in line with this definition.

This has effects. If an act were to be declared no longer a crime, the perpetrator would be released, and might remain exempt from any liability, or he could be prosecuted under nonterrorism laws.

[EL MERCURIO] Do you favor guaranteeing the release on bail of this type of prisoner?

[Cumplido] Release on bail should be the general rule, unless the judge feels that it may be necessary to impose preventive detention to ensure the success of the investigation, or that the person is an extreme danger to society.

[EL MERCURIO] The latter is assumed in the case of many political prisoners.

[Cumplido] I think the courts have been reasonable on this matter, and the judge should state his ground very clearly if he denies bail. Perhaps to accommodate that circumstance, some modifications will be needed.

[EL MERCURIO] And what does that mean?

[Cumplido] Today the Code of Criminal Procedure establishes restrictions for releasing someone on bail, and it would have to be repealed for the judge to be able to determine whether to release someone. It is not up to the legislators to establish these limitations; the judge who is familiar with the case should freely determine this matter on the basis of the two elements mentioned previously.

[EL MERCURIO] Do you favor eliminating the practice of holding prisoners incommunicado?

[Cumplido] Prolonging imprisonment incommunicado is a form of torture. The Bar Association gathered information from national and international experts, and we reached the unequivocal conclusion that holding someone incommunicado for more than a week seriously affects his psychic condition. Any confession obtained by holding someone incommunicado for a prolonged period is null and void. It is necessary to hold people incommunicado to investigate special situations, but never more than 5 days.

[EL MERCURIO] Are you thinking of dropping charges or declaring some prosecutions invalid, as the CPPD platform states?

[Cumplido] Declaring a prosecution invalid is an existing practice. We think that when rational and just procedures have not been followed—due process—there are grounds for a mistrial, which could be reinstated by establishing special review mechanisms or special evidentiary periods.

A confession that is reasonably considered to have been obtained through illicit means could be annulled. If a person has not been given a chance to put on a defense, special evidentiary periods could be provided.

[EL MERCURIO] But out-of-court confessions are not valid at present.

[Cumplido] Sometimes judges take notice of out-of-court confessions and the testimony of the security services.

[EL MERCURIO] Don't you fear that there will be an increase in terrorism with less to impede it, as happened in Peru?

[Cumplido] We have not said or affirmed that we will eliminate all the legislation; we will reduce the number of cases in which there is terrorist conduct. We regard terrorism as a violation of human rights. Even the Universal Declaration of Human Rights allows the state to take restrictive measures.

[EL MERCURIO] In other words, as the future interior minister said, if measures have to be taken, they will be taken.

[Cumplido] There is a political will to enforce the law...but a just law.

[EL MERCURIO] Do you think that during this period there have been sufficient guarantees in the trials against political prisoners?

[Cumplido] No, there have not.

[EL MERCURIO] But the military prosecutors, who have handled most of these cases, are under the tutelage of the Supreme Court.

[Cumplido] The mere fact that many cases are heard in military courts when the crimes involved are not military, and all kinds of procedural restrictions normally reserved for military crimes are imposed on these crimes, means that there is no opportunity to put on an adequate defense. I think the jurisdiction of the military courts must be modified so that they will be restricted to military offenses.

[EL MERCURIO] But they are under the tutelage of the Supreme Court.

[Cumplido] The Bar Association brought this situation to the attention of the Supreme Court on many occasions, particularly with regard to prolonged periods of incommunicado detention, massive searches, premature trials held by the authorities who were to make final judgment. We have stated many times that the courts have not investigated the responsibility or the innocence of different people with equal zeal. There are instances of people who have spent months or years in preventive detention, and then the judge releases them unconditionally. That proves that the judge has not investigated the possible innocence of the person with sufficient zeal.

[EL MERCURIO] Nevertheless, this situation does not just affect political prisoners.

[Cumplido] It is quite a widespread problem in the Chilean criminal justice system, but it is markedly more serious with respect to political prisoners. The problem lies in the fact that merely charging the person with a terrorist act causes the courts to consider him a danger to society, to allow him to be held incommunicado, and to deny him bail.

Advice

"A justice minister should not express opinions on the rulings of courts, but I am still at liberty to express an opinion as an academic," he stated when we broached this subject.

[EL MERCURIO] Do you favor pardoning people who have been condemned to death?

[Cumplido] (After clarifying that it is not the justice minister who makes that decision, he made this statement.) If I had to advise President Aylwin, I would tell him to pardon them. Because it is irreparable; it does not reeducate them; it is more an act of social vengeance that I do not agree with.

[EL MERCURIO] It has been effective....

[Cumplido] No. Studies in criminology show that it is not that effective.

[EL MERCURIO] Yes it is, for combatting terrorism in some countries. Take the Baden Meinhoff case in Germany.

[Cumplido] It disappeared because the State took all the necessary measures to combat terrorism.

[EL MERCURIO] Another problem is the Amnesty Law. Will it be repealed or not?

[Cumplido] In the CPPD platform we stated that we would propose the repeal of the Amnesty Law. Our decision will be made as soon as we have full knowledge of the situations. I have a suspicion that all of the cases can be resolved without the need to invalidate the law. I can't give you a definite opinion, as we are studying the matter case by case.

[EL MERCURIO] In other words, there may be more political prisoners....

[Cumplido] With regard to amnesty, you should give amnesty in all situations where the circumstances are the same, because otherwise you jeopardize equality before the law.

[EL MERCURIO] That is, amnesty will not be abolished just so that military officers can be prosecuted.

[Cumplido] No double standards, no. And I would prefer not to have to propose either repeal or invalidation to the president.

* Future Congressional Negotiations Viewed

90ET0096A Santiago EL MERCURIO in Spanish 21 Jan 90 pp 1d, 3d

[Article by Cecilia Alamos: "Legislators Already in Session"]

[Text] It looks as though there will not be any politicians on vacation this year.

The pace of work has become dizzingly fast for all of them since the December election. Some are concerned about handing over power; others, about receiving it properly, and all, about the appointment of new ministers and assistant secretaries.

And amid all of this, the legislators-elect are being broken in.

After they traveled back to their districts to thank their constituents, they devoted themselves full time to studying their future work in Congress.

There are indeed many facets to this work. Some have to do with what they will be doing inside their groups, and others with the people who will be allies or opponents.

They have to see who is on what committee, who the officers of the houses will be, how legislation is to be handled, and what bills are going to be submitted.

Therefore, negotiations are the order of the day. In private homes, offices, and favorite restaurants the "caucus coordinators" are holding informal and other meetings.

And results are beginning to be seen. This week the united PS [Socialist Party] and the UDI [Independent Democratic Union] revealed who their representatives will be on the various committees. DC [Christian Democracy] did so on Friday, and RN [National Renewal] was expected to by today.

Meanwhile, the key point is being negotiated: the "legislative package" that is going to be submitted when the next government takes over.

Chamber Presidency Votes Postponed

All of the parties have directed their major negotiating efforts towards putting together an agenda that will give specific answers to several of the "million" questions: What bills will be taken up during the first stage, when they will be taken up, and above all, how they will be passed.

This is the basis for everything. Any other matter, such as negotiations on the presidencies or the formation of the various chambers, has been subordinated to a prior agreement on these points. To put it differently, it would be the condition that could come up at consensus boards...if everything goes well.

They are so determined to do this that during its expanded session last weekend the DC decided that it was not even going to put forth names for the negotiations on the presidencies of the chambers until it sees how the talks that it is having on legislative matters with National Renewal, the UDI, and the Radicals are going. Its first impulse had been to put up Gabriel Valdes as an opponent of Jarpa, who has attended the negotiations with RN. But they chose to hold back their card for later.

They basically felt that abandoning this area of negotiations now would strengthen their hand in seeing to it that a major set of laws is ready for passage even before Congress is inaugurated in March.

The package that the CPPD [Coalition of Parties for Democracy] wants to buy contains tax reforms, legislation on municipal democracy, and changes in the Organic Law of Congress. It also provides for the possibility of debating the reform of the administrative statute and the Budget Law.

Shares of Power

We must not forget that there are a good many parties in the CPPD that want to gradually make it clear that they too have bargaining power and that they do not want to leave the DC with the biggest share of power. The Socialists, for example, wanted the matter of electing officers resolved by giving DC the presidency of the Senate and their bloc the presidency of Deputies. They are seeing, however, that this would not be possible within the negotiating framework that is being imposed. True, there has been talk of resolving the impasse by creating a second vice presidency in the Senate, which would go to Ricardo Nunez. But even so, and without intending to create rifts in the multiparty coalition, they do not want to see their bargaining power diminished.

Thus, they have stepped up their own bilateral meetings. Radicals, the UDI, and RN have spoken on several occasions with them and are even reportedly looking into a way to make their contacts public.

The Radicals are doing likewise.

This is a way of letting the DC know that alone it is not in the driver's seat.

Accords with RN

Meanwhile, the issue of the presidency of the Senate is important to RN. They agree, to be sure, that to reach agreements they need to have negotiated other points first. Therefore, their idea is that the DC would "exchange" the Senate presidency for RN support of certain bills.

They would not be any old bills, of course....They would reportedly be willing to legislate on four or five issues and to set up consensus committees in advance to look into them. This is why they are tossing around the names of legislators with whom it would be easiest for them to reach agreements. If we had to define the working model in RN words, it would be something like "being coprincipals in strengthening democracy."

In any event, Aylwin and Jarpa are expected to begin ironing out the differences in strategy at their meeting tomorrow.

Meanwhile, the UDI is enjoying its new political status, which has prompted Aylwin himself to underscore the possibility of reaching agreements with the group and has given it new bargaining power that has translated into numerous contacts.

The important thing is that since no political force has enough of a majority to make major changes in the laws, the groups will not be able to pressure each other too much. Seeking a consensus will be the key.

An interparty commission that is already in operation may be a good example of this. This congressional group is looking into another key news item this week: the possible return of the Congress to Santiago. Espina or Mekis, representing RN; Victor Manuel Rebolledo from the unified PS; Jaime Campos from the PR [Radical Party]; Eliana Caraball and Carlos Dupre from the DC, and a representative of the UDI are taking over the talks that the various caucus coordinators have carried on up to now. The idea is to look into all of the aspects of the facilities in Valparaiso and to see whether Congress can operate there with appropriate resources. The commission could also look into possible changes in the Organic Law of Congress, the bylaws of the chambers, and the administrative staffing.

The Controversy Over Valparaiso

The issue of where Congress will function has also captured the interest of legislators within the parties.

A majority of lawmakers would apparently prefer Congress to meet alongside the Executive Branch. In fact, the DC and PS have come out in favor of this.

But nothing is very definite yet. Not all senators and deputies have been polled, and even the parties that most strongly favor a return to Santiago have some members who are opposed. Moreover, in the personal opinion of Alberto Espina, RN would be inclined to leave Congress in the Fifth Region, and the UDI has come out publicly in favor of remaining in the new location.

In Valparaiso, meanwhile, the coordinators of the building construction and the lawmakers elected from this region are getting a move on. Worried by the flood of news indicating that Congress may not operate in their region, they have been meeting to plan a veritable public-relations campaign. And they are going to launch it in several directions.

The first is to give lawmakers appropriate information about the progress and quality of the construction project. They feel that they have not gotten an accurate idea of what the new building will be like and plan to psych them up by inviting them to tour the site. The did their first test of the strategy this week. Along with Senators Sergio Romero, Laura Soto, and Beltran Urenda, they invited Deputies

Alberto Espina, Federico Ringeling, and Claudio Rodriguez. The results were good. On returning, Espina was very interested and, in passing, invited Juan de Dios Carmona to discuss the issue at the RN convention that is being held today in Santiago.

The coordinators plan to intensify the schedule of visits as of 15 February.

All Set, Everything Ready

They also want to show lawmakers that it is unimportant for the Legislature to be in the same city as the Executive Branch. According to them, the technology that is going to be used for contacts is so sophisticated that communications will be much smoother than they ever were when the two branches were in Santiago. And they will show them so in practice. On 6 or 8 February they are planning to demonstrate the teleconferencing system, the fax machines, and the direct telephone lines. They are convinced that they will be amazed.

Lastly, they are working on all of the details so that the swearing-in ceremony reflects the excellent work that Congress will do as of 11 March. To this end, the team of Modesto Collados and Juan de Dios Carmona has been joined by the secretaries of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, the chief of protocol, and the assistant secretary of the interior, and they are not only planning the ceremony but also making sure that a large team of personnel will be handling all of the administrative tasks.

Meanwhile, it was learned that Carmona is looking for a large number of attached offices and that a committee of well-known residents of Vina del Mar and Valparaiso is sending letters to the lawmakers offering to register their children in local schools, rent homes for them, and get them into exclusive local clubs.

They have left nothing to chance.

Congress and Indictments

Amid all this the Constitutional Court handed down its ruling on the Organic Law of Congress on Thursday.

In an unappealable ruling it established that the transfer of presidential power will take place on 11 March and that the installation of Congress that same day must include both elected and appointed senators. Lastly and most importantly, it said that as far as indictments are concerned, Congress would have the power to bring charges only for actions that took place after it began operating, in other words, after March 1990.

Although the political parties acknowledge that they have not had a minute to study it, the ruling immediately prompted controversy. It was with good reason that there were constitutional gaps on these three points on which constitutional experts from various political groups had not come to terms, and the ruling did not embody any of the opinions voiced by the opposition.

True, not all of the differences of opinion had the same "specific weight." In fact, the disagreement over the day for the transfer of power was regarded as a minor matter. They wanted Aylwin to take over from Pinochet on the 14th instead of the 11th for symbolic reasons. And thus holding the ceremony on the anniversary of the 1980 Constitution did not seem right to them.

All in all, the opposition had assumed that the court's ruling was going to go against them. So in the talks to prepare for the transfer of power the government and the CPPD assumed that the ceremony would be held on 11 March.

Things did not go as smoothly with reactions to the ruling on temporary Articles One and Three, namely, the articles concerned with when the appointed senators would take office and the ability of Congress to prosecute the Pinochet government under the constitution.

In the first case the ruling brought a surprise: The chief justice of the Supreme Court, Luis Maldonado, did not stand by his own argument, as expressed in a minority vote in a recent Supreme Court ruling, that the powers under which the various bodies can appoint the appointed senators are not yet in force. On the contrary, in spite of the controversy that his words prompted at the time, he joined the other members of the court this time in a unanimous opinion that the incorporation of the appointed senators into Congress in March "...should be understood only within the harmonious whole of the provisions of the constitution and in accord with the concept of the National Congress that the constitution has established and that it would not be practicable to alter."

There is a great deal of speculation about why the chief justice changed his mind. Most people, however, conjecture that he chose to "let the issue pass" because he presumably did not have enough legal arguments on which to base a no vote. Maldonado presumably would have preferred that what happened to him on the National Security Council not happen to him again this time; on that occasion, he voted to appoint the senators that were up to the council to name even though he was opposed to the idea.

The opposition is upset because the ruling closes the chapter on the appointed senators for the next presidential term. Under the agreement that RN and the CPPD reportedly reached, this issue would not be reopened for 4 years, at which time the system would be reexamined.

Others Methods of Investigation

The debate that the last point in the Constitutional Court's ruling prompted cannot be regarded as a closed chapter, however. If we sift through the tangle of legal and constitutional terms, what the ruling specifies is that the Chamber of Deputies may not institute a political trial against the current government. In other words, in the future the two houses will not be able to force Pinochet to appear before them to answer charges that he openly violated the constitution or the law. Nor may they so demand of cabinet ministers, intendants, or governors accused of crimes of treason, extortion, embezzlement, or bribery.

The reason, according to the ruling, which Luis Maldonado and Ricardo Garcia did not join in, is that the houses were not authorized to state whether there were grounds for a constitutional indictment.

It is around this point that the controversy revolves.

The opposition is talking about how scandalous it was not to give the House prosecutorial powers. They feel that the provision is a virtual "whitewash law" that will enable any crime committed during these years to go altogether unpunished.

According to Interior Ministry sources, however, there is no basis whatsoever for this interpretation in the provision. Their explanation is that it is not true that the law prevents crimes and abuses from being investigated or culprits from being punished.

In their opinion, the law passed on Thursday in no way touches the prosecutorial powers of the Chamber of Deputies. Such powers are supposedly enshrined in Article 48, Number 1 of the constitution; what the temporary article of the Organic Law of Congress limits is Article 48, Number 2, concerning constitutional charges.

Moreover, since it does not restrict the deputies' prosecutorial powers, it does not scuttle the possibility of investigating that arises from them either. Thus, the sources continue, there are other avenues that can be used to investigate and punish, if necessary.

One of them would be Article 84 of the bylaws of the Chamber of Deputies, which is currently in force. This article empowers the House to appoint ad hoc committees that can pursue whatever legal purposes they deem appropriate. One such purpose could be to investigate any possible crime committed by officials of the current government, and if it develops conclusive proof of their guilt, it could bring it before the courts of justice.

Pinochet on Trial?

But laws come and go. What lies behind this whole jumble of arguments is a political issue that goes beyond the constitution. As Minister Hugo Rosende, the author of the law, disclosed in June of last year, "the intention is not to hide anything, but rather to save the officials who have governed or cooperated under the military regime from often inappropriate treatment by more than one member of the committees, as the undersigned has seen during the 16 years that he was in the Chamber of Deputies."

The Executive Branch's fear is that the Chamber of Deputies (where the opposition has a majority) will decide to bring political charges against a regime of which it was not a part without having conclusive legal arguments. Since charges are brought by a simple majority in the Chamber of Deputies, it could presumably harass Pinochet constantly. If after the corresponding investigation the Senate did not allow the charge, the public could then conclude that the Senate does not want to investigate.

As the sources put it, the only thing that the law seeks is to prevent constant partisan political accusations from becoming a parallel course of action to judicial inquiries.

Mutual Mistrust

Meanwhile, the opposition has its suspicions. Although they acknowledge that they have not explored this possibility, they see it as an opening.

Moreover, they are voicing their doubts. If it were necessary, could the man who will be commander in chief of the Army be investigated and punished through this channel? They do not know.

So, they prefer the safer path: trying to get the next Congress to repeal the law.

And since this will not be easy, inasmuch as this is an Organic Law and they would need a 57-percent vote of the two houses, their strategy is directed elsewhere. Just as the negotiations on Senate and Deputies officers depend on a prior agreement on a series of bills that the parties want to submit to the next administration, the presidency of the two houses could also be talked over after a formal commitment by politicians to repeal the Law of the National Congress.

The matter does not worry its proponents at all. After all, they say, how can a legislator agree to have his powers restricted? In their judgment, repealing the law would be almost "proof of democratic purity."

* PPD's Imminent Demise Analyzed

90ET0095A Santiago HOY No 645 in Spanish 15-21 Jan 90 pp 3-5

[Article by Pedro Ramirez P.: "Politics: the PPD in the UTI"]

[Text] Ricardo Lagos stands alone and has no political party base. His own supporters comment, off the record of course, that the PPD [Party for Democracy] will not last beyond the first half of 1990. The principal factions of the socialist movement united and became the largest party of the Left, bypassing the Party for Democracy to do this.

This is a long story which was slowly resolved after the repeated errors which Lagos made. There was a latent conflict which no one wishes to recognize publicly but which is virtually a required subject for conversation in any political meeting. Responsibility for it is shared by a number of personalities, ranging from people who supported the Almeyda faction of the Socialist Party [PS] and who say, "The only thing which we want is for the PPD to be deflated quickly," to the most determined members of the PPD, such as Jorge Schaulsohn, who consider that "there are no problems in the PPD, and not even an impasse."

Whatever the outcome, the fact is that the PPD will never again be the party which it was. In the view of some people—particularly the members of the Almeyda faction of the PS—the party should be turned into a front or movement built around the Socialist Party, an extension of the party to bring progressive elements together. ("The question is how to present this matter so that those independents will not perceive that what is involved is turning the PPD into an instrument of the PS.") In the view of other people—particularly the socialists of the Arrate faction of the PS who are also members of the PPD—the Party for Democracy has already completed a cycle of its existence and should be turned into a movement where socialists and independents have room for a common program with a role distinct from that of the PS (although as of now no one is capable of explaining what that role would be).

Finally, there are the independents, who feel that the existence of their party was cut short by groups outside the PPD. They do not wish to be the tail end of the PS. As a high official of the PPD said, who preferred to remain anonymous while recounting the "odyssey" of Lagos and his party, "a lot of dirty tricks were played, and now it is time to get someone to pay the bill."

The Downfall of Ricardo Lagos

In the middle of 1989 Ricardo Lagos should have set the first alarm bell ringing for himself and for the PPD. The process of socialist unification was beginning to pick up speed, with dates and other details agreed upon. It is no mystery to anyone that the PS-Almeyda never considered the possibility of joining the PPD, as Lagos wished it to do. If, in the view of the members of the Almeyda faction, the Party for Democracy was a problem, it was also a headache for the members of the PS-Arrate, because this was an obstacle for the process of unification.

From then on the question was batted back and forth between the members of the PPD, who defended their party, and the socialists, who were looking for a good place in the files to put this party which had served its function as an instrument for the elections, without making too much of a fuss.

The strategy of those close to the PPD leader was simple: "If Lagos wins, the party wins, and we all win." The only support for continuing and strengthening the Party for Democracy, the only pillar which "would assure the continuation of the PPD for a time," was an overwhelming victory by Lagos in the legislative elections. The next step would have been to turn him into the president of the Senate. Who would dare to touch the party of the winner and the charismatic leader of the forces of renewal?

However, as a result of his own errors and of those which he shared with his advisers, Lagos lost. And, following the simple logic of the strategy which his followers had outlined, after the defeat of Lagos the PPD also lost.

He made his first error when he began his campaign. As Heraldo Munoz, the leader of Lagos' own supporters, has stated, Lagos would not listen to his advisers, who recommended to him the "Jarpa option," that is, running in an electoral district where he would be sure of victory. He insisted on Santiago. Many people already understood clearly that his entry into the Senate depended on the PPD's continuing to exist. Therefore, what was important to them was to ensure him of having an electoral district "with no complications." However, as Munoz said, the man liked "big challenges."

Once the question of the electoral district was settled, Lagos and his advisers chose to burden themselves by running on the same list with Zaldivar, although things looked easier if he ran on the same list with Frei. The Christian Democratic advisers recommended Zaldivar, who accepted the PPD offer, on condition that he chose the electoral district. And he chose Santiago Poniente [Santiago West], where the Christian Democrats have a party machine with more than 30 years of experience and where the PPD was only recently established.

Andres Zaldivar began his door-to-door campaign, with a great deal of direct contact with the voters. Refusing to accept the counsel of his advisers, Lagos preferred to use television. Again and again they recommended to him that he "lower his tone and not fight so much with everyone." However, he continued to seek a place in the House of Representatives, pointing with his fingers and accusing people left and right.

Heraldo Munoz believes that Lagos also made a mistake by going out into the provinces to support other candidates. Munoz said: "His campaign was aimed at a national audience. He ignored his electoral district, and the voters saw that Lagos was not paying attention to their problems." He recognizes that the defeat of the PPD leader was not only due to his own errors but also to the strategy and intelligence of Andres Zaldivar, a politician of great experience.

Time for Readjustment

With all of the internal problems of the PPD during the campaign it was already apparent by the first week of December that things were getting difficult. On the night of 14 December there were tears in the PPD, but there was also enough political intuition to begin the process of readjustment after the defeat. They began to shuffle the cards again, and the future of the PPD seemed to be uncertain. There was one less obstacle for the unity of socialism, and Lagos began to be left alone.

In the beginning of December Sergio Bitar met with the Christian group in the Party for Democracy. From his remarks it clearly emerged that the only way to move forward was to strengthen the PPD, turning it into an axis around which a renewed Left could gather, bringing together humanists and the Christian Left. The unity of all of the factions of the Chilean socialist movement did not involve passing over the PPD but should have been achieved by bringing it together under the great umbrella of the PPD as an instrument for this purpose. Shortly after the elections Sergio Bitar and the Christians in the PPD made public their decision to join the reunified PS.

A PPD source commented: "Many things like that pass for style. What happened is that Lagos lost, and not everyone wanted to lose with him."

In part that solitude is also the fault of the leader of the PPD himself. Lagos continued to make mistakes. In the third week of December a plenary session of the Central Committee of the Socialist Party-Arrate faction was held in Canelo de Nos to define its union with the Socialist Party-Almeyda faction. As always, Lagos arranged to arrive late. He spoke before the assembly, calling on it to achieve unification by making use of the "legal container" of the PPD. Then he left. At this point a rural leader stood up and said: "What does our comrade think when he comes to speak to us without remaining to hear what we think? He must think that he is the lord of some country estate." Soon after that the plenary session unanimously approved the establishment of the unified Socialist Party.

An Inexorable Destiny

The socialists belonging to the Almeyda faction of the PS recall that in the private understandings attached to the agreement on party unity, signed by Clodomiro Almeyda and Jorge Arrate, the future of the PPD was decided. One of them said: "The PPD was evaluated as the instrument which provided a channel for the participation of progressive independents. However, it was clear that it could not continue to exist as a party. It will have to lower its profile or disappear or become a movement or front group of the PS."

After all, the Almeyda socialists decided to join the Arrate socialists in order to become the largest party of the Left. They did not intend to keep in existence such a close competitor as the PPD. Furthermore, the PPD is a party which the Arrate socialists control. Therefore, the Almeyda socialists say that, at most, the PS would be a kind of circle, and the PPD would be the aura surrounding it.

That would explain why many Almeyda socialists are rapidly leaving the Party for Democracy, since sooner or later the real center of power will be the PS.

However, socialists of the Arrate faction point out that it will not be so easy to leave the PPD. They know that in the PPD there is a large group of people who would never be members of a traditional, ideological party like the PS but who, nevertheless, are prepared to follow the most progressive policies, as they have done until now in the PPD.

Ricardo Nunez indicated to HOY that the PPD has already completed the first cycle of its life by helping to defeat the military dictatorship. However, it must now redefine its future role, "keeping itself as a space which would fit the fringe of progressive people who would like to participate in the rebuilding of democracy." In his view this would involve turning the PPD into a movement, "however it might be called," which would provide for this kind of participation. He recognizes that there is a risk that such action would lower the profile of what now is the Party for Democracy. However, he says that "no party is forever sure of continuing to exist in this country, and this applies to the PPD as well."

For their part supporters of the PPD—among whom such figures as Lagos, Schaulsohn, and Victor Manuel Rebolledo stand out—have no intention of changing anything in the party. When Ricardo Lagos himself was asked by the press about the future of the PPD, he was half surprised and half annoyed when he answered: "What is a movement?" He emphasized that the Party for Democracy will continue to exist legally and that in no case will it be turned into something different or join a federation alongside the PS (another formula under consideration by his fellow members of the Arrate faction).

The only card which PPD supporters can play to save the party is to carry out a reform of the law on political parties in such a way as to permit membership in more than one party. In this way socialists could remain in the PPD when the PS is legalized.

This idea is considered out of the question in the socialist movement. To carry it out in practice, it would be necessary to have the support in Congress of part of the Right and of the Christian Democratic Party [PDC]. This would amount to strengthening a party which would compete with them for the support of the Center.

However, there is no reason to lose hope. PPD supporters are convinced that the PDC will throw them some kind of life preserver. They think so because they believe that the Christian Democrats are not going to let the PS continue to strengthen itself even further. A PPD leader said: "The shadow which the socialist movement is casting over the PDC is already considerable. In some way they are going to give us additional political room to maneuver and they are going to recognize and even support us in one political context or another."

However, now that the possibility of simultaneous membership in political parties appears difficult to accomplish, other arguments are flourishing. Schaulsohn put it this way: "The PPD is not a traditional political party. It has no ideological position and therefore does not compete with any other party. What must be done is to look calmly for a way to deal with this new stage and to define a role which does not trespass on the field of action of the socialist movement." This is a solution which does not sound bad, but until now no one has been able to say how it could be implemented in practice.

Another possibility, also proposed by Schaulsohn, is that socialists should join the PS legally while "in fact" remaining in the PPD.

The problem is that Almeyda socialists do not wish to accept the idea of multiple party membership. They say: "The entire, historical tradition of the PS would prevent this, apart from the legal problem involved." They would not like to have near them a party similar to the PS which is not the PS.

For the moment a bipartite committee, composed of PPD supporters and socialists, has been formed which will negotiate a solution to the conflict. However, it is known that there will be no satisfactory answers for those who support the interests of the PPD.

In short, the only problem which the united socialists now face is how to carry out in practice the private agreement which they signed. In other words, to what "elephant cemetery" they should lead the PPD. The fact is that Lagos lost in the election, and so did his party.

[Box, p 4] The Last Sacraments

When Lagos ended up accepting the Ministry of Education, the leaders of the PPD wavered. They were convinced that he was the only person capable of conducting a struggle to the end, keeping the Party for Democracy alive.

One of them said: "He had to hold the reins of the party until the end and to lead its defense, publicly accusing those who have played badly." And almost everything had been said: "If Lagos goes, it is because he has no future. It will be like giving him the last sacraments."

The PPD leaders were more disconcerted after learning that the leader of the party, in the middle of the debate on its future, is going to Israel near the end of January.

Oscar Guillermo Garreton or Jose Antonio Viera-Gallo are mentioned as possible successors to Lagos as party president, although Garreton may be appointed Chilean ambassador to Argentina. For the moment and in his capacity as first vice president of the PPD Armando Jaramillo will fill in for Lagos, now the minister of education.

[Box, p 4] And the Posters?

Independent voters charge that in various communal elections some socialist leaders boycotted the campaign of Ricardo Lagos. They point to "hundreds of posters which were virtually unused and campaign material which did not reach local party units. There were very important party organizations which never functioned regularly, and there were leaders who neglected their candidates to make sure of a position in the reunified Socialist Party."

Heraldo Munoz, Lagos' campaign director, emphatically denied these accusations. He said: "Throughout the campaign, and I have evidence of this, we had the support of the PS. Arrate himself discussed these accusations with me. The efforts made by the (socialist) party were significant. Certainly, mistakes were made, but they were shared by Ricardo Lagos and his advisers."

[Box, p 5] Accomplished Facts

In the next few weeks the legal registration of the unified Socialist Party will be undertaken, whether the leaders of the PPD want it or not. That will lead to considerable tension between the PPD and the PS, since with the collection of signatures for the registration of the PS there may be a massive exodus from the PPD.

Members of the Party for Democracy say that application lists for membership in the PS are already circulating in local units of the PPD, as well as resignation lists from the party.

It seems that no one is willing to wait for a change in the law on political parties which would make it possible to belong to more than one party at the same time.

Finally, if the problem gets worse, the socialists will be in a position to order their members to leave the PPD. That would be a fatal blow, since 80 percent of the more experienced senior and middle-ranking officials of the Party for Democracy are also members of the PS.

* 'Progressive' PC Member on Party Splits

90ET0095B Santiago QUE PASA in Spanish
11 Jan 90 pp 39-40

[Interview with former Communist Party leader Patricio Hales by Mariana Grunefeld: "We Need Democracy Within the PC"; date and place not given; first paragraph is author's introduction]

[Text] What would make you stop being a communist? We asked this question of Patricio Hales a few years ago in a clandestine interview which took place in a restaurant in a village in the mountains. He answered, sure of himself, "Death." On the other hand now, in his architect's office in the center of Santiago, Hales admitted: "I will continue as long as there is room for democracy." The fact is that a great deal of water has gone under the bridge. He is still dressed as well as he was previously. However, instead of being the spokesman of the Chilean Communist Party [PC] he has become just another member of the party, belonging to one other cell. He was punished. He explained: "Bureaucratic pressures were an authoritarian measure used to disqualify me."

[QUE PASA] What were your basic differences with the party?

[Hales] I have a point of view clearly different from that of the present party spokesmen. I would not say that I have differences with Volodia and Guastavino, but certainly with the rest of them. The central point of our differences is the conduct of political activity in terms of national realities.

[QUE PASA] Mireya Baltra said that you were "objectively outside the revolutionary party." What do you think of that?

[Hales] I think that Mireya is mistaken. I respect her political experience, but I think that her opinion is a personal one and not very democratic. It does not take into account the right of each party member to express his own opinions.

[QUE PASA] Corvalan said that you "did not have a tough enough hide to be a communist for your whole life."

[Hales] I have proved during the hardest and most difficult years that I have a tough hide. When someone tells me that I do not have a tough enough hide to be a communist, after knowing how much I, my children, my family, my sister, my father, and my mother have suffered, it hurts—a great deal. However, I believe that these are indications of personal blindness of comrades who sometimes are unable to understand the need for democratic debate.

[QUE PASA] Why do you think that you are so much under attack by your "comrades"?

[Hales] I have been attacked by some comrades. I think that it is hard for them to develop the most democratic forms which we should have for undertaking the kind of debate which the party needs. We need democracy in the country and in the party.

[QUE PASA] Are you alone in the PC?

[Hales] No, absolutely not! I am very much understood, respected, and loved. The opinions which I have expressed reflect the worries of the great majority of the party. I have expressed my concern over the defeats which the party has suffered and over its leadership.

[QUE PASA] How do you know that the majority of the PC supports you?

[Hales] I measure this by the expressions of criticism of our political leadership at the XV Congress of the party, and I see it in the concern felt by party members regarding the defeats which we have suffered at every tactical turn in our political line.

[QUE PASA] If there are so many members who want to see changes, then why have they not occurred?

[Hales] There have been changes. What has happened is that these have been erratic turns in the party line. We adopted the policy of the people's mass rebellion, but some public spokesmen displayed a very permissive attitude and manner of expression regarding certain forms of major violence which took place in Chile and even made a certain kind of apology for it. Evidently, that was not shared by the majority of the membership, since a tactical turn away from such an attitude was followed from 1986 to 1989. From individual expressions we went on to participate in the plebiscite, although we were slow to do so, and afterwards, during the elections.

[QUE PASA] But do you not believe that the changes have been too slow?

[Hales] They have been slow, erratic, and inadequate.

[QUE PASA] Was that a problem of leadership?

[Hales] In the first place, it was a problem of living under a dictatorship. We were persecuted. You will remember that on more than one occasion I met with you when I was being sought by the police.

[QUE PASA] However much you were persecuted, and all of that, you changed, while others did not. Is there an internal problem within the PC?

[Hales] Yes. Teitelboim, the secretary general, put it very well when he said that Stalinism has been a strong influence in the party, a dead weight which we have to overcome.

[QUE PASA] Is that still the case?

[Hales] We still have many forms of Stalinism which we must erradicate.

[QUE PASA] Do you think that the leadership of the PC must be changed?

[Hales] This is not a personal decision for Patricio Hales to make. My opinion is that this decision should be made at a party congress and that it should be discussed, among other things. Furthermore, we should debate publicly why the disciplined, political line is one thing and why the personal opinions of each member are another. Happily, we do not belong to a party where there is the biological aberration that we are all equal.

[QUE PASA] Did the XV Congress of the PC make fundamental or only superficial changes?

[Hales] The XV Congress was very insufficiently marked by the difficulties of the final period of a dictatorship, by the difficulties of a party which has had inadequate exercise of its internal democracy and was marked by the heavy weight of Stalinism within it.

[QUE PASA] What is the weight of Stalinism in the Chilean PC?

[Hales] There are practical, formal, and substantial dead weights involved. There are difficulties in the area of theory and of the conceptual model. In practice, it seems to me that we have a structure which makes the exercise of internal democracy difficult.

[QUE PASA] Does this involve the party cells?

[Hales] Not only the party cells but the whole structure. This makes the influence and participation of the party member more difficult in the final decisions involving the determination of the political line. There is a structure.

[QUE PASA] Is it very hierarchical in form?

[Hales] It is rigid and it makes it difficult for the party member to exercise his democratic rights in the broadest way in changing the line and influencing it. It seems to me that we have difficulties with the manner of election of our own leadership positions. There are structures which we must change. I believe that there is a misunderstanding of what it is to be a spokesman and what are personal opinions and between what freedom of opinion is and what party discipline is.

[QUE PASA] They charge you specifically with publicly criticizing the PC. Why do you do it?

[Hales] Because I am a thinking person and have a personal opinion.

[QUE PASA] Do you think that there are communists who are afraid of debate?

[Hales] Yes, I am sure that there are people who are afraid of distorting the value of democratic debate. That has been one of the great difficulties, not only of our party, but of the parties of the socialist world. Today they are split and in difficulty because they have had insufficient debate and participation in the exercise of democracy.

[QUE PASA] You wish to debate what the present leaders and spokesmen of the PC have done. Is it not logical that they would refuse to engage in such a debate because they will be questioned?

[Hales] Yes, but a revolutionary is always open to self-criticism. Until now the leadership of the party has seemed to be inadequately self-critical. I believe that within the party there is confusion and a crisis regarding theory, the model we follow, and the relationship between political action and national realities. I believe that the leadership of the PC has not escaped from these difficulties.

[QUE PASA] What influence does a PC member have on the decisions of the party?

[Hales] Given the present style of our party democracy, very little. Many people say, well, there was a congress of the PC in 1989! I say, but in the same short period of time so many things have happened! It is not possible to pull down a wall of communist parties at the international level and for us to raise walls made in Chile.

[QUE PASA] What impact did the changes in Eastern Europe have on the Chilean PC?

[Hales] Enormous changes! Those clear facts provoked a personal crisis within each one of us who at any time had to defend the Berlin Wall.

[QUE PASA] Did you believe in that socialist world?

[Hales] Quite sincerely, I was never able to explain the Berlin Wall, but I believed in Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. I did so for only a few months, but I believed. I put out a public statement regarding Czechoslovakia. For a few years the world of explanations which surrounded me, my will and my faith in socialism, and an almost religious attitude led me to defend that.

[QUE PASA] And now you realize that those were police states.

[Hales] I believed that there was political democracy, but now Gorbachev tells me that this was not true. This created a crisis within me, and I imagine that it has also been a blow to any party member. That alone justifies holding a party congress. (Author's note: To this you should add the electoral defeat of the PC, which did not elect even one representative to Congress. Hales attributes this defeat to the electoral law and to a trust in "illusionism and triumphalism" by the PC and the already mentioned "errors in the political line.")

[QUE PASA] The Chilean PC has been very dependent on Moscow. Do you think that the present crisis is due in part to that reality?

[Hales] (A long pause.) We clearly have a position of strong solidarity in international affairs with the various socialist movements, including the Soviet PC. It is probable that on more than one occasion we carried our solidarity to the point of blindness, without much reflection. Today I would revise our unrestricted support for the Czechoslovakian invasion of 1968, for example. There has been a practice of opening umbrellas in Santiago when it rained in Moscow. I would be happy to learn that today, when the sun has come out in the USSR, we will close our umbrellas in Santiago.

[QUE PASA] Would not this major renovation which you wish to see imply a split in the Chilean PC?

[Hales] Not at all. If anyone who does not like internal democracy wishes to leave the party, my best wishes to him, and let him leave. Reform will make us strong. Precisely during those years when there was an inadequate amount of internal democracy, there was dormant militancy in the party and in our dreams. Reform of the party will bring this back.

[QUE PASA] Is it true that between now and March 2,000 members of the PC will join the PS?

[Hales] I do not know how many members will leave the party. However, there are many PC members who, because of confusion in the political line over the last few years, have concluded that it is better to keep their militancy in a dormant state and join other democratic parties.

[QUE PASA] Finally, do you want the PC to be one more party in the political system?

[Hales] We are a party in this system and wish to develop the system and build a new society. If we wish to look at the political system from behind a wall made in Chile, we are mistaken. Recently, some of the most apologetic spokesmen of the people's mass rebellion were candidates of the system and under the constitution of 1980, and associates of the senators appointed by Pinochet. Black and white views of the world are finished.

Colombia

Police Guarantee Security at Cartegena Summit

PA1502021390 Madrid EFE in Spanish 0038 GMT 15 Feb 90

[Text] Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, 14 Feb (EFE)—Colombian police authorities today guaranteed the complete security of the presidents of Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, and the United States, and of their delegations, during the antidrug summit to be held in this city tomorrow.

Presidents Jaime Paz of Bolivia, Alan Garcia of Peru, and Virgilio Barco of Colombia will meet with U.S. President George Bush to outline a common strategy against drug trafficking.

The Colombian police dismissed the existence of a reported terrorist plan to be carried out during the summit which will gather the presidents of both the three leading cocaine-producing countries and the leading drug-consumer country.

Generals Miguel Maza Marquez, director of the Administrative Department of Security [DAS], and Miguel Gomez Padilla, director of the National Police, held a news conference prior to the presidential summit.

Maza Marquez said the police agencies "do not anticipate any terrorist action" against the heads of state who will attend the antidrug summit.

Maza Marquez also said he does not believe in the "goodwill gestures" of the drug cartels and their armed branch, the Extraditables, of whom he said: "They have always tried to destabilize the Colombian state."

This was his reply to the surrender statement that the drug traffickers made on 17 January and the later release of seven people they had kidnapped.

In his opinion, "the persons released paid a certain amount of money to be released, according to the security organizations."

In addition, Gomez Padilla said that, although the cartels early yesterday surrendered three cocaine labs in Colombia's northeast, the police at the same time "found and destroyed a huge laboratory in Yari in the southern part of the country."

Gomez Padilla reported that in this antidrug operation the police found more than 60,000 gallons of chemicals, five electrical plants, several ovens used to dry the drugs, and more than 700 kg of high-quality cocaine ready for shipment.

The two generals agreed that "there will be no letup" in the antidrug struggle and that "the only dialogue possible with them is for them to give themselves up to authorities to be tried according to the law."

According to the two officers, the drug problem "is a broad one" and must be dealt with both in the producing and consuming countries. Nevertheless, the officers dismissed the possibility of troops from other countries being used to meet the challenge that the drug traffickers have posed for more than a decade, particularly in Colombia.

Also participating in the news conference was General Guillermo Munoz Sanabria, director of the Colombian Antidrug Police, who said that although he cannot provide an exact date, he is sure Pablo Escobar Gaviria, the top man in the Medellin Cartel, will be captured "very soon."

President 'Expecting' Offer From Extraditables

PA1502133490 Bogota Radio Cadena Nacional in Spanish 1209 GMT 15 Feb 90

[Text] Colombian President Virgilio Barco Vargas has said that he is expecting an offer from the so-called Extraditables, but he advised this does not mean that the government will negotiate. Answering questions from Colombian and foreign reporters, Barco Vargas emphasized: It is not that we are going to negotiate. We are going to apply the law, and we hope the narcotics traffickers will comply and accept the law even if it is harsh. He added the government is willing to listen to their proposals.

Concerning the confidence one might have in the proposals by the Extraditables, President Barco said: We must have confidence and see what the future will bring us. He added the government is willing to listen, but it does not know what the Extraditables want to offer.

Barco on Need for Aid Against Drug Production

PA1402202290 Hamburg DPA in Spanish 1831 GMT 14 Feb 90

[Text] Cartagena de Indias (Colombia), 14 Feb (DPA)—The three Andean nations that will participate in an antidrug summit in Cartagena de Indias tomorrow—Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru—will urge the United States to fight domestic consumption of cocaine as one of the measures that would significantly reduce the enrichment of the international drug-trafficking mafias.

According to Colombian President Virgilio Barco Vargas, there is consensus on this point among the countries that produce this drug to not leave the field open only to the repressive actions that were implemented in the past few years.

The head of state, in statements to the daytime newspaper "EL ESPECTADOR" of Bogota, added that U.S. aid in the form of war helicopters and planes "has been useful, but is only a small fraction of what the country is investing in defense and security out of its own resources."

The United States, days after Colombia declared a "war" on drug trafficking in the wake of several terrorist actions one-and-a-half years ago, offered aid for $65 million, described as "insignificant" by various Colombian groups which compared it with the sums assigned to collaborate with the Nicaraguan "contras."

Barco Vargas believes "the United States should also understand that repression is not enough to reduce coca production. In the case of Bolivia and Peru, the growing of coca leaves, the basic ingredient in cocaine production, not only has ancestral roots but is also an important source of income for a large part of the rural population.

The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has estimated that in Peru—the main coca leaf producer in the world—between 97,000 and 124,000 hectares of land are used for coca production, while 70,000 are used in Bolivia for the same purpose.

During the summit with his U.S., Colombian, and Peruvian counterparts, Bolivian President Jaime Paz Zamora will propose the implementation of the formula "Alternate Development for Coca," through which approximately 400,000 coca growers in his country will not be left completely unprotected after plantations are eliminated.

For Barco Vargas, the struggle against drug trafficking must be complemented with an economic and social program which "will require firm financial support from U.S. authorities and multilateral credit institutions."

During tomorrow's antidrug summit that will last less than five hours, the Andean Pact presidents will ask U.S. President George Bush to adopt formulas to fight drug trafficking which will include better controls on money laundering in U.S. banks and on U.S. companies exporting chemicals to Latin America that are necessary to process the drug.

Workers Protest Bush Visit, Barco Policies

PA1502020690 Hamburg DPA in Spanish 0027 GMT 15 Feb 90

[Text] Bogota, 14 Feb (DPA)—Thousands of Colombian workers marched today in several cities throughout the country to reject U.S. President George Bush's visit and President Virgilio Barco's economic policy.

A labor spokesman said that "Bush's presence in Colombia should not be applauded by any conscientious Latin American," adding: "We know that there is a U.S. imperialist plan behind the struggle against drug trafficking."

"Why does not the U.S. President convoke a summit to discuss the foreign debt?" the labor leader asked, adding: "Thousands of people are starving to death while our presidents are lending themselves to publicity shows."

The workers believe that the salary increase decreed by the government "is simply a result of the IMF's demands," and they asked Barco Vargas "to fulfill his promises concerning the social debt rather than the foreign debt."

The police did not report violent incidents during the workers' demonstrations, although it has mounted large-scale patrol operations in the largest cities on the Atlantic Coast because of the antidrug summit that will bring together Presidents Bush, Barco, Jaime Paz Zamora (Bolivia), and Alan Garcia Perez (Peru) tomorrow, 15 February.

ELN's Union Camilista Criticizes Bush Visit

PA1502044690 Madrid EFE in Spanish 0403 GMT 15 Feb 90

[Text] Bogota, 13 Feb (EFE)—The pro-Castrist Union Camilista-Army of National Liberation (UC-ELN), the most belligerent in Colombia, today denounced U.S. President George Bush's visit to the country and warned that "we will be in Cartagena."

The guerrilla group's "Communique No. 1" on "Operation Colombia" was sent to EFE. it states that "in repudiation of Mr. Bush's presence in Cartagena, we are going forward with Operation Colombia." "The Mandela Commandos" have been created for this purpose.

Addressing the Colombians, "the people of Peru and Bolivia, and the international media," the UC-ELN says: "We consider the U.S. President's visit a mockery of Colombia's dignity and sovereignty."

Without identifying them, it announces that the "Nelson Mandela Commandos of our organization have seized U.S. citizens and we will later reveal the conditions for their release."

As of today, the only information available is on kidnapping victim U.S. Professor David Leslie Kent. Kent was kidnapped on 13 February in Medellin, 250 km northwest of Bogota.

Another U.S. citizen, James Arthur Donelley, was kidnapped on 12 February approximately 25 km from Medellin and released on 13 February with a message that rejected Bush's visit. [as received]

Approximately 2,500 Colombian troops, policemen, and secret agents have been deployed to guarantee the security of the "summit" that will be held on 15 February in Cartagena de Indias by the presidents of Colombia, Virgilio Barco; Bolivia, Jaime Paz Zamora; Peru, Alan Garcia; and the United States, George Bush.

Maza Blames ETA Terrorists for Avianca Attack

PA1502043490 Madrid EFE in Spanish 0253 GMT 15 Feb 90

[Text] Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, 14 Feb (EFE)—General Miguel Alfredo Maza Marquez, head of the Administrative Department of Security [DAS], today accused two Spaniards who are allegedly members of the terrorist organization ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty] of perpetrating an attack against an Avianca airline aircraft in November.

In a news conference held in Cartagena de Indias today on the eve of the antidrug "summit" to be held tomorrow in this Colombian city, Maza accused these "two Spaniards" of perpetrating an attack on his department headquarters in Bogota in December.

General Maza also reported that he has requested Interpol's assistance in capturing these two alleged terrorists who are still in Colombia.

On 27 November, 27 people were killed by an explosion aboard a Boeing 727 passenger aircraft of the Colombian airline Avianca flying between Bogota and Cali.

On 6 December, 63 people were killed when a bus bomb with 500 kg of dynamite exploded in front of the DAS building.

Based on these attacks, Maza adds, the alleged ETA members have advised Colombian drug traffickers on the use of explosives. Maza, however, did not reveal their names or provide any additional details.

Maza today admitted that he did not have much information on the whereabouts of the two Spaniards.

The Colombian general held the two Spanish terrorists and "many other foreign mercenaries," including Israeli Colonel Yair Klein, responsible for "having harmed the Colombian people."

According to Maza, the "nefarious" training that the mercenaries gave members of the Medellin Cartel, the leading cocaine-exporting group in Colombia, made it easier for the drug traffickers to perpetrate the bloodiest attacks in the country's history.

The general told the press that, for this reason, he is considering "linking" Yair Klein, "who enjoys freedom in his country," to the attacks on the DAS and the Avianca plane.

DAS Director Maza Minimizes Lab Turnover

PA1502043690 Madrid EFE in Spanish 2223 GMT 14 Feb 90

[Text] Cartagena (Colombia), 14 Feb (EFE)—General Miguel Maza Marquez, director of the Colombian secret police, today said in Cartagena de Indias that he does not believe the "Extraditables," a group that represents the largest group of drug traffickers in the country, are willing, as they have claimed, to achieve peace.

Maza Marquez, who arrived in Cartagena de Indias along with President Virgilio Barco—the host of the drug "summit" that will be held in this city on Colombia's Caribbean Coast—added that the partial turnovers of raw materials and weapons that the drug traffickers have made in recent weeks "prove very little."

According to the Colombian general, the drug traffickers "turn over one ton (of dynamite) but they hide seven tons."

The director of the Administrative Department of Security (DAS), the secret police at the service of the executive branch, made this statement regarding the voluntary turnovers made by the Medellin Cartel, the largest cocaine-exporting group in the world.

The "Extraditables" began their turnovers during the last week of January, after announcing their surrender to the state, as proof of their "goodwill"—to earn them "less strict treatment" by Colombian society.

Today the drug traffickers "delivered" three laboratories, with a capacity for processing 20,000 kg per month, to 25 Colombian journalists.

The facilities, located in the Choco jungle region on the Panamanian border in northern Colombia, have been termed by the journalists as "the biggest" labs available to the drug traffickers.

Nevertheless, the turnover was minimized by the DAS director who said these production centers "have not been in use for a long time."

During a news conference prior to the meeting between the presidents of Bolivia, Colombia, the United States, and Peru, Miguel Maza Marquez emphasized today that the Colombian state's "goal" is still "to capture the drug traffickers and turn them over to Colombian justice."

The chief of the secret police insisted that there is nothing to indicate there is a possibility of holding a dialogue or reaching an agreement with the narcoterrorists.

The antidrug summit will be held tomorrow in Cartagena de Indias with the intention of coordinating joint policies to end the production, processing, and export of coca leaves and cocaine in Latin America.

The presidential summit will last only four hours, and it will conclude with the signing of a document that, judging from the draft, will strengthen multilateral relations to counter the production, export, and consumption of drugs.

Minister on Security for Elections, Guerrillas

PA1402190090 Bogota Inravision Television Cadena 2 in Spanish 0000 GMT 10 Feb 90

[Report by correspondents Elmer Castaneda and Adriana Santacruz]

[Text] [Announcer] The defense minister of Colombia and the commander of the Colombian Armed Forces today spoke separately about the guerrilla issue. They said that there has been no repression operation carried out against the guerrillas because this is what a prudent management of politics recommends.

The two visited Medellin and Cali to implement the Democracy for Elections Plan.

Here is a report by Elmer Castaneda and Adriana Santacruz:

[Castaneda] During a security meeting at the Fourth Brigade headquarters in Medellin between Defense Minister Oscar Botero and military and civilian authorities from the departments of Antioquia and Choco, General Botero said that the plan to guarantee peace during the 11 March elections will consist in reinforcing areas enduring conflicts, such as Magdalena Medio, southern Cauca, and Uraba, the border, and the 7,000 polling stations throughout the country.

[Begin Botero recording] Public forces in areas we believe could face disorder have been reinforced. This involves some areas of Santander, Arauca, and Antioquia. We are going to send reinforcements there to strengthen the current campaigns. [end recording]

[Santacruz] General Mejia Henao presided over the security meeting in the Colombian southwest. This meeting took place in Cali. The democracy plan is being implemented in that area. Mejia Henao said that some 2,000 polling stations do not have Armed Forces protection because they are very quiet areas that do not have too many polling tables; therefore, there is no justification for the presence of soldiers considering that the country does not have enough men to guard the entire country.

The security meeting was attended by the governors of six departments and the commanders of the Third, Sixth, and Eighth Brigades, who delivered a public order report. With the exception of the areas where the guerrillas continue activities, public order is good.

[Begin Mejia Henao recording] There are two areas of unrest. One is in the northern region of Valle, where the National Liberation Army is working on its national no-vote campaign. However, we are working in coordination with the 8th Brigade, headquartered in Armenia, and with the National Police to check them.

In southern Cauca Department, there is concern in the areas of Almaguer, Guachicono, etc., that is, in the Cauca passage. [end recording]

Paraguay

Payments To Some Creditors 'Virtually' Ceased

PY1402174690 Asuncion ABC COLOR in Spanish 14 Feb 90 p 11

[All figures as published]

[Text] Following an economic team meeting, [Finance Minister] Engineer Enzo Debernardi yesterday reported that Paraguay has been regularly making payments on its debt (interest and amortization) to the multilateral credit institutions (World Bank, IDB, FONPLATA [River Plate Basin Fund], etc.), but payments to other creditor entities ("Paris Club," foreign private banks and suppliers, etc.) have "virtually" ceased "over the past six months."

Debernardi reported: "Thus far, payments to the multilateral credit institutions, especially the World Bank, IDB, FONPLATA, etc., have been made promptly and regularly. Interest and principal were paid. Some payments were made to other creditors when it was necessary to have credits released, but during the past six months virtually nothing has been paid, even to the private banks."

When he was asked if "something" meant interest or principal, the minister replied that he meant interest and explained that, concerning the Paraguayan foreign debt, "small adjustments" have been made, "but substantial amounts have not been paid at all."

The finance minister admitted that postponing the signing of a Letter of Intent with the IMF until the second half of 1990 will force Paraguay to rethink its foreign debt plans if we are to find an alternative, even a provisional one, especially with the "Paris Club."

According to the original plan, our country was scheduled to resort to the "Paris Club" in April 1990 "to resolve the state of our foreign debt payments," the minister pointed out. He added: "After this postponement, however, it is possible that our country will not go to the IMF until the middle of the second half of 1990. It is obvious, therefore, that a plan to handle the foreign debt issue at that time must be drawn up."

Asked if meeting the commitments with the "Paris Club" partners is pressing our country, Debernardi responded that "as long as the foreign debt is not paid, interest and penalty interest will continue to accrue and the country will be unable to secure other loans."

Debernardi also reported that during yesterday's session the economic team decided to ask the Finance Ministry and the Central Bank of Paraguay [BCP] to draw up a provisional plan to handle the Paraguayan foreign debt.

According to a summary drawn up by the BCP, our country's foreign debt net balance (plus overdue and unpaid interest) is as follows:

1. Multilateral organizations (IDB, IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development], FONPLATA, FIDA [International Fund for Agricultural Development], OPEC, BIAFE [expansion unknown]): $646,481,492.60.

2. Foreign governments and financial institutions ("Paris Club"): $698,544,367.60.

3. Foreign private commercial banks and suppliers (?outside) the "Paris Club": $239,787,681.40. Latin American banks: $2,177,180.90.

4. Bank of Brazil (CACEX) [Foreign Trade Department]: $435,482,069.

Our country's total debt came to $2,020,301,610 on 30 September 1989.

Military, Clerics Banned From Party Activities

PY1502134190 Asuncion ABC COLOR in Spanish 15 Feb 90 p 4

[Excerpt] The Chamber of Deputies yesterday approved a bill forbidding active members of the Armed Forces and ordained religious officials from becoming members of political parties. The chamber also established that, as of yesterday, persons who have already become members of political parties can no longer carry out any political party activities. [passage omitted]

Peru

Government Orders Ambassador Back to Washington

PY1502020090 Lima Television Peruana in Spanish 0000 GMT 15 Feb 90

[Text] Regarding the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Panama, the Peruvian Foreign Ministry has reported the following:

In view of the completion of the withdrawal of the U.S. troops that participated in the invasion Panama, the Foreign Ministry has instructed Cesar Atala, Peruvian ambassador to the United States, to resume his duties.

[Dated] Lima, 14 February 1990

[Signed] Foreign Ministry Mass Media Department

President Garcia on Panamanian Situation

PY1402212890 Lima Domestic Service in Spanish 1807 GMT 14 Feb 90

[Statement by President Alan Garcia at Government Palace on 14 February—live]

[Excerpt] A few minutes ago we participated in a solemn ceremony to lower the Panamanian flag from Government House. The flag has been flying in front of Peru's Government House since 20 December as a symbol of atonement and homage to the Panamanian people for the invasion of their territory.

We have received the information that all U.S. troops illegally deployed inside Panamanian territory have been withdrawn. Not only that, there are now fewer troops in the Panama Canal zone than before the invasion. I think this fact fulfills one of our objectives for raising the Panamanian flag in front of our Government House. I think the withdrawal of all the troops that participated in the invasion of Panama just hours before our very important meeting with President Bush in Cartagena is very meaningful.

I reiterate our firm rejection of the invasion of Panama. I reiterate Peru's insistence on the right of Latin American countries to demand respect for the principle of nonintervention. I also reiterate that after the withdrawal of U.S. troops we still need to legitimize the government installed in Panama after the invasion.

We welcome the news that the U.S. Government has asked for elections, or a plebiscite in Panama, to legitimize the government that was installed on 20 December. These two things—troop withdrawal and a plebiscite, or an election to give the Panamanian people the chance to speak—are essential to solving the very grave problem that at the end of December forced us to take a firm position on this issue. [passage omitted]

Panamanian Embassy Bombed; No Casualties

PY1502103290 Madrid EFE in Spanish 0344 GMT 15 Feb 90

[Text] Lima, 14 Feb (EFE)—Witnesses have reported that several bombs exploded against the front of the Panamanian Embassy in Lima tonight. The explosions caused damage but there were no casualties.

Witnesses indicated that several unidentified persons threw homemade bombs at the door of the Panamanian Embassy, located on a downtown street in the San Isidro neighborhood, and that the explosions damaged the door and broke windows in the building and in neighboring structures.

Another bomb attack was carried out against a pharmaceutical laboratory in the neighborhood of Brena. There were no casualties.

Economy Minister: Dollar Upsurge 'Speculative'

PY1402162690 Buenos Aires DYN in Spanish 1840 GMT 13 Feb 90

[Text] Lima, 13 Feb (AFP)—People involved in money exchange reported that today the dollar exchange rate went over 16,000 intis in the Lima free exchange market. This is the first dollar upsurge this year after staying around 12,400 intis for almost seven weeks.

Economy Minister Cesar Vazquez labeled the dollar upsurge "a typical speculative bank maneuver." He announced the implementation of emergency measures but gave no details. He said "there will be no traumatic devaluation or measures against the population." He denied that the government had ordered an issue of currency as part of its control policy.

Since last December the social democratic government of Alan Garcia has drastically restricted issuing currency or circulating dollars because it causes illiquidity. Because of this situation bankers and businessmen have become afraid of financial paralysis which can be worse than a 3,000-percent annual inflation rate.

The government measure was able to contain the dollar rise, which last December reached 15,000 intis. Many economists estimate that the real dollar value is about 23,000 intis.

Today the dollar rate on the free exchange market was 15,500 to buy and 16,200 to sell. The official rate of the single exchange market [mercado unico de cambio—MUC] was 7,002.51 intis to buy and sell. [as received]

Recently President Garcia announced that he would increase liquidity to the financial sector through public expenditures by increasing the salaries and bonuses of public servants and by paying the contractors of important public projects.

Garcia said that some businesses and banks do not have intis because late last year they bought dollars on the parallel market and they are now waiting for a devaluation when the new government takes over on 28 July following the 8 April elections.

Businessmen and economists have publicly accused Garcia of looking at this problem politically in an alleged desire to leave a heavy burden to his successor.

The latest electoral polls show Mario Vargas Llosa, presidential candidate of the liberal Democratic Front and Garcia's main ideological opponent, as the possible winner in the upcoming elections.

Judges Charged With Taking Bribes From Cartel

PY1502002690 Madrid EFE in Spanish 0057 GMT 14 Feb 90

[Text] Lima, 13 Feeb (EFE)—LA REPUBLICA newspaper reported in Lima today that Loreto Superior Court members have been charged with taking a bribe from the "Medellin Cartel." Loreto is an important Peruvian jungle department and a strategic location for drug trafficking.

The newspaper, which cited police sources, said that this Colombian drug-trafficking organization "has invested" $50 million in Iquitos, capital of Loreto, to bribe judges and establish legal businesses to disguise cocaine trafficking.

LA REPUBLICA reported that Medellin Cartel members have bought sawmills, hotels, luxurious restaurants, and tourist boats.

"The Medellin Cartel leaders have decided to establish a new international drug-trafficking operations center in Iquitos. This situation has alerted the police and the military intelligence service," the newspaper added.

Superior court judge Bernardo Prado Concha has published a letter in Iquitos revealing that a colleague of his whose name has not been disclosed is the "Director of Panmafia" [Director de Panmafia]. This organization, which operates in the judicial district of Iquitos, helps "Narcopower" [Narcopoder] carry out its activities, the newspaper said.

Prado has charged that this organization helped Luis Alvarado Macanillas escape when he was leaving the Iquitos court almost without police surveillance, despite the fact that Alvarado Macanillas is regarded as one of the "top leaders of narcopower" in the Amazon plain.

The newspaper said that a national court council committee is conducting a secret investigation into the alleged "involvement" of some Loreto court judges with "narcopower."

Last week a group of 19 judges belonging to the ruling party and representing several jungle provinces of the Loreto jurisdiction criticized the behavior of the Iquitos judges, days after the results of an Interpol investigation were released in Lima, the newspaper added.

Terrorist Printing Shop Workers Arrested

PY1402211390 Lima Television Peruana in Spanish 0000 GMT 14 Feb 90

[Excerpt] The national police has struck a harsh blow against terrorism with the arrest of four members of the Shining Path propaganda apparatus. These men are responsible for several murders and for publishing and disseminating leaflets promoting the boycott of the upcoming general elections.

According to a report from a DIRCOTE [Anti Terrorist Directorate] officer, this terrorist cell also forged entrance tickets to the National Stadium and other public shows which they sold to raise funds for their criminal organization. The four terrorists, who were arrested in a house in La Victoria District, were shown to the media today.

These four Shining Path members raised funds by forging tickets to public shows and through other criminal actions. They were presented to the media by the DIRCOTE, which depends on the Peruvian Technical Police Division.

These criminals had a well-equipped printing shop in which they printed subversive propaganda; and entrance tickets to National Stadium events such as the last Peruvian professional soccer championship, cultural events like ballets, and other sporting events such as the Libertadores de America soccer cup.

The DIRCOTE police also confiscated numerous forged documents proving that this terrorist cell sought to boycott the 8 April elections. [passage omitted]

First Radioisotopes To Be Sent in Next Few Days

PY1302204590 Buenos Aires DYN in Spanish 1708 GMT 10 Feb 90

[Text] Lima, 10 Feb (AFP)—Official sources in Lima today confirmed that Peru will send the first lot of radioisotopes to Argentina for medical use in the next few days in compliance with the agreement signed with Argentina, which gave Peru financial support to build the Peruvian National Nuclear Center.

Frigate Captain Jose Pereyra Lopez, director of the Huarangal Nuclear Center, also called "Oscar Miro

Quesada de la Guerra," reported that the radioisotopes, which are destined for the Argentine Atomic Energy Commission, consist of 200 millicuries of Iodine-131. The agreement established that Peru will supply Iodine-131 to Argentina.

He said that the radioisotopes produced at the Peruvian nuclear center can only be compared to those produced in Canada, which is one of the world's main producers of this substance.

He added that, after the quality of the first lot is checked, a second lot will be sent to Argentina on 1 March. Because this substance has a limited life span outside the reactor, other shipments will be sent regularly in accordance with Argentine needs. The Peruvian nuclear center, which is built on a 125-hectare area in the Lima Caravayllo District, 42 km northeast of this capital, is composed of 100 laboratories and highly specialized facilities.

Pereyra Lopez noted that the center's nuclear reactor has a 10,000-kw capacity and produces several types of radioisotopes, such as Mercury-197, Potassium-42, Sodium-24, Rubidium-87, and Zinc- 65, among many others that do not require complex chemical processes.

The radioisotopes, which are chemical elements that throw out radiation once they are introduced into a nuclear reactor, have several uses. Among many other uses, the radioisotopes are used in medicine in the production of radio medicines. They are also used in agriculture to control plagues, sterilize insects, improve the quality of seeds, and control the ripening of fruits, Pereyra Lopez said.

* Party Officials Discuss Government Plans

*90ET0087A Lima CARETAS in Spanish
8 Jan 90 pp 40-42, 58, 85, 88*

[Text] Before the campaign begins its last three months, CARETAS asked the designers of the program of government for each of the four major political blocks to answer the same questionnaire:

What are the country's three main problems?

What measures would you adopt for dealing with them during your first 90 days in office?

What kind of results could be expected after two years in office?

Luis Bustamante Belaunde

From Arequipa. Lawyer. Bustamante, who has no prior history of political involvement, is responsible for the plan of government of the "Libertad" Movement and Fredemo [Democratic Front]. The University of the Pacific professor studied in Spain and is a specialist in public administration. He has worked at the National Institute of Planning.

Problems

In our judgment, there are not just three main problems. There are at least twice that many. Among them is subversive terrorist violence which launches criminal attacks against an insufficiently protected society. There is narcotics trafficking which erodes the democratic system and corrupts its institutions. There is economic chaos of a depth unprecedented in our history. Per capita production is at a level equivalent to 30 years ago with distribution even less fair than it was then. There is the extreme poverty that afflicts major sectors where incomes are too low to meet the most basic needs. There is an immense but impotent government seeking to meet the pressing demands of these social sectors through the services it is required to provide them. And there is the lack of opportunities and jobs that so frustrates Peruvians, especially the younger ones.

It is hard to say which of these problems is more important than the others, and they are all intimately linked.

Measures

Dr. Mario Vargas Llosa recently outlined the program of government at CADE [National Conference of Business Executives] '89. We feel Fredemo's presentation was different from all others at that event in offering a complete and coherent plan.

Limitations of space preclude an exhaustive description of what is foreseen. We can spell out the following:

a. Inflation will be attacked through a stabilization program making intelligent and coherent use of suitable instruments of economic policy.

b. Initiatives will be taken to confront and put an end to subversion and terrorism. This will be done by providing needed leadership and equipment for law enforcement, mobilization of society, and providing judicial mechanisms with the means to assure effective punishment for crime and destruction.

c. Narcotics trafficking will be dealt with in the same fashion. It should be combatted according to the principle of coresponsibility among producing, intermediary, and consuming countries.

d. A program will be started to deal with critical poverty. The goal will be to relieve suffering from its effects as a result of the economic disorder sown by the disastrous policies of the present government.

e. Government reform will begin by shrinking the size of ministries, privatization of state-run enterprises, debureaucratization, deregulation, and decentralization.

f. Programs will be started to create opportunities, to stimulate the grassroots economic initiative now lodged in the informal sector, and to encourage single-person enterprises. These programs will also stimulate job creation and bring flexibility to the currently rigid structures of the labor market. This will mean allowing temporary and atypical contracts and removing barriers to new job creation found in current labor laws aimed at insuring stability in the workplace. These actions will be taken in accordance with the Constitution and established concepts of worker rights.

Results

Concerning subversion and terrorism, the government and society at large will have taken the initiative in halting their advance and bringing about their extinction. Exact predictions are difficult, but the pace and direction of the process will have changed radically. In the battle against drug trafficking, a multilateral program ought to be under way. It will seek substitutes for coca cultivation, punish processing and trafficking, and create conditions favorable for agricultural development in areas where government authority and services are restored.

With regard to the economic program, inflation will have fallen to international levels at an annual rate of around 10 percent. Liberalization will be moving ahead through reforms of the tax, tariff, and financial system. The program of social support will have achieved its goals with respect to the sectors in greatest need. Economic recovery will be gaining momentum, and its programs of opportunity and job creation will bring considerable relief to broad social sectors. And with clear and stable rules, necessary private investment will flourish and clearly show the way to the stage of sustained development. The economic system will be substantively different from those of the past and will result in evident and widespread social well-being.

It is our considered opinion that only an effective, integrated, and coherent program can assure these results. We think Fredemo is alone in offering one that meets these conditions. This is why it will be able to grapple with the problems in question and come up with a radical solution, that is one that gets at root causes and not just symptoms. This is the only way the country can come to grips with major change.

Francisco Guerra-Garcia

"A New Pattern of Growth"

From Cajamarca. He studied political science in Belgium and was a professor at the Catholic University of Lima. An old-guard Christian Democrat, he became part of the leadership of Sinamo [National System for Supporting Social Mobilization] during the Velasco years. He is the current director of CEDEP [expansion unknown], and he drafted the plan of government for Barrantes' Socialist Left.

Problems

The very grave situation in Peru is the reflection of a global crisis that has a profound effect on every aspect of reality in this country.

Hence, an efficient approach to overcoming the crisis must be global, coherent, and realistic in nature. It must permit the mobilization of our society as a whole in order to: restructure the government, ease the economic crisis, and begin transformation of the means of production. At the same time, it must combat violence, drug trafficking, and all the forms of social disintegration that are a threat to the very life of the country.

Measures

a. Develop a national consensus on how to bring about economic stability and equitable growth among the country's social, economic, and political organizations.

b. Governmental restructuring to strengthen regional and local governmental units. This will make it possible to reschedule the government's current accounts and capital spending, design and put in place a new tax system, and decentralize the financial system.

c. Restructure state-run enterprises to improve the efficiency, coverage, and quality of their services.

d. Put into effect an economic policy to regain and sustain parity in the exchange rate. This will include progressive reduction and rationalization of tariffs and the setting of realistic interest rates. It will entail indexing wages and salaries to inflation, eliminating tax exemptions, and getting rid of subsidies except in cases related to the program to combat extreme poverty.

e. Simultaneously put into effect a new portfolio of projects to include investments through state-run enterprises and regional and local governments as well as programs coordinated with the private sector.

f. Manage the economic system with the aim of achieving stabilization and stimulating a new pattern of growth through mechanisms for coordinated planning.

g. Renegotiate the debt on the basis of these measures in order to obtain fresh credit and assure sustained growth of the economy.

h. Carry out a pacification strategy under a single command with authority in the economic, psychosocial, and military spheres. This will involve combined mobilization of all the country's social institutions and organizations.

Results

a. Regional governmental units will be fully operational and will account for 35 percent of all public spending. Decentralized provision of social services through regional and local governments will be reflected in substantial improvements in coverage, quality, and efficiency.

b. Sustained maintenance of the road system will result in improved conditions for travel, security, and lowered transportation costs.

c. One result of democratizing and decentralizing governmental units will be greater citizen identification with them. This will lead to increased tax collections and greater efficiency in administration of the taxation system.

d. The annual inflation rate will be below 100 percent, and the trend will be downwards towards monthly rates of under 5 percent. The fiscal deficit will be less than 4 percent of gross national product. Tax collections will amount to over 12 percent and domestic savings to over 10 percent of GNP. Normalization of relations with the international financial system, and particularly with such multilateral bodies as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, will give rise to a new portfolio of projects to improve and expand the country's social and economic infrastructure.

e. The Camisea Project will be under way as will formalization and implementation of minimum base output levels for such exports as agroindustrial, forest, fish, and ferrous and nonferrous mineral products. Linked to these will be new frameworks for foreign investment, concentration of international markets, and debt payment.

f. Restructuring of state-run enterprises will lead to more efficient basic services to increased numbers of consumers. Their financial consolidation, autonomy, and the strengthening of their management teams will assure renewed access to foreign credit for new public and private investment projects.

g. Macroeconomic stability will be regained together with a relative pricing structure that will keep domestic products competitive with imports. This will encourage domestic savings, penalize consumption of luxury goods, and promote capital formation. The resulting integration of productive capacity will generate jobs and a net rise in hard currency earnings that will improve the balance of payments situation and assure sustained growth throughout the economy.

h. The regionalized financial system will prevent gravitation of domestic savings to the market of Metropolitan Lima. This will promote regional economies by increasing their capacities for growth.

i. Coordinated planning mechanisms will be in operation. This will increase output of essential goods and push minimum base levels of production high enough to allow competition in international markets.

j. The government will have regained its hold on some areas now racked by violence. In these areas regional and local governments will be making use of the new investment portfolio to underwrite projects aimed at increasing production. Preferential treatment will be given to efforts to increase productivity in rural areas and cities of the interior.

Victor Lopez

"A Really Effective Military Service"

From Piura. A sociologist and author of four published books, Lopez took charge of Popular Cooperation in 1985 and is regarded as the creator of the PAIT [Temporary Income Support Program]. A year ago an in-house election resulted in his designation as head of APRA's [American Popular Revolutionary Alliance] Commission for a Plan of Government.

Problems

Violence, hunger, and poverty are built into the framework of a society that denies the majority of its population the right to exist and that is racked by a backlog of long unresolved problems. But the principle problem now facing the country is violence that is subversive and terrorist in nature. Any plan of government must be intimately linked to resolving this problem by eliminating political violence, destroying subversion and terrorism, restoring public tranquility, and guaranteeing the country's security.

In second place comes the problem of scant experience with democracy and too little institutional development. The most critical aspect of this problem, which has built up over our history, is elitist government. It is marginal, bureaucratized, and sluggish, and it is divorced from society at large and its fundamental problems. Its structure and function bear no relation to the need for national change and transformation. Therefore, democratizing and transforming the government is a fundamental task.

In third place are the economic crisis and the social problem which are intimately intertwined to comprise a fundamental problem. In the first instance, the most critical point is inflation, which must be halted and reduced. In the second, it is the critical poverty of millions of Peruvians unable to meet vital needs or improve their standard of living. Therefore, overcoming the economic crisis, raising precarious living standards for large sectors of the population, and meeting the vital needs of the people amount to a challenge.

Measures

a. With regard to violent subversion:

- Propose a national pacification agreement to the country. It would combine social justice with an integrated strategy to combat subversion and terrorism.
- Prepare the country, the government, and its institutions for the new situation. This means giving priority to public spending in areas of extreme poverty and quickly putting the regionalization process into practice.

- Pass laws permitting the confrontation with subversion and the defense of democracy to proceed on a clearer and more solid legal basis.
- Equip the Armed Forces and the police with the resources they require and need to be able to fulfill their responsibilities. Increase military manpower through truly effective mandatory military service that extends to all those of draft age.
- Strengthen, consolidate, and recognize the role of such existing popular self-defense groups in the countryside and in the city as the rural and urban patrols. This would include necessary technical and logistical support with permanent and sustained advice from the Armed Forces and police.
- Put into effect an emergency youth program to include creation of a Youth Institute, a Youth Development Fund, and Youth Participation Councils in the different spheres of government.
- Commit the mass media to united, permanent, and sustained participation in the struggle against subversion and terrorism.

b. With respect to democratizing the country and transforming the government:

- At the executive level, emphasize the role of the chairman of the Council of Ministers. The holder of the post should function as a minister without portfolio and concentrate on improving coordination among ministries. Three functional committees should be established at the ministerial level in the areas of: economics, social and defense issues; domestic affairs; and international relations. A Family Ministry and a Youth Institute should be created. At the same time, advisory councils should be set up as instruments and mechanisms for citizen participation in the decisions most vital to the country's destiny.
- At the legislative level, a Single Political Chamber should be established with one-third of its seats to be contested per election, and National Economic Congress should be established.
- At the level of Public Administration, a code of procedure is needed with guarantees for career administrators. This should include establishment of an integrated pay scale to correct existing salary distortions. Power should be decentralized and dispersed to regional and municipal governments.

c. With regard to the economic crisis and the social problem:

The current situation requires that two clearly defined and intimately linked programs be put into operation. One is a stabilization program to rectify imbalances in the economy. It should operate within the framework of a program of structural reforms seeking solutions to deep-seated problems in the domestic economy. The stabilization program must: combat inflation; reactivate productive capacity; and generate jobs and create conditions favorable to private investment without further declines in lower-class living standards. A parallel social emergency program must also be set in motion and be geared exclusively to the sectors where poverty is greatest and the situation is critical.

The problem of structural reform must be geared to transforming productive capacity and reorienting the economy. It must take into account the downsizing of public sector business ventures and tax reform. At the same time, there is a need for a program for the country's most depressed and neglected areas.

Results

The magnitude of the crisis, the size of the problems in need of solutions, and the correlation among existing political forces demonstrate that no proposal is viable without consensus and the participation of all the players and actors on the national scene. The major structural changes require legislative approval, and both these and the changes of policy direction must have a solid and consistent base of popular support. Thus policies and measures adopted during the first days and months are fundamental if there are to be noticeable results in the first two years. This makes it urgent and necessary that the ruling class have the maturity to understand that the present is a time demanding the will and determination to forge agreements, not further to confront and antagonize the country. With nationwide consensus we will be able to achieve satisfactory results and see light at the end of the tunnel. Without nationwide consensus the country could turn out to be nonviable, and this would open the door to all sorts of extremism.

Javier Iguiniz

"The government must be deprivatized"

Born in Spain. Iguiniz is an engineer and economist educated in the United States. He is a Catholic activist and within the IU [United Left] is a member of MAS [Social Action Movement]. A professor at the Catholic University, he has headed the Commission on a Plan of Government for the leftist front for several years. He works at Desco [Center for Development Studies and Promotion].

Problems

a. Poverty and the lack of opportunity for economic progress in Peru. This situation is attributable in large part to two factors whose combined effect make the Peruvian economy one of the hardest to manage in the world.

The first is the enormous disparity among the incomes Peruvian families receive. It is the kind of disparity that occurs in countries that are ethnically or regionally segregated. This situation is the main reason for the disparity of opportunities among Peruvians. The second factor is the large drop in private investment. Domestic investors must collectively share responsibility with administrations present and past for not regarding Peru as a place for capital accumulation and growth. This is why the problem isn't "privatization or nationalization" but "new investment" whatever its source.

b. Lack of a democratic national government. Generally speaking, the Peruvian Government has not been a tool for the transfer of wealth based on the quality of natural resources and guarantees for private privilege. It has been the alibi for income distribution but neither the builder nor the product of a sturdy society. It has been and continues to be government by private intervention and without bureaucracy. That is, there has been no class of public servants whose interests are roughly similar to those of the government and which is in a position to promote those interests. Even for public officials it remains a government that redistributes resources. It is necessary to "reprivatize the government."

c. Political-military violence and citizen insecurity. The people are effectively caught between two fires, and their most basic rights as citizens are left unprotected. Increasingly, security and peace are parcelled out according to the ability of individuals to pay, and whatever means achieves them is seen as justified.

Measures

a. Gradual decontrol of prices to eliminate the need for the kind of liberal avalanche or "shock" that typically ravages the unprotected and, as happens in our avalanches, leaves them without timely or adequate compensation. To this end, IU would start to govern in April, not July. It would issue the orders needed to prepare for and encourage: immediate increases in the supply of farm, fish, and cattle products; output of goods for government use and for export; and, above all, a shopping basket of emergency commodities to be made available for a guaranteed cost while price controls are being lifted.

This decontrol includes eliminating a great many subsidies, reorienting others, massive use of labor in crop cultivation and public sanitation, and indexing of wages and interest rates. Additionally, over the long term, plans will be made to decentralize resources for use by regional governments, and minimum conditions will be discussed and established for signing long-range contracts with foreign capital in such critical categories as Camisea gas and others.

b. Moral and administrative purge of critical governmental sectors. Initial emphasis will be on matters concerning foreign trade, government purchases and sales, and the banking industry. A concerted planning effort and a tax reform will begin. A principal aspect of this policy will be the presence of users in public decisionmaking.

c. Generalized mass participation in self-defense efforts. The task of organizing the population throughout the Republic will be fundamental but will be accompanied by other ideological, political, and military initiatives.

Results

In two years we expect to have inflation steadily decreasing with real wages and the domestic market gradually expanding. These effects should extend to some sectors beyond those that will be the main focus of decontrol.

Experience with reform in government will be applied to other sectors, and decentralization of resources to regions will continue. Most of the nation's territory and population will have made major advances in terms of personal security, protection of property, and civil rights.

Venezuela

Government Agrees to Alliance With Opposition

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[Text] Caracas, 13 Feb (EFE)—Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez and his Democratic Action Party (AD) last night approved the formation of an alliance government with opposition parties to guarantee the approval of government laws and plans by parliament.

According to reports from AD sources today, the plan is to incorporate the center-right New Democratic Generation (NGD) Party and, possibly, the center-left Movement Toward Socialism (MAS).

Last week AD Secretary General Humberto Celli publicly proposed a government coalition with opposition parties. Nevertheless, Perez categorically refuted Celli's statements, saying that a coalition government had never been proposed.

Perez later changed his position and accepted the formation of an "alliance," but not a "coalition" government, in response to which Celli pointed out that even though the two words can be interpreted differently, "in essence, they mean the same thing."

The agreement between the AD and President Perez for the formation of a government alliance consists of creating a ministry to struggle against drug trafficking, which will be offered to the NGD.

AD and Perez also want to incorporate the MAS into the government, and to this end, the president is meeting today with the leaders of that party which, since the 1988 elections, has been the third strongest political force in the country.

The second leading party in Venezuela is the Social Christian Party (COPEI), which, according to its leaders, will continue to oppose the current government.

The alliance between the AD, MAS, and NGD will garner the votes needed to approve the Investments Plan and the eighth national plan at the extraordinary congressional sessions that are scheduled to begin on 14 February.